

America, the EU and Strategic Culture

At last a study that sets contemporary European security and the European Union in its broader transatlantic context.

Professor Michael Cox, *London School of Economics*

Toje's book provides a clear-headed, solid assessment of America's continued influence – for better or worse – on the community-building process in Europe.

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Asle Toje has indeed fulfilled a much needed niche in the study of European Security and transatlantic relations ... one of the few enjoyable reads on the subject of European security in recent years.

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Well researched and very readable.

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The book challenges established orthodoxy regarding the *sui generis* nature of the European Union. Through detailed case studies, it shows how the US influenced decisions during the formative years of the EU foreign and security policy: during the 1999 Kosovo war, the EU and NATO enlargement processes, and the 2003 Iraq crisis. However, the book argues that although policy ends may be defined by the US, the EU is growing increasingly confident in selecting distinctively “European” means to achieve these goals. These findings have important implications for understanding both the EU as a foreign policy actor and of the EU–US partnership at the start of the twenty-first century.

This book will be of interest to students of transatlantic security, EU politics, contemporary history and US foreign policy, as well as students of IR in general.

Asle Toje is a Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. He has a PhD in International Relations from Pembroke College, Cambridge.

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Renegotiating the transatlantic bargain

Asle Toje

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Preface

To the person who has written a book, the pages carry meanings beyond those of the words – somewhat like a secret memoir. A section about the nature of influence brings me back to an autumn afternoon in my office at Ludwigkirchplatz in Berlin, the inner courtyard strewn with bright yellow leaves; a passage about EU enlargement brings me back to the night train out of Brussels typing up my interview notes; a detail from the Rambouillet conference on Kosovo reminds me of my cramped New York apartment on East 14th street as summer arrived with sweltering heat. I also remember when I decided on the topic of this book, walking down a gravel path in Cambridge, and suddenly thinking “That’s it”. My mind is capable of forgetting the most trivial things, but I can remember where I was when I wrote most of the parts of this book.

Several institutions have provided invaluable support in the writing process. I wish to thank the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin, the Institute for the Study of Europe at Columbia University in New York and the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique in Paris for their support and facilities. For funding, I am grateful to the Fulbright Foundation, the University Association for Contemporary European Studies, the Ruhrgas Foundation, the Royal Norwegian Science Academy and the Research Council of Norway. I should also like to register my gratitude to the staff at the Norwegian Nobel Institute library in Oslo, the Library of Congress in Washington, the library at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Brussels and the Fondation Nationale de Sciences Politiques in Paris, for their patience in answering my never-ending queries. Finally, Pembroke College in Cambridge always provided a safe harbour during the wandering years of my doctorate.

One of the paradoxes of the age of Internet research, the growth of a political scholar class and of compulsive record keeping, is that writing about the past has become increasingly difficult. While the challenge of the scholar is to uncover contemporary material, when writing about contemporary events the challenge is not to be overwhelmed by it. If the most promising young researcher were to be given three years and free access to the thousands of documents pertaining to EU-US security

relations at the turn of the century, he – or she – would likely find it difficult to know where to begin. There is simply no way of knowing what documents reflect genuine decisions and what was a show of mere intent, which reflected actual participation and which had been issued as *ex post* justifications. And what to do when the paper trail stops at the door of a meeting room where no minutes have been kept?

For this reason much of the information on which this work is based has been filtered through interviews with people who viewed events from up-close. Over 60 such interviews and exchanges have been engaged in. I would like to take the opportunity to thank all those who set time aside to speak with me and thereby directed and redirected my research. Most of these interviews were contributed on a non-attributable basis to encourage forthright and open responses. In order not to compromise agreed anonymity indirectly, interview details will not be listed in the text but can be made available upon request. Clearly, interviews are not an infallible way of gathering information. As far as possible, I have cross-checked data with primary and secondary sources, and I have indicated discrepancies wherever I have found them.

Finally, I owe special thanks to Geoffrey Edwards, a scholar and a gentleman. Many thanks also to the colleagues who have commented on this work at various stages. Needless to say, any errors of fact or judgement remain – as in life – mine alone.

Oslo, 22 August 2007

Introduction

It would seem paradoxical that 2003, the most eruptive year in transatlantic relations since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, was also a year of crisis for the European Union, by many the anticipated successor to the transatlantic alliance. Tectonic plates are shifting. The cold warriors with their strong Atlantic orientation are giving way to a new generation of Europeans who hold the idea of “Europe” with the same esteem in their belief systems that “the West” had for the Cold War generation. The debate concerning whether to promote “multipolarity” or to defend “unipolarity” is in reality a debate concerning the internal organisation of the transatlantic West.

The end of the Cold War was a moment of triumph, but also one of uncertainty for the transatlantic partners. The bipolar balance, around which the European security architecture had been constructed, collapsed. With it, the very concepts with which we had come to understand international order and disorder were challenged. “East” and “West”, the “communist” and the “free” world, were replaced by new constructs like “American hegemony”, the “Muslim world” – and an increasingly defined European Union. Unipolarity as global political order was an inherently transitional phase, and one that by 2008 is irrevocably over. At the same time we are witnessing a momentous transfer of capital and manufacturing capacity away from the transatlantic region which, combined with increased consumption, are driving the Asian challengers faster, higher, stronger. With the costly failed US occupation of Iraq and the equally deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, this is a time to take stock of the post-Cold War transatlantic bargain, whether we want to or not.

Will the transatlantic bargain endure in the absence of a shared enemy? During the 1990s, the United States of America (US) and the European Union (EU) had emerged as primary forces in European politics – one, unrivalled in all the traditional benchmarks of power; the other, with all the characteristics of a giant, except the outward trappings of power. As new states were invited into the transatlantic security architecture, the US appeared to be redefining its role in European security. In a parallel development, the members of the EU moved

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towards framing an autonomous European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) within the existing framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

So far, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the security politics between the EU and the United States. This work intends to help fill this gap by exploring the interactions between the two actors over three of the most discussed foreign policy questions after the end of the Cold War. There are three basic aims: one, to explore the role played by the US in shaping EU security policies; two, to examine the techniques used by America seeking to influence its European partners; and three, to assess how the tides of power and influence in the transatlantic bargain have shaped EU strategic culture. This study is among the first detailed assessments of US policies towards the European Union, from the Saint Malo Declaration (1998) which launched the EU's security and defence dimension to the completion of the EU and NATO enlargement processes in 2004.

Analysis and prescription

It has been common to claim that the primary factors shaping European Union foreign policies are internal characteristics such as capabilities, decision-making procedures and institutional frameworks. Due to its unique multilateral architecture less attention has to date been paid to external pressures in foreign policy matters than is usually the case in state-centric analysis. Policymakers have, one must hasten to add, actively encouraged this perspective. The same has been the case with academics, who generally find the multidimensional, fragmented nature of EU policy-making sufficiently challenging, without adding external actors into the scope of analysis.

While most agree that it is difficult to overemphasise the importance of the American role in shaping and conditioning security in Europe before 1989, many analysts tend to overlook America's impact on EU security policy cooperation after the Cold War. This could perhaps seem reasonable considering the manner in which the EU has constructed its security dimension. From the launch of the CFSP, European foreign policy cooperation has been marked by meticulous incrementalism. This perception has been strengthened by the US not developing firm institutional bindings with the EU, choosing instead to manage its security relations with Europe primarily through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The claim put forward in this study is that the US exerted significant influence on the way in which EU security policies were shaped during the period, 1998–2004. The study is centred on three case studies, the Kosovo conflict (1999), the EU and NATO enlargements (1998–2004) and the Iraq crisis (2003). In addition to existing literature, the study relies on

memoirs of policymakers and public records. The backbone of this work is the more than 60 interviews conducted from 2003 to 2006, in France, Britain, Germany, the US and Brussels. All were carried out under the Chatham House Rule and all direct attributions have been explicitly agreed. The approach was broadly to carry out extensive surveys of the literature on each of the case studies, locating contentious points which were then made the main questions of the interviews. The interviewees covered the whole spectrum of specialists – from generals to politicians, from policy experts and academics to government and EU officials. Needless to say, the responses differed on some points, while they also threw up many consensual general findings.

Outline

The plan of this book is relatively straightforward. A general outline contextualising the transatlantic bargain over time is followed by three core chapters centred upon the case studies, while a concluding chapter summarises the findings in the broader context of American influence on EU security policies. Chapter 1 lays out the research question in detail, defining the key terms used in the study with an emphasis on the questions of “actorness” and strategic culture. Chapter 2 traces the history of transatlantic security cooperation with an emphasis on the dual security bargain underpinning American engagement in European security and the emergence of a European Union strategic culture. Chapter 3 examines the Kosovo war (1999) in the context of US–EU relations. Emphasis is placed on the contested questions that the crisis triggered between the US and the EU under three broad headings corresponding to phases in EU policies: sanctions and incentives; coercive diplomacy and imposed settlement; and air strikes and ground troops.

Chapter 4 examines the extent to which the US influenced European policies over the dual enlargement of NATO and the EU with an emphasis on three contested policy areas: the question of sequencing – which organisation should enlarge first and which countries should be offered membership; the question of financing – how were the costs and burdens of enlargement to be split; and finally, the question of primacy – which actor should reside at the centre of the security architecture in Europe. Chapter 5 studies the 2003 Iraq crisis and its impact on the transatlantic bargain and EU strategic culture. In the chapter, American influence over EU policies is examined through the prism of three key terms found in the EU and US security strategies: failed states, preventive engagement and effective multilateralism.

In the conclusion the extent and nature of American influence is assessed and linked to the transatlantic bargain and the emerging EU strategic culture. While the primary focus of this work is on American influence on European Union security policies, its interests also transcend this

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field of research. Any explanation of US policies also casts light on policy and policy-making in the EU, and the broader European security architecture. In examining the American *Europapolitik* – the policies and attitudes to the European Union – the work also helps in improving our understanding of the end of the post-Cold War era.

1 Understanding transatlantic relations

Some definitions

In order to embark in an orderly fashion this chapter will lay out some of the core concepts and assumptions that underpin this study. This work argues that the United States exerted significant influence on the European Union security policies during the formative years, 1998–2004. Hardly a revolutionary assertion – yet, one that is surprisingly often overlooked by EU security policy scholars. Attempts to put forward a coherent EU foreign policy have been hampered and shaped by ambiguity and inconsistency, but also by policies made in Washington, DC. This thesis is arrived at through three empirical case studies. The approach is to refine empirical findings into a more general framework in order to explain the exercise of influence in the US–EU security relationship. American theorist Jack Nagel points out three preconditions for the study of power and influence, namely to specify precisely, the time-period (i.e. from when to when?), the domain (i.e. power over whom?) and the scope (i.e. power with regard to what?).¹ This work focuses on the impact of the United States on the dependent variable, namely the EU strategic culture, by focusing on key security policies during the formative years from 1998 to 2004. Less attention will be paid to the capabilities and institutions of the European Security and Defence Policy and the future of the transatlantic link, although the work is clearly also relevant to these debates.² The criteria for the selection of the time-period and cases, that is, why certain events were chosen over others, are relatively straightforward. The 1999 Kosovo war, the 1998–2004 EU–NATO enlargements and the 2003 Iraq crisis have been chosen because they represent three momentous events in the transatlantic security partnership of the period. The disparity of these cases also helps shed light on the topic from different angles.

The Franco-British Saint Malo declaration of December 1998 marked the first beginning of the European Security and Defence Policy. The year 2004 is chosen as the second milestone not only because five years is a sufficient time span to allow for an assessment of EU security policies, but also because that year saw the completion of the dual project of enlarging

the EU and NATO. As a European Commission study on Euro-American relations concedes: “Any assessment of EU–US cooperation immediately runs into the problem of scope”, noting that “most issues are more than exclusively EU–US issues”.³ This book will not concern itself with the formal frameworks for EU–US interaction in any detail – that ground has already been covered. Nor will much attention be given to bureaucratic interplay.⁴ Instead the study will focus on Euro-American interaction over real-world security policies. An alternate approach would perhaps have been to have singled out other events such as the EU’s missions in the Balkans in the early 2000s. But this would have complicated analysis in the sense that these operations attracted little attention in Europe and the United States. Influence is, as we shall see, best observed in issues where each actor has a stake – defined preferences with regard to outcomes, as is the case in the three chosen case studies. The three cases being spread out in time allows for monitoring diachronic change as well as the American techniques of influencing and the circumstances under which the EU proved more, and less, susceptible to influence.

American foreign policy

Before discussing the boundaries of this study in greater detail, it may be helpful to clarify what is meant by “significant American influence on EU security policies”. How to analyse the relationship between the EU and the US? The connection is characterised by a lack of institutional bindings and formal channels of communications. This is by mutual preference. The US prefers to see NATO as the primary arena for its security interaction with the Europeans, while EU institutions have, given the overpowering nature of the US, preferred to keep the world’s most powerful state at arm’s length. Strategic interaction has traditionally played a marginal role in overall EU–US relations, where most issues have been on a practical level. Primary contact points include the EU Commission and relevant US government agencies, on issues that fall within their competencies such as the exchange of data and biannual summits.⁵ Therefore, the first question pertains to who the primary actors are. The making of US foreign policy is a complicated and, in many ways, impenetrable process.⁶ Needless to say, the President and his Administration are key players in determining American attitudes towards the European Union. Presidential Administrations tend to place great emphasis on maintaining a unity of purpose. Adopted policies are usually defended by all members of the Administration regardless of personal leanings. The Washington process of policy formation traditionally involves the State Department, the Department of Defense, the National Security Council and an inner circle of White House advisers.

The second key player is the Congress. The Houses of Congress have real influence in foreign policy matters due to their fiscal powers over the

federal budgets. By controlling the government's "purse", Congress can regulate the President's level of ambition abroad. Once Congress is asked for specific or additional funding for a foreign policy issue, the question is introduced into US domestic politics. Congressional votes tend to fall along party, electoral and moral lines. Given the crucial constitutional roles of the Senate in the ratification of treaties and the House of Representatives in legislating funding for government programmes, the Houses of Congress have a tradition of overseeing and shaping transatlantic security policies. The role of the Congress is strengthened by the tendency of Presidents to use foreign policies for domestic, political gain which, in turn, leads to the "domestication of foreign policy". In addition, foreign policy lobbies and advocacy groups play a highly visible role in US foreign policy debate.

The making of EU security policies

This is not the place for any detailed account of the intricacies of EU security policy-making – that has been done in great detail elsewhere.⁷ I will instead limit myself to a few general observations. The first question one needs to ask oneself is: What are "security policies" in an EU context? It would have been considerably easier to pinpoint only two decades ago, when most readers would have had an instinctive understanding of this term.⁸ Security policies were then limited to what was called "high politics" – the diplomatic and military defence against a single and existential threat represented by the Soviet Union – or (for the member states in Eastern and Central Europe) the United States. The end of the Cold War saw a fundamental rethinking on the nature of security, with less emphasis being placed on military security, and more on non-military aspects.

As we shall examine more closely in the next chapter, the ESDP is a true-born child of the post-Cold War era. Potentially it covers a wide range of policy areas – from long-term development assistance to crisis management and military intervention with a correspondingly wide range of policy instruments. Security policy is therefore, for our purpose, defined in terms of scope – issues that are a matter of strategy. Paul Kennedy defines strategy as the endeavour to reconcile the ends and means by powers with extensive interests and obligations.⁹ This concerns the exercise of the "hard power" that stems from military and economic means. Hard power is a means of direct influence and describes an actor's ability to coerce, induce or resist attempts at such. These were the areas the CFSP/ESDP nexus was meant to improve. The term "EU security policies" refers to policy guidelines and positions agreed upon within the EU framework which will be examined more closely in the three case studies.

With regard to decision-making, it is important to keep in mind that the EU is not a strong, centralised federation like the US, but is rather a weak federation with a fragmented centre. Examining influence in the

context of EU foreign policy is more difficult than analysing the foreign policies of any single member state. For better or for worse the EU is a *sui generis* organisation. For reasons we shall examine in greater detail in the next chapter, the CFSP is frequently not a *common* policy in the sense indicated in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU). It is a coordination mechanism in which input from the EU institutions feed in alongside those of the member states. The member states pursue their parallel national foreign policies and maintain control over the fiscal, military and diplomatic resources that are to be mobilised in the context of the EU. The EU is therefore not in a position to interact wholly and deliberately with other international actors such as the United States.

The institutional structures governing EU foreign and security policy are dissimilar from their nation-state counterparts. In pluralistic democracies, power and legitimacy is transmitted bottom-up through the democratic process. The EU foreign policy institutions cannot claim a similar democratic legitimacy. This limits the mandate of the EU policy-makers but it also insulates them from public opinion and electoral politics. The EU Commission is dependent on the member states with whom it shares the right of initiative. The member states figure more prominently in the forward-looking, or strategic, elements of the EU foreign policy-making process that is characterised by intergovernmental bargaining. For this purpose, the Union from 1998 to 2004, pooled power resources and devised processes to mobilise and deploy these resources. Foreign and security policies are not integral parts of the EU – in the sense that the CFSP/ESDP nexus has been singled out in a separate “pillar” uneasily tacked on to the European Communities.¹⁰ The European Council defines the principles and general guidelines for the CFSP, of which the ESDP is considered a major element, as well as common strategies to be implemented by the EU. In Pillar II, the EU has embraced unanimity, that is, in principle, each of the 27 members have an absolute veto over any policy.¹¹ Of course, as Simon Nuttall has observed, “the system does not operate under a perpetual threat of veto”.¹² CFSP decisions are therefore generally made by consensus, which normally is arrived at through carefully crafted ambiguities, consensus building and horse trading.¹³

Karen Smith rightly notes that it is usual for analysts to see EU foreign policies as being dominated by élites in national foreign ministries.¹⁴ Yet Michael Smith is also correct in pointing out:

it is evident that there is an intimate linkage between the internal development of the EU and its institutions and the broader European order, which is not solely attributable to the interests, power or policies of major European states. Whilst some analysts have emphasised this connection, it is doubtful whether it can be accounted for simply within an inter-state or inter-governmental framework.¹⁵

Although the member states are important, it is important not to underestimate two other structures, notably the “Troika” (which comprises the holder of the rotating EU Presidency alongside the Commissioner for External Relations and the High Representative for the CFSP)¹⁶ and informal directorates, notably the “EU-3”, which comprises Germany, France and Britain, whose importance cannot be overestimated. In the EU process, the importance of individual actors clearly varies, albeit perhaps not in the ways one might expect, as we shall see in the case studies.

Although decision-making by consensus certainly limits policy output, the EU states have generated a cumulative body of common foreign and security policies characterised by common positions and joint actions. For all its shortcomings, the CFSP has brought about a sea-change in the practice and ambiance of foreign policy-making. This is due not least to the fact that the *modus operandi* of voluntary security, combined with the ineffective decision-making mechanism, have proven fertile ground for “bureaucratic politics”, where the HR-CFSP, and Council and Commission staff play essential roles in formulating EU foreign and security policies. In an interview, a Council Official stated: “We are charged with identifying the issue areas where there is an overlap in terms of means and ends among the member states.” She later went on to say, “Alongside the rotating presidency it is our job to play the role of the honest broker.” Through a blend of incrementalism and pragmatism, the CFSP staff has played an important, if not widely acknowledged, role in setting the EU security agenda. This is the primary reason why EU foreign policies do not represent the lowest common denominator, but rather a median of the range of national views.¹⁷

A question of actorness

The EU wears confidence and insecurity in equal measure. After the Cold War, the Union was widely expected to play a leading role in the new European political and security order. The EU foreign policy élites increasingly took to referring to the EU – in that familiar jargon that conceals and at the same time highlights shortcomings – as a “global actor”.¹⁸ The High Representative of the CFSP summarised the rationale:

Indeed we are a global actor. With 25 member states, with over 450 million inhabitants, a quarter of the world’s GNP, and around 40 per cent of the world merchandise exports; and with the comprehensive array of instruments – economic, legal, diplomatic, military – at our disposal, that claim is not an aspiration but a statement of fact.¹⁹

The question of actorness is of importance because it alludes to the EU’s aspiration to become what in international relations jargon is called a *power*. David Allen and Michael Smith note that such a presence refers to

the ability to exert influence, to shape the perceptions and expectations of others.²⁰ Wolfgang Wessels makes this point clearer still, when he points out that the term “global actor” is usually taken to refer “to a state that is endowed with the traditional attributes of a large power, or even a super power”.²¹

For decades foreign policy integration under the European Political Cooperation (EPC) seemed to be of somewhat greater consequence in academic writings than in real-world affairs. Early European foreign policy studies fell, broadly speaking, into a theory-building branch – a heterogeneous tradition with few agreed fundamentals – and one branch seeking insights from case studies and empirical analysis. Both traditions justified their approach with reference to the uniqueness of the object of study, that is, the multi-purpose, multi-dimensional, semi-supranational, semi-intergovernmental character of European integration.²² What the two schools did agree on was that there are other constraints placed on Brussels than on sovereign states, which renders state-centric analytical tools surplus to requirements. While a *sui generis* perspective helps explain why the EC – and later the EU – has fallen short of fielding anywhere near the sum total of the member states’ weight in terms of foreign policies, it also tends to invalidate comparative analysis – which renders success and failure matters of subjective taste. This is especially so, when the theoretical fad of constructionism has led many analysts to attempt to speak a strategic EU into existence by actively overstating the progress made. In the 1990s the debate centred on the questions of whether “actorness” can be bestowed on an entity that lacks a self-contained decision-making system and the practical capabilities to affect policy, and whether there is such a thing as “partial actorness”.²³

Christopher Hill asserts that “true actorness” requires “a clear identity and a self-contained decision making system” as well as the “practical capabilities to affect policy”.²⁴ In other words, the development of actorness can be seen as a process that comprises three interconnected dimensions: *presence*, *opportunity* and *capability*. While *presence* alludes to the relationship between the internal developments and third-party expectations of the EU’s role in global affairs, *opportunity* refers to factors in the external environment which enable or limit deliberate action. Finally, *capability* refers to the capacity to formulate and carry out foreign and security policies, both in terms of proactive policies and in responding effectively to external events, expectations and opportunities. Most commentators will agree that the EU did not meet this strict definition of actorness in 1998 – nor did it do so in 2004, or 2008 for that matter.

The question is whether such a strict definition is still relevant – or is it a measurement of the past, not of the present and the future? David Allen and Michael Smith point out that: “the notion of a ‘foreign policy’ carries with it a conceptual framework which is inseparable from the state-centric view of world politics”.²⁵ Here, they hint at Max Weber’s monopoly on the

legitimate use of physical force as an essential attribute of sovereignty, and in the extension of this – actorness. It is not coincidental that this notion of actorness has been challenged in much the same way that sovereignty has been tested by new actors performing roles previously played by nation-states in post-Cold War international relations. Michael Smith asserts that foreign policy actions “with meaning and effect” can stem from a variety of sources, including non-state actors.²⁶ The logic is that since the very idea of actorness stems from the nation-state, when the nation-state is transformed, so must the notion of actorness.

In a widely cited definition, Gunnar Sjöstedt defines an international actor as one that is delimited from others and its environment; autonomous, in the sense of making its own laws and decisions; possesses certain structural prerequisites for action on the international level such as a legal personality and a set of diplomatic agents, and the capability to conduct negotiations with third parties; and has the capacity for goal-orientated behaviour towards other international actors.²⁷ Other scholars have pointed out that the EU’s international performance is increasingly defined by multi-level governance, making the question of “actorness” dependent on the level of governance.²⁸ Magnus Ekengren and Kjell Engelbrekt note that EU actorness can also be derived from two sets of circumstances, namely that a mandate has either been delegated to an “agent” (such as the EU Commission) or that it arises from a substantive understanding among the “principals” (for example by declaring: “A common foreign and security policy is hereby established”).²⁹

The obvious problem with Sjöstedt’s definition of actorness is that it is self-serving in the sense that it is tailored for the EC/EU. The unwillingness to hold the EU to some of the same yardsticks as states is disingenuous. After all, the EU operates in an international system constructed by and inhabited by states. As Hedley Bull noted: “the power or influence exerted by the European Community and other such civilian actors was conditional upon a strategic environment provided by the military power of states, which they did not control”.³⁰ The CFSP/ESDP nexus has been constructed on the understanding that if the EU is to be an effective force in international affairs it would need to control credible power tools. For that reason this study will rely on Christopher Hill’s definition of “true actorness” (i.e. clear identity and a self-contained decision-making system, and the practical capabilities to effect policy). At the same time, it remains clear that none of these criteria are absolutes. Actorness will therefore be treated not as a static concept, but rather as a yardstick by which the process of change in EU foreign policy can be monitored.

What this definition does not do is capture the fluidity of the EU actorness – that *potential* power that often lies dormant but by virtue of the frameworks and capabilities in place must be taken seriously. Emphasis will be placed upon the EU’s presence vis-à-vis the United States. Jack Nagel notes that “actorness” “refers to an individual, group, organization

or other collectivity. In social power relations, the outcome must be a variable indicating the state of another social entity – the behaviour, beliefs, attitudes, or policies of a second actor.”³¹ In other words, actorness is to no small degree constituted by the ability to influence other actors – and the ability to resist attempts at such. This is an important point. The case studies selected illustrate specific EU policies and American influence on these policies. Experiences influence the manner in which new challenges are met. In this work, the “outcome” will be treated under the heading “EU strategic culture”.³²

Power and influence

Saint Augustine once said about *time* that we all know perfectly well what it is, until someone asks us to define it. Arguably the case is much the same with *power*. Most attempts at definition start off with Bertrand Russell’s 60-year-old formulation, “power is the production of intended effects”.³³ One might add, as Jack Nagel does, the qualification that there must be a causal link between preferences and outcome.³⁴ According to David Baldwin, *influence* is a form of communication or action intended to persuade a second party to change behaviour or priorities. The dependent variable in most studies on influence is the outcome of the attempts at influencing.³⁵ While power in international relations research is seen primarily as a resource, influence is the active ingredient – the ability to make an actor do something it otherwise would not do. Or as Madeleine Albright put it:

The purpose of foreign policy is to influence the policies and actions of other nations in a way that serves your interests and values. The tools available include everything from kind words to cruise missiles. Mixing them properly and with sufficient patience is the art of diplomacy.³⁶

All these definitions have two main components, namely, the sources and effects of influence. The ability to exert influence depends on the resources that can be mobilised. Resources vary in relevance. A given capability – military, economic or diplomatic – might be essential in one situation yet nearly irrelevant in another. Resources translate into influence only if they can be mobilised for political purposes. Susan Strange defines power in terms of setting the rules: “The power to decide how things shall be done, the power to shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, relate to people or relate to corporate enterprises.”³⁷ She identifies four primary power structures: security, knowledge, production and finance. An additional fifth structure that has been given much attention over the past decade stems from shared values and perceptions in what Joseph Nye calls “soft power”, which translates into “the power to

make the other want the same as yourself" by acting as a model or example.³⁸ Any quantitative assessment will show that America outpaces all other international actors in the traditional measures of power, be it in terms of economy, military capabilities or technology. Such assessments would also show that if the EU were to mobilise its resources as a whole the US would find its primacy challenged in all these areas.

How do the potential power of the EU and the substantial power of the US impact on US–EU relations? This is one of the questions that this study seeks to answer. The exertion of influence has its own characteristics and dynamics that are often more clearly discernible – or public – among unfriendly states than among friends and allies. Starting on a basic level, the instruments of foreign policy are usually grouped under the broad headings of diplomatic bargaining, persuasion, economic rewards and coercion, armed coercion and military intervention. Friendly states tend to interact at the lower end of this scale and adversaries tend towards the upper end. While the former emphasise persuasion and cooperation, the latter more frequently operate through deterrence and coercion. Although there have been many disputes across the Atlantic, relations have, by and large, remained strong and cordial. Interactions between the EU and the US take place directly and indirectly in a great many arenas. Perhaps for this reason, the transatlantic relationship is defined by a general will to solve disagreements through deliberation and compromise. The case studies will give us a clearer idea of how exactly this is done.

Studying influence is more complicated than one would imagine, given the persistent challenges of anticipated reaction and deception.³⁹ The problem with early attempts at conceptualising inter-state influence was, as pointed out by David Baldwin, that they generally failed to explain outcomes and focused exclusively on intent, or what Baldwin calls "undertakings".⁴⁰ Jack Nagel presents a solution to these conceptual problems. He operationalises outcomes as: (1) selection of events to observe, (2) determination of the actors at each event, (3) choice of the measure of the possible states, and (4) observation of which measure actually occurs.⁴¹ In his book, Nagel devises an ideal approach for dealing with a fragmented security actor such as the EU. The essential variables for which data must be identified are preferences and outcomes. By linking the two, Nagel bases his model on Herbert Simon's model of causality.⁴² From this, it follows that for the study of influence it is not essential to spend much time grappling with how and when EU policies came about; instead, in our context it is more expedient to simply focus on stated preferences and outcomes.

This leads us to measurable indications that influence has been "significant". Clearly, among friendly states, some attempts at exerting influence are more successful than others. For American influence to be "significant", there has to be a change in EU policy that can be traced to US pressure and that cannot be fully explained by other factors.⁴³ The

case studies selected offer three alternative “lenses” through which Euro-American interaction can be observed. A great many factors influence policy. Monocausal phenomena are exceedingly rare in international relations. Therefore, the influence of the US will have to be weighed against other factors that shape EU security policies. The US can be said to have exerted “significant” influence only if alternative accounts of the evolution of EU policies are less plausible or convincing. So how do we assess whether an attempt to influence has been successful or not? The questions of quantification and verification are among the dilemmas of international relations research. The methodological difficulty in how to isolate the relative strength of one factor when more than one factor is pulling in the same direction is a constant challenge. Also, deception is in the nature of influence. There can be a number of reasons why both the influencing and influenced parties might desire to disguise the fact that pressure has been applied. The state that seeks to influence is often wise not to twist arms too publicly – just as actors that are being influenced often do not wish to be seen to be so. Like most important dimensions of international politics, the nature of influence does not lend itself to quantification. Therefore, the study of influence relies on the researcher to select the relevant facts from a potentially endless universe of data. In this study, American influence on EU security policies is seen to have four components:⁴⁴

- the EU common position, or statement made on behalf of the EU, has been formulated on the issue at hand;
- there is an initial disagreement between the US and one of the leading EU member states or EU foreign policy chiefs over how a security challenge should be handled;
- American demands or preferences are communicated explicitly either through official channels or through reliable unofficial channels;
- the outcome of the EU policy process is close to the signalled US position and this policy change cannot be more plausibly explained by other factors.

As Raymond Aron points out in his famous essay on the pitfalls of international relations research, even states – the principal actors in international affairs – “cannot be endowed with a single aim”.⁴⁵ I refer to “America” and “Washington”, or to “France” and “Paris” – and “Brussels” – although I am aware that neither the nation-states nor the EU are necessarily unitary actors. When used, the terms refer to government policy and or the dominant views among élites, or when a common policy unites the EU as a bloc. For the present purpose, it suffices to see preferences and policies communicated under an EU heading – from the Commission, the Council, the HR-CFSP or the rotating EU Presidency – as EU policies. The aim is to provide an accurate account of American influence

on EU post-Cold War security policies in three specific cases during the period, 1998–2004. The aim is not to confirm or falsify more fundamental assumptions about the international system, the future orbits of the EU and NATO, or the likelihood of success or failure of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. We have already visited the ever-contentious issue of whether the EU can be said to be an actor in its own right. My answer is that what the EU “really” is or isn’t is of little importance; so long as the EU sees itself as a foreign policy actor, analysing it as such is valid; as long as the EU continues to raise the expectation that it indeed is an actor, then that is what it should be treated as.

Strategic culture as an analytical tool

Since first being introduced by Jack Snyder in a 1977 research report on Soviet and American nuclear strategies, the term “strategic culture” has grown to become an integral part of the international relations jargon. Snyder defines strategic culture as “the sum total of ideals, conditional emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of the national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to [nuclear] strategy”.⁴⁶ Colin S. Gray was among the first to dignify and elevate this observation to the level of principle. He defines strategic culture more broadly as “modes of thought and action with respect to [force], derived from perception of national historical experience, aspiration for self-characterization, and from state-distinctive experiences”.⁴⁷ Generated at the crossroads of history, capabilities, geopolitics and values, strategic culture is an aggregate level of the most influential voices in terms of attitudes and behaviours. It indicates but does not determine what is expected of an actor, what the alternatives are or what courses of action are deemed possible.

A pliable term, strategic culture straddles seemingly irreconcilable entities. Traditionally, “strategy” refers to how hard power can be applied to reach political ends. The stress on politics as the source of the objectives of strategy indicates that we are not talking about indulging in strategic acts for their own sake. Most scholars seem to agree that strategic culture consists of a behavioural factor that can be traced in actual policy conduct and a more subtle cultural factor that comprises stated and implicit expressions of ideas, expectations, values and attitudes. The question is: How are the two interrelated? Ann Swindler sees culture as the “tool kit” that enables actors to form strategies of action.⁴⁸ She sees the significance of culture not in the defining of ends of action, but in providing the cultural components that are used to construct strategies of action.⁴⁹

The cultural and behavioural elements of the term have been the topic of some debate.⁵⁰ John March and Johan P. Olsen point out how the “resurgence of sub-state and supranational identities have renewed

interest in concepts like culture and identity as fundamental to the understanding of international relations".⁵¹ Ronald Jefferson, Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein see culture as "a set of evaluative standards, such as norms or values, and cognitive standards, such as rules or models defining what entities and actors exist in a system and how they operate and inter-relate".⁵² Of course, strategic culture does not exist isolated from real-world capabilities. After all, without credible capabilities any talk of strategy would be a largely theoretical exercise. Capabilities need not be used or even mentioned, but they must be credible. That said, in the presence of similar capabilities, different actors can act differently. Geopolitics, values and historical experience clearly play important roles in shaping strategic culture.⁵³

As Colin S. Gray argues, "all strategic behaviour is affected by humans who cannot help but be cultural agents".⁵⁴ If people share world-views and values, they are more likely to cooperate effectively. Culture is a context that, if integrated and coordinated, can help actors overcome even serious obstacles to cooperation; conversely, culture can be the determining source of strategic incoherence. Strategic culture is often used to explain what constrains strategic actors from making certain types of decisions. Studying action as well as discourse makes it possible to take account of the issues to which the actors are reacting as well as the impact of experience on their policies. One might argue that the formation process begins when policy élites accept that using hard power is nothing but "a continuation of politics by other means", to rephrase von Clausewitz' adage. By this, it is understood that military and economic rewards and coercion are means of pursuing political goals. David Vital rightly emphasises that an important criterion for measuring the strength or weakness of an actor is "the capacity [...] to withstand stress on the one hand and its ability to pursue a policy of its own devising, on the other".⁵⁵

In order to place this work in the strategic culture research canon, it may be helpful to trace some of the main milestones in the tradition. As strategic culture entered the international relations dictionary, Snyder's and Gray's definitions drew criticism for mixing the dependent and independent variables by taking behavioural elements into the concept.⁵⁶ According to Alistair Iain Johnston the conceptual debate on strategic culture has arrived in three sets, separated in time and emphasis. The introduction of the term was part of a reaction seen in the late 1970s against the primacy of game theory and rational actor models in strategic studies. The critique brought about a shift towards a diachronic, narrative-orientated approach where the past is seen to influence the present and the future. Early strategic culture scholars were for the most part narrowly concerned with the superpower–nuclear strategy nexus. To Johnston, the strength of the first generation lies in their predictive and explanatory power. If strategic cultures evolve gradually and permeate all levels of security policy from war and peace issues to geopolitics, then strategic

culture is clearly a helpful concept for scholars and decision-makers when analysing strategic behaviour. Johnston saw the main weakness of the first generation to be “a mechanical determinism” concerning the relation between culture and behaviour, which makes it difficult to evaluate the causal relevance of strategic culture.⁵⁷

During the 1980s, focus of the debate shifted from cultural predispositions and restraints to the analysis of manifest, communicated security doctrine, seeking to decipher “coded messages” in the strategic studies discourse. What Johnston calls the “second generation” of strategic culture theories made a clear distinction between strategic culture and behaviour, as well as between declaratory and uncommunicated doctrine. Bradley Klein, for one, focused on a perceived gap between rhetoric and intent, claiming that the defensive nature of US military doctrine was a decoy, aimed at providing a rationale for America’s strategic posture, while the “real” strategy was far more sinister and concerned with willingness to employ force in defence of hegemony.⁵⁸ While the distinction between declaratory and real doctrine arguably helps avoid some of the pitfalls of the first-generation theories, it again raised questions about the nature of the relationship between culture and behaviour, which had so far been left ambiguous. How to avoid chasing the red herring of declaratory doctrine as opposed to the “genuine” implicit doctrine – how to avoid the tendency of the scientist to “discover” whatever he or she presupposes?

A new batch of strategic culture studies arrived in the early 1990s. The third wave sought a more “rigorous” approach to the topic by tightening the definition. Alastair Iain Johnston sees himself as part of this third generation, which has attempted to make the concept of strategic culture “falsifiable” in a near-positivist sense. Johnston argues that strategic culture consists of assumptions about “the role of war in human affairs” and “the efficacy of the use of force” and appears in the form of a “limited, ranked set of grand-strategic preferences over actions that are consistent across the objects of analysis and persistent across time”.⁵⁹ This is achieved by cordoning off behaviour from “strategic culture” and treating the former as the dependent variable and the latter as the independent variable. This essentially cultural explanation of behaviour was sought to be rigorously tested by pitting it against alternative explanations, such as realist and liberal accounts. Jeffrey Legro is one example of those who use this approach.⁶⁰ Johnston’s persistent and consistent ranked set of strategic preferences are not seen to be responsive to changes in non-cultural variables, such as technology, threat or organisation.⁶¹ By making the assertion that culture appears in the form of measurable preference ranking and behaviour, Johnston argues that this makes his definition falsifiable: in the sense that strategic culture is persistent if preference ranking is persistent; and that the strength of a strategic culture is indicated by the

degree of correlation between ranked strategic preferences and displayed strategic behaviour.

At the turn of the century questions with regard to the durability of a unipolar order and the emergence of new actors, notably the European Union and China, led to renewed interest in the concept.⁶² A “fourth generation” – to continue with Johnston’s terminology – has cultivated a rich flora of strategic culture research. Different academics often apply very different conceptions of the term. This is one reason why, despite the steady flow of books and articles, there is little cumulative research tradition to speak of. Colin S. Gray warned that invoking cultural differences should be an explanation of last resort in social science.⁶³ Culture can be used to black-box phenomena that can be explained in reference to measurable variables. For example, that a militarily weak European Union takes a defensive posture, while the militarily strong United States chooses a more offensive approach, can be spun into a near-mystical connection under the label of strategic culture.⁶⁴ Differences in internal circumstances can help explain the event-driven, post-ante policy approach of the European “weak federation”, while the US “strong federation” allows for initiatives to be forced from the top.

The decidedly unenthusiastic father of the term, Jack Snyder has come out against explaining doctrine in terms of political or national culture.⁶⁵ He warns against reducing social science to pointing out inter-actor differences and slapping a cultural explanation on them. According to Snyder, the abstract game theory’s stripped-down assumption of a universal strategic rationality delivers more in terms of predictive quality than the check for ethno-centrism and size sought by introducing strategic culture. Snyder argues that although structural variables such as capability constraints clearly must be taken into consideration, it is also certain that there are distinctive ways of strategic thinking and behaviour that cannot be explained by rational actor-models, comparative advantage, technological imperatives and so on. Kenneth Booth asserts that decision-making cannot exist independently of cultural context since past experience shapes strategic behaviour. Booth also offers a timely reminder that cultural explanations do not exclude other explanations. Rather, time-tested models can be improved upon by taking on a cultural dimension.⁶⁶ As Sun Tzu Wu famously observed two and a half millennia ago, good anthropology is the basis of good strategy. As Ken Booth points out, a primary strength of the concept is that it can help make sense of the frequent misinterpretations among actors based on cultural differences and prejudice.

In order to set this literature apart from some dominant contemporary competitors in the strategic culture canon, it may be helpful to state explicitly how strategic culture is applied in this work. In the choice to focus on a combination of observable behaviour and discourse this work falls within the broad scope of Johnston’s “first generation” as applied in the work of contemporary scholars such as Kelly Longhurst and Arthur

Hoffmann.⁶⁷ In doing so I concur with P. M. Martinsen who suggests envisioning culture as the product of the dynamic interplay between the two elements that rely on, and affect each other in a continuous process.⁶⁸ Needless to say, perhaps, this study is concerned not only with the attitudes and beliefs that flow from a distinctive European experience, but also with the EU style in terms of behaviour. While much of the Cold War strategic culture research concerned itself narrowly with the use of force, this study will understand strategy as the endeavour to reconcile the ends and means by powers with extensive interests and obligations, and will be concerned with the exercise of the “hard power” that stems from military and economic means.⁶⁹ The strategic culture approach focuses on how decision-makers understand and interpret the main attributes of the international system in which they operate and how these assessments influence their views on security policy. The approach is based on the assumption that concepts are tools to be applied, not declarations of faith. In the present context the concept is perhaps best understood in the sense given by Russell Ackoff: “an idealised research model for answering questions concerning the concept defined”.⁷⁰ Concepts in international relations are valuable heuristic tools that can be deployed to yield explanations for real-world outcomes. Rather than attempting to falsify or indeed verify the EU strategic culture, an inherently fruitless activity, the concept will be applied in a genuine attempt to illuminate the case studies.

The EU strategic culture

I see, broadly speaking, four reasons why it makes sense to introduce strategic culture in the context of the security policies of the European Union. First, the concept is non-deterministic and dynamic, and can be readily applied to non-state actors. The methodological individualist perspective can help clarify a field of study muddled by the redefinition of terms and replete with “invisible hands” acting as intermediaries between cause and effect. Second, the concept differentiates between words and action. This is useful when dealing with an actor prone to promising more than it delivers and delivering things other than it promised. The focus on stated ideals and outcomes also makes it easier to bypass the difficult question of the relative importance of the Council, the Commission, the EU Presidency and informal groupings such as the EU-3. Third, the term is not exclusive. A number of strategic cultures can co-exist, embedded, for example, in the EU, NATO and the nation-state at any given time. And fourth, the term provides an effective link between strategic means and predefined political ends. The degree to which ideas and expectations are reflected in patterns of behaviour and vice versa is a yardstick by which the effectiveness of a strategic culture can be measured.

The European Union clearly possesses the prerequisites to form a strategic culture in terms of having extensive interests and obligations, and

capabilities. There are, somewhat simplified, three approaches to the analysis of EU strategic culture. One approach is teleological – assessing developments in the light of the goals to be achieved. This is the approach of the most important EU strategic document to date, the 2003 EU Security Strategy, which calls for the Union to develop a specific type of strategic culture, one “that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention”.⁷¹ From this perspective, a strategic culture is seen as a tool – a means to an end. The second approach is to trace EU strategic culture through historical experience, capabilities, geopolitical settings and values. Both these approaches are problematic. The trouble with teleological analysis is that it encourages the perspective that the EU is either a great power or nothing at all. Tracing EU strategic culture via existing strategic cultures runs the risk of determinism. Also within these confines it is possible to approach the concept from various angles. Strategic culture can be studied as political anthropology, as sociology and as strategic studies. Each has their use and value. The third, and to date the least explored, approach is the analysis of EU strategic culture as displayed behaviour.⁷²

This study will trace EU strategic culture as it unfolds, with emphasis on stated goals and strategic behaviour. In order to process and order information, an analytical framework is necessary. After having sampled several possible frameworks for operationalising strategic culture I returned to Richard Tanner Johnson’s classic study of American foreign policy-making. His analytical framework is straightforward, based on the key question facing American and – I will contend – all other strategic actors, namely: (1) choosing between pursuing the “best” policy and the most “feasible” policy (How far can one go in the direction of doing the “best” without being “impractical?”); (2) responding quickly or allowing for extensive deliberation (How much conflict can a workable decision process tolerate?); (3) selecting information or evaluating as much information as possible (How much desirable screening can occur without incurring undesirable distortion?); and (4) whether to act through strict consensus or through majority decisions (How elaborate can the decision-making process be without sacrificing responsiveness?).⁷³ The answers to these questions not only help explain why the EU was susceptible to US pressure – they also, as we shall see in the case studies, tell us something about EU strategic culture.

2 The transatlantic bargain

Introduction

The poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772–1834) once observed: “So often do the spirits of great events stride on before the events. And in today already walks tomorrow.”¹ This could be a fitting maxim for the study of the transatlantic connection, a relationship that is largely constituted by its history, and where changes often remain unspoken for some time before emerging as the new status quo. European security cooperation is a good example of a topic that becomes more confusing when it is simplified. If European defence initiatives are only unfolded along a single dimension – a particular point in time or a single issue area – motives and outcomes become difficult to understand, even illogical.

Before American influence on European Union (EU) security policies at the turn of the twentieth century can be assessed in detail, some background is therefore needed. Since the end of the Cold War, a great many books and papers have been written on the topic of European security, but to date, very few of them have dealt with the link between the two most important actors in the building of a European security order, namely, the United States (US) and the European Union. This is, in part, a result of the recent nature of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), but it also reflects a lack of consensus regarding the importance of the US as a factor in EU security policies. The integration project is often – if not in theory then in practice – seen to be a discrete venture centred on economy and identity, while the Euro-American partnership and its sole institutional link, NATO, are seen as being about security and strategy. In a post-Cold War setting, this dichotomy came under pressure due to the decline in threat, the increased importance of the EU and the apparent decline in the American presence in Europe. It was not coincidental that “autonomous” was the watchword of the Saint Malo Declaration which marks the launch point of the ESDP.

A cherished child has – as the saying goes – many names. Some call it the transatlantic partnership, the West, or “‘Empire’ by invitation”. I prefer the term “the transatlantic bargain”, not least because such a

perspective directs our attention to connection as a mutual understanding with two dimensions – one intra-European and one Euro-American. The term was coined by Harland Cleveland, the former US Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) who argued that: “The glue that held the allies more or less together is a large, complex and dynamic bargain – partly an understanding among the Europeans, but mostly a deal between them and the United States of America.”² One might add that the transatlantic bargain is an agreement to construct and protect a European order that was universal in conception, that is, not an order directly expressing the interests of one state but an order that most other states could find compatible with their interests given their different levels of power and lesser abilities to change that order. Under the original Euro-American bargain the United States would contribute to the defence of Europe and to the region’s economic recovery on the condition that the Europeans would unite in the effort to defend against the Soviet threat and use the economic aid effectively. The dual bargain might be thought of as a two-dimensional chess game. The salient point in Cleveland’s concept is that US engagement not only invited, but was also subject to, European cooperation and unity.

The Euro-American security bargain

At the time our case studies begin, the unique security cohabitation between Western Europe and North America had lasted for more than half a century. It was the tardy, but decisive, intervention of the United States in the First World War that for the first time established Washington as a power in Europe. This brief spell of engagement was followed by US disengagement during the inter-war years, a trend that was only reluctantly discontinued upon the US entry into the Second World War as an Allied power. At the onset of the Cold War, it soon became clear that the main fault line between the communist and capitalist blocs – championed by the USSR and the US respectively – would run through Europe. Despite attempts at bridge-building, the security relations between the communist and capitalist blocs were to be based on armed deterrence throughout the Cold War. A large permanent military presence in the region signified a new level of American commitment. One might say, as Richard Holbrooke does, that after 1945, the United States went from being a power in Europe to becoming a European power.³

Stanley Sloan has noted the permanence of the fundamental transatlantic bargain, with the United States pledging continued involvement in European security arrangements in return for a European commitment to organise itself for both external defence and internal stability.⁴ The politico-military relations of the transatlantic double bargain were first fashioned under the Vandenberg Resolution (1948), the Brussels Treaty (1948) and the North Atlantic Treaty (1949). It is important to note that

these initiatives were encouraged as much by Europe as by America. Under the original transatlantic bargain the United States would contribute to the defence of Europe and to the region's economic recovery from the destruction of the war on the condition that the Europeans would unite in the effort to defend against the Soviet threat and use the economic aid effectively. Cleveland described the essence of the transatlantic bargain as "a strong presumption of cooperation in the event of trouble – or in the event of negotiations that affect all the members".⁵

It is important to note that in Cleveland's bargain, US engagement not only invited, but was also subject to, European cooperation and unity. The bargain was not solely a military understanding. European integration was a key element in American post-war *Europapolitik*. One might say with some confidence that in the past, American observers have been more prone than Europeans to conceive of Europe as a whole, to transcend Europe's patterns of interwoven particularisms. The American author, the US economist Gottfried Haberler in 1949 noted that: "The idea of a European political and economic union is taken more seriously in the United States than in Europe."⁶ Although the strength and relevance of different factors vary over time, many of the sources underpinning the American rationale behind venturing into this bargain are clearly discernible: counterbalancing the Soviet bloc; the containment of Germany; cultural closeness to Europe; a desire to have other partners share in the burdens of global leadership; an ideological desire to export American ideals; as well as a desire to help Europe break out of the circle of increasingly destructive inter-state violence. Once it became clear that the European allies would not shoulder their portion of the defence burden of the West, the American resources committed to Europe became far more substantial than was initially envisaged, handing down a legacy with which NATO struggled until the end of the Cold War.

During the Cold War, European support for US engagement in the region was based on many of the same reasons that kept the Americans engaged in Europe; territorial defence against communist expansion and preventing Germany from rising again to challenge the European order were wedded to a newfound admiration for American values at a time when many local ideals had been discredited. The states that joined NATO shared a desire for a strong leader to keep war-weary Europe from slipping back into inter-state jealousies and strife. The need for such a European bargain is obvious to anyone acquainted with European history. Great power rivalry had sparked two world wars within three decades and the balance of power between Germany, France and Britain had been the main ordering principle over the past three centuries. A self-sustained European order that was not based on great power rivalry had never existed, save for a brief interlude in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars. An understanding was reached in the face of the looming existential

threat from the Soviet Union based on cooperation within the overall framework of American primacy.

The Franco-German understanding was fortified through the European integration project. Britain was allowed to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1972, but enlargement failed to foster the same degree of closeness between Paris and London that it had done between Paris and Bonn. The two countries came to form two camps which, as we shall see at the end of the chapter, have endured to this day. The intra-European bargain was also eased by American engagement, preventing any one European power from seeking primacy in Europe. One must not forget that American engagement helped guarantee the sovereignty of a great many small states that might in other cases have been of questionable durability, and made it possible for them to venture into binding cooperation with more powerful states. Also – for Europe’s great powers past and present – a hope for assistance to retain their global interests and dominions certainly played a role. Beyond the specifics of security calculations and economic considerations, there was an unspoken agreement that Europe would support, or at least not openly challenge, US foreign policies. In return, the US would support, or at least not actively undermine, European integration. The arrangement, in which both parties were free to frequently criticise but not subvert the other, endured despite being severely tested from the left bank of the Atlantic during the 1956 Suez crisis and from the right bank during the arms race of the 1980s.

A shared blend of institutions, democracy and market economy

Throughout the Cold War, both superpowers enthusiastically exported their economic systems, values and forms of organisation to their respective blocs. The integration project was profoundly influenced by a distinct Anglo-American blend of market liberalism, constitutionalism, egalitarianism, liberal democracy and unashamed consumerism which, in turn, have formed much of the foundation for the European integration project. During the Cold War, the European acceptance of US foreign policy leadership was traded for military protection, mutual market access and respect for the norms of multilateral institutions. As Robert Keohane pointed out in 1984, this international framework was essential to the US exercise of power.⁷ A general acceptance of US leadership was traded for military protection and access to the US domestic market.⁸ Over time, the Western bloc became increasingly institutionalised. The success of projects such as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank appeared to validate the merits of American leadership. The US was the key factor in creating the institutional and political climate that helped the EEC to

thrive. The obvious advantage of American engagement was that it took the sting out of European geopolitics. American security guarantees removed the thorny issue of the European balance of power and the ceaseless watchfulness that came with it.

Above all, it was NATO that came to embody the US commitment to Western European security. The original vision of a two-pillar structure for NATO with equal sharing of the burden and power between the US and Europe did not materialise. The US remained a senior partner in the Alliance throughout the Cold War. There were, especially in the 1950s, strong voices arguing in favour of the need for Euro-American political integration in order to fortify the connection. This was not to be, at least not in a political sense. While the Americans were concerned about diminution of their sovereignty, voices in Europe warned against the implications of US dominance and “interference”.⁹ The transatlantic bargain was always more than a security understanding. Over the years, the Euro-American partnership has been bolstered by a strong sense of common values. But the presence of Stalinism as an alternative model of cooperation, no doubt also strengthened the sense of community. One of the Union’s founding fathers, Paul-Henri Spaak, once claimed: “The real father of the Atlantic Alliance was Stalin. It is he who has the right to a statue in each of our countries.”¹⁰ The qualitative difference between intra-bloc relations during the Cold War is highlighted by the fact that the US, unlike the USSR, never intervened militarily in any Allied state. Geir Lundestad captures this in his concept “‘Empire’ by invitation”.¹¹

The President of the European Commission, Walter Hallstein (1958–67), once warned: “Don’t waste time talking about defence. In the first place we don’t understand it. In the second place we’ll all disagree.”¹² After the failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954, it became conventional wisdom that promoting integration in the fields of security and defence policy was a fool’s errand. Accordingly the Treaty of Rome (1957) did not envision a common foreign and security policy. American good-will and cooperative policies helped the European states grow into allies rather than satellites, as seen in Communist Eastern Europe. With relatively low military spending, Europe was able to construct its European Community, concentrating on social stability and economic prowess while leaving much of its defence to NATO – meaning the US.¹³ Throughout the Cold War, the drawbacks of dependence on the US were outweighed by the security guarantee embedded in the American commitment to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Western European states, despite their military dependency, remained relatively independent – politically and diplomatically. Dan Smith describes American dominance in the Euro-American security partnership as being primarily the ability to control the agenda. The Europeans grew accustomed to letting the US first formulate a position and then lining up for or against it – what Harlan Cleveland called “*Après vous*,

Alphonse".¹⁴ The European states grew accustomed to being able to influence American policies and the US grew accustomed to shouldering much of their defence burden.¹⁵ This is not to say that transatlantic relations were always harmonious. There were heated disagreements not only over matters such as the appropriate level of military contributions or how to organise global security, but also over economic policies towards the Soviets, how to manage the dollar's international role and the global economy in general. The EEC/EC states, moreover, occasionally prevailed or were at least able to bring the US into negotiated settlements.

The 1950s and 1960s: from partnership to primacy

The vision of an integrated European army under joint command was born out of the destruction seen during the Second World War. This came close to realisation with the so-called Pleven Plan. In May 1952, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany signed the Treaty on a European Defence Community (EDC). This attempt to force the European political integration process into a trot failed when the French National Assembly rejected the plan on 30 August 1954. The Europeans were simply not prepared to hand over sovereignty in order to facilitate a unified contribution to the defence of Western Europe. With the failure of the integration project in shouldering the collective defence burden, the Euro-American bargain became dependent on a substantial US military presence in Europe to give credibility to NATO's defence.¹⁶

During the first years after the establishment of NATO when relations were supposedly at their closest, there were frequent and heated disputes over issues ranging from German rearmament to the Korean War and the failure of the EDC. The US had supported this venture. As US Secretary of State, John F. Dulles, put it:

No more will there be national armies to fight each other and to invade each other in a quest for national triumphs. There will only be the common army so interlocked that no single member of the community could in practice commit armed aggression.¹⁷

Dulles was so committed to the idea that he threatened an "agonizing reappraisal" of US policy vis-à-vis Europe should the Europeans fail to agree on a common defence. This was an empty threat. Despite the establishment of the Western European Union (WEU) in 1948, the collapse of the EDC in practical terms meant that Europe would not shoulder a proportionate share of the burden of defending against the USSR.

The integration project began with the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1950 when six Western European governments, in agreeing to create the European Coal, Iron and Steel Union (ECSC), declared their intention

ultimately to form some sort of political union. The primary motive was to bind together the armament industries of the signatories in order to make future arms races more difficult.¹⁸ This was the heyday of world federalist thinking when many hoped that the UN would one day become a world government. Throughout the Cold War, economic integration was kept at the forefront of the agenda while the pooling of sovereignty in other policy fields often proved elusive. As the first Secretary-General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, observed in the late 1940s:

At the time there was a good deal of talk – which still persists – of developing Western Europe into a “third force” between the Soviet and American giants. But Mr Churchill saw Europe with no means [...] of recovering to become a force of any kind without American help and partnership.¹⁹

One phase of renegotiation of the Euro-American bargain came in 1956 with the Hungarian uprising and the Suez crisis, which ended any pretence of strategic equality between Europe and America in NATO. The events in Hungary showed that the US commitment to constructing a new European order was limited to Western Europe. The Suez crisis, the same year, signalled the relegation of Europe’s two leading powers – France and Great Britain – from the top power league. American leaders sided with the communist states to deny the European attempt to occupy the waterway, somewhat hypocritically citing a general opposition to the use of force in international affairs. During the crisis, British Premier Anthony Eden, who had been known as a Eurosceptic, resurrected Churchill’s bold proposal from 1940 for a common citizenship for British and French citizens. His French counterpart Guy Mollet proposed a Franco-British union as a way of sealing their alliance.²⁰ London, faced with mounting American economic pressure, declined the offer and bowed out of the conflict. The Suez stand-down not only undermined any pretence of equality in the Euro-American part of the transatlantic bargain, it also drove a wedge between France and Britain. As French historian Frédéric Bozo has pointed out, France was unwilling to accept the bargain presented. Paris would not accept American dictates. This stance became entrenched when France left NATO’s integrated military structure but not the Alliance altogether in 1966.²¹ The United Kingdom, on the other hand, chose to perceive the relationship with the US as a community of values that would, even if it occasionally meant eating “humble pie”, make Britain’s hand stronger than asserting an independent strategic outlook would. Following Suez, it has been common to discuss the Euro-American security relationship in the context of primacy: European acceptance of American leadership of the Western bloc in return for US attentiveness to European concerns. One might call this, as Stanley Sloan does, a “defence dependence culture”.²² While the American engagement was always

motivated by more than just strategic considerations, European unease over American dominance was ever coupled with fears of US disengagement. Therefore, the US was invited to stay; first, through requests for economic aid, later, for political support and security guarantees and finally, through a strong US military presence.

The renegotiation of the Euro-American bargain was accompanied by persistent US support for European integration. According to Geir Lundestad, the transatlantic partnership can be seen as a product of the consistent support for European unity that proved crucial to the success of the integration project. Scholars frequently fail to appreciate the degree to which the US served as a model for the integration project and provided impetus for conceptualising the European Union at an embryonic stage. In the first decade after 1945 the idea of forging a “United States of Europe” out of a federalist mould was arguably stronger in the US than in Europe in the period immediately after the war.²³ European integration was seen as a way of delivering Europe from its troubled past. Jean Monnet returned the compliment when referring to the role of the US in early European integration: “[This] is the first time in history that a great power instead of basing its policy on divide and rule, has consistently and resolutely backed the creation of a large community uniting peoples previously apart.”²⁴ The basic US position on this issue was summarised by Pascaline Winand in her study *Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe*.²⁵

First, European energies should be concentrated on building a European political community solidly rooted in economic integration. This would give Europe greater influence in world councils and reduce the attraction of nationalism. Western Europe would therefore become the economic and political equal of the United States. Second, the potential of the European co-equal should be harnessed to that of the United States for two common enterprises – world economic development and military defence.

This view has been repeatedly expressed in public speeches by American leaders, from General Eisenhower’s dream of a “unified Europe” in 1951 to President George Bush the Elder’s call for a Europe “whole and free” in the *annus mirabilis* 1989.²⁶ Two often-cited motivating factors for American engagement in Europe come under the broad headings “economy” and “security”. In notes prepared for Secretary of State George Marshall, the State Department Policy Planning Staff Director, George F. Kennan, argued that the Marshall Plan was necessary for two reasons, the first of which was “so that they can buy from us”, and the second was “so that they will have enough self-confidence to withstand outside pressures”.²⁷ Peace was to be underpinned by economic integration, which conveniently resulted in the opening up of new markets to US products.

Yet American support for integration was always seen as a means to an end, a position put into plain words by Stanley Hoffmann:²⁸

We have had, over the years, the Atlantic design, first with the Marshall Plan, NATO, the early steps toward the integration of the West Europeans into an entity bound to the United States, later under the name of the Atlantic partnership, used both to bless the development of that entity and to stress its true destination: playing its part in America's orchestra.

During the 1960s, the gap in military capabilities across the Atlantic widened. The Administration of John F. Kennedy sought a greater European contribution to Western defence. NATO's *Harmel Report* (1967) which was intended to strengthen the political dimension of the Alliance illustrated American willingness to match greater burden-sharing with a greater European say in Western strategy.²⁹ The Vietnam conflict was undermining the American willingness to lead – eventually resulting in a breakdown of national consensus on what Robert Tucker called “the purpose of American power”, especially with regard to foreign policy.³⁰ It also led to a reappraisal of America's role in Europe. Diminished prestige of the armed forces in the US led to increased calls for the Europeans to shoulder more of their own security burden. When the Europeans failed to do so, the US increased its reliance on nuclear deterrence in the defence of Europe. NATO's 1967 Strategic Concept was revamped with the doctrine of a “flexible response” towards a possible Warsaw Pact attack. This suggested that battlefield nuclear weapons might be used in the early stages of a European conflict. A second turning point came when large segments of European society and also a number of governments called for rapprochement and disarmament while the US assumed the role of a status quo actor, seeking to uphold the international order by maintaining a missile-by-missile bipolar balance of power. The term “alliance” took on a new meaning during the Cold War. A single state, the USSR or the US, provided most of the security for their respective bloc. The withdrawal of China from the Soviet bloc and the defection of France from NATO's command structure failed to tilt the increasingly deep-seated asymmetry in the transatlantic bargain.

The 1970s and 1980s: different approaches, similar goals

The early 1970s was a turbulent period in transatlantic relations. In the words of James Chace and Earl Ravenal, “the policy of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger emphasised the direct approach to adversaries and the institutionalisation of summitry, bypassing the more cumbersome mechanisms of alliance consultation”.³¹ Under the “Nixon Doctrine”, many of the burdens and some of the risks of defence were handed over

to the allies. Notably, the demand for greater “offset” payments to reimburse the US costs of stationing troops in Europe became a key issue. The attempt to link commercial and security interests failed and American accusations of European “free riding” persisted. These were years of crises: the suspension of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, the devaluations of the dollar, bilateral accords with the Soviets and the US handling of the 1973 Yom Kippur war that sparked the OPEC oil embargo that same winter. Kissinger noted that: “These events [...] redistributed the relative advantages of the United States and its various European allies – again in favour of the United States.”³² Washington grew disinclined to invite its European allies’ involvement in the handling of issues beyond Europe – especially in the Middle East. Henry Kissinger was the first to admit the undesirability of the emerging Euro-American relationship. He blames the trend on a lack of an “integrating all-over framework” that encouraged American “unilateralism” due to European “irresponsibility”. By allowing the power gap to grow, the Europeans now had to face the fact that “arrangements concerning their vital interest are being negotiated without them”.³³ The 1973 “Year of Europe” initiative aimed at refocusing US policy on Europe and redefining the transatlantic relationship. The European Political Cooperation (EPC) initiated by the EC was clearly in part a response to the renegotiation of the Euro-American bargain under Nixon. In the original understanding, American leadership was traded for the US not rising or not being *seen* to rise above the rank of *primus inter pares*. Had the Europeans wished to maintain the established Euro-American balance, they would have had to acquire a costly new generation of sufficient conventional forces, or acquire or expand their own national nuclear arsenals. Only France and Britain chose to do so.

Under President Reagan the transatlantic bargain came to be based on unashamed primacy. “We’ve heard a lot of protests from our European allies”, said Vice President Bush. “I’m sorry. The US is the leader of the free world, and under this Administration we are beginning once again to act like it.”³⁴ The “America first” policies sparked powerlessness and disillusionment in Europe. This was reflected in a surge in counter-cultures, from ecology movements, to new-age religion, feminism as well as peace and one-worldist movements. These reformist movements shared a social constructionist credo that the world could be changed by simply thinking differently. Although many of them originated in America, these counter-cultures have arguably had a stronger long-term impact on political culture in Europe than in the US. The tendency of Europeans to turn out in their hundreds of thousands to protest US policies, such as the 1981 deployment of Pershing II missiles, while failing to respond with a similar outrage to events in the Communist bloc, such as the martial law in Poland the same year, impressed upon a generation of American leaders the fallibility of the European path. It should be noted that voices calling for a stronger Europe were conspicuously absent among the counter-

cultures. The EC failed, not for the last time, to tap into the zeitgeist of the period.

The 1980s saw attempts at European strategic thinking. Security issues began to appear on the agenda of the EC Foreign Ministers' meetings, but only political and economic aspects were addressed. The antipathy felt by many towards President Reagan's confrontational rhetoric did not translate into common European policies. As Christoph Bertram observed in 1984: "The European Council, originally invented so as to provide a framework for policy coordination, ha[s] visibly degenerated into a bargaining parlour, as had all the other institutions of the Community."³⁵ Relations with members of the Warsaw Pact were an area of frequent transatlantic friction. The European countries generally advocated a softer pressure than that favoured in Washington. The EPC can be seen as the first step down the road that seemed to have been closed by the failure of the EDC, leading to Maastricht and the establishment of the CFSP. Though the demand for greater autonomy grew stronger during times of transatlantic discord, the EC displayed what Christoph Bertram called a "plain unwillingness" to adopt common defence policies, something that many commentators had hoped for.³⁶ It took years to agree on even a token defence dimension. The 1987 Single European Act (SEA) formalised the EPC, calling upon the member states not to stand in the way of consensus formation on political issues.³⁷ This did not prevent the EPC's foreign and security policies from being primarily declaratory, with scant impact on international affairs.

1989–91: years of transition

Many expected America's role in Europe to diminish after the end of the bipolar conflict. Yet, surprisingly little changed. Under President George Bush the Elder the Euro-American bargain remained remarkably stable. America pledged to maintain its engagement in European security in return for a European commitment to work towards collective external defence and internal stability. There was a fundamental difference in "narrative" between the US and the EU concerning the ending of the Cold War. In the US, many believed that it was the nerve and determination of President Reagan that had brought the Soviets down.³⁸ In Europe, many credited Europe's willingness to reach out and talk to adversaries with having made it possible for the USSR to disintegrate peacefully. As the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, put it: "The West won the Cold War by combining strategic power and a positive alternative system, by using 'hard power' and 'soft power'. The alternative system, however, was the decisive factor."³⁹ In this sense, the Cold War ending without violence affirmed both the American belief in its own visionary leadership as well as the cooperative values held high in European quarters.

Leading voices in Europe believed that genuine European security

cooperation would require the disengagement of both superpowers. In early 1989, French Defence Minister, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, asserted: "International events are encouraging us to take our security in our own hands, at the same time offering us new possibilities to do so."⁴⁰ By signing the 1992 Treaty of the European Union, the EU countries outstripped the US in terms of population size and foreign trade. These trends boosted European confidence in framing common policy goals in new areas. If the EU – an actor of nearly 500 million people with a combined gross national product (GNP) of US\$8 trillion – was able to unite its resources into a combined foreign policy effort, it would be one of the world's leading powers. In the eyes of many, economic integration, foreign policies and security policies could no longer be kept apart.⁴¹

It was to be expected that the demise of the Soviet Union would impact the Euro-American bargain. It was generally assumed that the European security tasks would be simpler; the burdens lighter. Many believed that the US should exit gracefully before being shown the door by an increasingly self-confident EU. The question of whether or not to disengage and give up its role as a "European power" was a matter of some debate in the US. President Bush the Elder pre-empted demands for European autonomy at NATO's 1991 Rome Summit:

Our premise is that the American role in the defense and affairs of Europe will not be made superfluous by European unity. If our premise is wrong, if, my friends, your ultimate aim is to provide independently for your own defense, the time to tell us is today.⁴²

As years passed, concerns that Europe would actively challenge America seemed unwarranted. While the US downscaled its physical presence in Europe, there was no immediate response from the EU or from individual states. No one seemed eager to fill the spending gap left by the US.

A surge in European integration added to the Union's relevance and attraction, as was illustrated by a continuous stream of new membership applications throughout the 1990s. The return of war in Europe brought about a new sense of urgency and determination in giving the integration project a security dimension in the traditional sense. The US welcomed Europe's shouldering of more responsibility in fields such as peace-keeping, but there were also concerns that European cooperation might develop into something autonomous and at odds with the strategic objectives of the US, and its overall leadership within NATO. In the 1992 "Dobbins démarche", President George Bush the Elder laid down pre-conditions for a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) that would be acceptable to the US.⁴³ US support for European integration was also, partly, a result of the perceived cost of obstruction. An inter-agency study from the summer of 1989 concluded that the "accelerated political integration within the EC is unstoppable and that the US opposition to

the process would be both futile and counter productive". As Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane pointed out in 1993, American concerns over Eurocentric security aspirations were soothed by the continued acceptance of US policy leadership on important issues such as the 1991 Kuwait war.

In the 1990s, the US experienced a boom that reversed a decades-long relative economic decline vis-à-vis Europe. The US percentage of world gross economic output grew to levels not seen in decades, and at the turn of the millennium, the US economy was again larger than all the EU economies put together. This helped to postpone the decision regarding the role of the US in Europe. The financial freedom that accompanied the robust growth allowed the US to retain much of its Cold War posture while revamping its armed forces for post-Cold War missions.⁴⁴ Most European states greeted the end of the Cold War with further reductions in their defence budgets. However, while the Europeans reaped the peace dividend, continued high levels of US investment encouraged a generational shift under the heading "Revolution in Military Affairs", which further deepened the Euro-American gap in capabilities.

The 1990s: autonomy and dependence

The election of Bill Clinton to the Presidency in 1992 led to a change in American perception of the EU as a foreign policy actor. The multilaterally inclined President was eager to shift some of the foreign and security policy burdens onto regional partners. With the Cold War at an end, the need for policy coherence was less pressing. This was also, in part, a response to the changes taking place in Europe, namely, the EC's metamorphosis into the European Union and, with it, renewed interest in the traditional tools of statecraft. A new element in the Euro-American bargain was the willingness with which President Clinton ceded initiative to the EU when the Yugoslav crisis erupted in 1991. It seemed that the Euro-American bargain was being renegotiated with a lower degree of US commitment or a greater role for the EU. Secretary of State James Baker famously summarised the American position: "We do not have a dog in that fight."⁴⁵ Although Clinton initially displayed little interest in Europe, the combination of headline-grabbing conflicts and EU inertia challenged Clinton's preference for domestic politics. Indeed, the Balkan conflicts would become one of the critical issues during Clinton's terms in office.

Although much can be said about the obstacles and impossibilities faced by the EU, the fact remains that Europe failed to rise to the challenge. Germany broke ranks with its European partners over the break-up of Yugoslavia by recognising Croatia as an independent state, thereby stymieing attempts by the bloc to keep the federation together. Washington was thoroughly unimpressed by the ineffectual EU initiatives to end the conflict. After seeing the EU/UN-sponsored "Vance-Owens plan" founder, the Clinton Administration concluded that the multilateral

approach favoured by the EU would go no further than ineffective sanctions, arms embargoes and occasional peace-keepers. Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs, stated openly the view that unless “the United States is prepared to put its political and military muscle behind the quest for solutions to European instability, nothing really gets done”.⁴⁶

A sign of the change in climate between Clinton and the Europeans came in November 1994 when the President, pushed by Congress, stopped enforcing the arms embargo against Bosnia. In 1994, instead of waiting for the conflict to burn out on its own accord, the US adopted a pragmatic “lift and strike” policy. “Lift” meant violating the UN arms embargo, lending support to the Bosnian Muslims and to Croatia, and “strike” referred to the active taking of sides by the US in carrying out air strikes against Serb forces. The combination of credible force and resolute diplomacy finally delivered the peace accord at Dayton, Ohio. With EU representatives conspicuously absent the US had achieved in a few weeks what the Europeans had failed to achieve in three years. This was to prove important when a new crisis broke out in the Yugoslav region of Kosovo in the spring of 1998, as we shall see in the next chapter.

In the US domestic context, “political time” picked up speed during the 1990s. The failed intervention in Somalia in 1992 and the blocked health-care reform weakened the Clinton Administration, and the demoralising 1994 mid-term elections, in which the Democrats lost their majority in the House of Representatives, led to a sharp turn in President Clinton’s policies.⁴⁷ From being a strong proponent of UN-centred internationalism, even contemplating placing US troops under UN command, he shifted towards rhetoric centred on national interest.⁴⁸ This shift also impacted US–EU relations, sparking a series of transatlantic disputes. There were disagreements over a range of trade issues, the International Criminal Court (ICC), the United Nations, the Kyoto Protocol, the Kosovo crisis and differences over the EU and NATO enlargements. The harsher climate, combined with American reluctance to intervene in the Yugoslav civil wars and its tetchiness over unequal burden-sharing within NATO, led to uncertainty in European capitals over America’s continued commitment to European security. It appeared that the transatlantic bargain, instead of developing in the direction of a two-pillar structure, was heading towards a situation where the US would take its own counsel on foreign policy issues, captured in the axiom: “multilateral when possible, unilateral when necessary”.

These changes were also apparent in the efforts targeted at revitalising American primacy in Europe through redefining and enlarging NATO. The choice to retain a strong presence in Europe was less of a foregone conclusion than one might assume. The end of the Soviet empire and the existential threat that came with it reduced the strategic importance of Europe for the US. The need to act as an offshore balancer to prevent a

single power from dominating the continent also seemed less pressing, given the success of European integration in curbing great power politics in Europe. Rather than disengaging from Europe, President Clinton sought to construct a “New Transatlantic Agenda”, providing a new framework for a partnership of global significance, designed to lend a new quality to the transatlantic relationship, moving it from one of consultation to one of joint action in four fields: “Promoting peace and stability, democracy and development around the world; Responding to global challenges; Contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations; Building bridges across the Atlantic.”⁴⁹ Based on the cultural closeness to Europe, the initiative reflected a wish to have other partners share in the burdens of global leadership combined with an ideological desire to export American ideals and make sure that Europeans didn’t backslide into cyclical inter-state warfare.

The end of the post-Cold War era

The 1990s was characterised by indecisive European attempts to create new forms of security cooperation better suited to the post-Cold War situation. Although there was much talk both in Europe and in the US about “new security”, this discourse had a limited impact on actual security in terms of security concept, strategic outlook, capability procurement and alliance structure. The apparent transatlantic harmony during the Clinton years was illusory, in the sense that all parties were aware that the changed strategic situation would impact the transatlantic connection, although no one seemed to be quite sure how. The first term of the Clinton era was, in a way, a return to the closeness of the 1950s and 1960s, but without the threat that had inspired that closeness. The second term was characterised by a slow-burning discord over burden and power-sharing in which both the US and the Europeans wished to maintain the one and increase the other.

American resentment over perceived European freeloading on US military spending is an old phenomenon. In 1984 Senator Nunn presented an amendment to Congress seeking to tie the size of US forces in Europe proportionally to the European’s defence effort. The bill was defeated but a downscaling of the presence in Europe remained high on the US list of priorities. During the 1990s American troop levels in Europe fell sharply, from approximately 320,000 troops stationed in Europe in the late 1980s to an estimated 100,000 troops during the Clinton Administration. This number dropped further under President George Bush the Younger to approximately 50,000 troops in 2004. In doing so, the Administration signalled a downscaling of US engagement in the region. New bases were built elsewhere. In its relations with Europe, the Bush Administration continued President Clinton’s policies of explicit asymmetry while adding greater pressure for the Europeans to contribute actively to US policy

objectives. NATO was pressured to reform, with emphasis on its role as a coordination mechanism for coalitions of the willing. The 2003 Iraq war, which we will revisit in Chapter 5, was the most serious dispute in transatlantic relations in decades. From a European perspective, the elevated position of the US is captured in what former French Foreign Minister, Hubert Védérine, dubbed a “hyper power”.⁵⁰

Once in office, President George Bush the Younger challenged the old understanding that the US would not embarrass its allies by rising above the rank of *primus inter pares*. The foreign policy during his first term in office was characterised by a notion of flexibility derived from unrivalled power. This meant shifting away from the concept of a balance of power while putting up for review the ideological baggage of the Cold War, some of the rigidities of the international system, and some allegiance to existing alliances. In 1969 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had remarked: “We have sought to combine a supranational Europe with a closely integrated Atlantic Community under American leadership. These objectives are likely to prove incompatible.”⁵¹ Thirty years later he wrote: “If the existing trend of transatlantic relations continues, the international system will be fundamentally altered.”⁵² Historian Tony Judt went further: “We are witnessing the dissolution of an international system.”⁵³ As the time lag from the Cold War wore off during the 1990s, it became increasingly apparent that the security architecture in Europe was less in need of repair than reconstruction.

The degree to which the European Union is misconstrued or only partially understood in the US is often underestimated in Europe. Sentiments in the American foreign policy establishment have been characterised by a deep ambivalence regarding European security cooperation. Were the Europeans making the US burden lighter or were they about to challenge the Pax Americana? While Philip Gordon concluded that the US was “more than ever the diplomatic and military leader of the western world”, Joseph Nye took a different view, dubbing the EU “the closest thing to an equal the United States faces at the beginning of the twenty-first century”.⁵⁴ The tendency towards “all or nothing” is apparent in most US strategic analysis of the European Union. Either the EU is an emerging superpower, or it is immaterial. While scholars such as Joseph Nye, but also Samuel Huntington and Kenneth Waltz, have predicted that the United States in the twenty-first century will find itself challenged by a resurgent Europe, other scholars, led by Robert Kagan, have reached much the opposite conclusion.⁵⁵ This is, in part, due to the American predisposition to see events outside their borders as analogous to their own history, where there is no half-way house between a federal union and an intergovernmental regime. Yet that is exactly where the EU is found during the period in question, as we shall see in the next section.

The intra-European security bargain

The European Union has, over time, come to play much the same central role in the intra-European security bargain as that played by NATO in the Euro-American equivalent. Especially after the Cold War, the EU assumed an increasingly central role in the European economic and political order. Capturing the *malleability* – the multi-purpose, multidimensional, semi-supranational, semi-intergovernmental character – of the Union is trickier than most casual observers would imagine. The idea of a Union in Europe since its earliest beginnings has developed in the context of finding a way to contain great power rivalry, by replacing the Westphalian balance-of-power mechanism with a degree of supranational organisation. Anton Deporte was one of the early scholars who singled out the role of the integration project as a potential foundation for a self-sustaining European security order. He challenged those who saw the European order as inherently unstable and in need of external engagement. In 1979 he noted that the system had already withstood successive challenges, and he saw no reason why it should not last, simply because the intra-European bargain and the EC served the interests of the states that have the power to change it.⁵⁶ Over five decades the EU has become an increasingly important constituent in the “glue”, to use Harland Cleveland’s term, of European security. This has happened through six interconnected dimensions:

The EU is a system of governance

Recent European history shows that integration is a highly effective tool for burying grievances. One of the architects behind the CFSP, Robert Cooper, is amongst those who see EU membership as a solution to the fundamental insecurity of the anarchic international system. Integration allows former adversaries to develop shared identities, and through mutual interdependence, one might even say that they gradually become each other, become one.⁵⁷ During the 1990s the EU assumed more trappings of statehood, adding to the flag and anthem, a shared currency and, in 2000, a new motto. The case of the EU is popular with academics who are interested in studying the ways in which membership of an international organisation can change national interests. Much has been written on this topic since Ernst Haas saw a “supranational” style of decision-making taking hold in the Coal and Steel Community.⁵⁸ Michael E. Smith sees the trend towards consultation among national governments on foreign policy issues as part of a broader trend of “Europeanisation”.⁵⁹ This process has traditionally been most pronounced in the “heartland” of the six founding members and has not only helped to quell nationalism, but also to nurture an embryonic European identity. Much of the literature on this topic is concerned with how national preferences are transformed into a common EU interest.

The EU is a security community

European integration has helped alter the member states' perception of interests in a way that favours cooperation through consultations and participation in multilateral forums. "There are two ways of constructing an international order," Henry Kissinger once wrote, "by will or by renunciation; by conquest or by legitimacy." Kissinger attributes the durability of a given order to the legitimacy derived from "an international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy".⁶⁰ There can be little doubt that such legitimacy has played an increasingly important role in reducing the scope of hard power in relations among the EU member states.⁶¹ To understand the logic behind the EU's external security dimension, it is necessary to keep in mind the internal security argument often referred to as the Kantian or "peace argument" for integration. This argument sees integration as a bulwark against a return to Europe's troubled past of national interest-driven policies, military power balances and war as final arbiter. According to this rationale, integration is a goal in itself because the alternative is a self-propelling process that could again plunge the region into conflict and zero-sum competition. After half a decade of integration among the EU member states, the common market area is characterised by economic interdependence, social interpenetration and strategic interaction to such an extent that by 1998, the EU states resembled what Barry Buzan calls a "security complex" – "a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot be realistically considered apart from one another".⁶² Although the EU does not have an explicit collective defence article, the Union clearly affords its members collective security.

The EU is a community of values

By continuously adding new members to its ranks, European integration has been crucial in expanding a community of values, and sharing a blend of democracy, the rule of law, market economy, human rights and the preservation of local diversity as captured in the EU's motto: *In varietate concordia – Unity in Diversity*.⁶³ What makes the EU different from past alliances is that the treaty underlining the cooperation clearly articulates common values. Unlike, for example, NATO, the EU has proved itself to be unwilling to compromise on these values when reviewing membership applications. Values are the glue that holds the EU together and are an important factor in why EU membership is so attractive to emerging democracies. The values underpinning the EU are evident in its treaties. Policy-making in the EU is a dynamic process through which interests and objectives emerge as a result of interaction at the domestic, national and European level. Consequently, the clear distinction between "national"

and “European” might gradually blur even in the area of “high politics”. Perhaps the strongest testimony to the importance of these values is that negotiations, diplomacy, economic interdependence and the use of inducements have gradually replaced sanctions, military deterrence and balance of power as the hallmarks of the regional order.

The EU is a civilian power

The concept of “civilian power”, often associated with reformist theories, such as with the writings of François Dûchene.⁶⁴ Most analysts today agree that the EC, and later the EU, has played a limited but nevertheless important role as a “civilian power” in the international system and that it relies on “soft power” by using diplomacy, trade, aid and enlargement to further European interests abroad. This power has clearly been most pronounced in the Union’s influence on countries seeking EU membership, but after the Cold War, the integration process has been used for political goals beyond the borders of the member states. Karen Smith lists the primary instruments of the CFSP as being declarations, confidential démarches to foreign governments, high-level visits, diplomatic sanctions, political dialogue, making peace proposals and dispatching special envoys.⁶⁵ The EU enlargement process has proved to be an important tool in teaching the new democracies in Europe the ways of liberal democracy, not only in terms of domestic and economic good governance, but also in the conducting of foreign and security policies. This process is the only path through which new states can join the Union. The EU’s neutral member states have embraced the EU’s civilian efforts to promote stability in Europe and beyond. The European countries are also using the Union as a means to engage Russia in political and security areas without the military baggage of the Cold War, in the hope of gradually integrating their eastern neighbour into a cooperative European security system. The primary significance of the EU’s civilian approach has been to develop open, transparent and predictable relations with the states on its borders.

The EU is a great power understanding

The goal shared by Europe’s remaining three great powers over the past two centuries has been to prevent any one power from dominating the continent. The integration project has provided the institutional framework for reconciliation between France and Germany. The Franco-German “Axis” has been the primary dynamo in driving the integration project towards fulfilling the Treaty of Rome’s promise of an “ever closer union”.⁶⁶ Since Britain joined in 1974, London has joined Paris and Berlin in an informal grouping, a *directoire*, known as the EU-3. The intra-European understanding in which the most powerful states agree to submit themselves to the same rules as the smaller ones, to be tied down

like Gulliver (along with the American security guarantees), made it possible for Europe's many small and medium sized states to venture into an "ever closer union" with greater powers without fear that it would be a case of the proverbial pig being persuaded by the hen to join up to make bacon and eggs. This intra-European understanding has also helped sustain a great many states that might otherwise have been of doubtful durability. This perspective is eloquently summarised in Alan Milward's book title, *The European Rescue of the Nation State*.⁶⁷ The EU's unique role as an instrument of economic, political and security cooperation among the member states has brought Europe's great powers closer in matters of security and defence, lending new importance to the EU-3 which is continuously consulting and acting as an executive committee in pressing foreign policy matters.

The EU is a strategic actor

As seen in the discussion on actorness in the previous chapter, the EU is clearly a partial and incomplete, yet potentially formidable strategic actor. Building on the EPC system of diplomatic coordination, the Saint Malo agreement initiated a process in which the EU began to focus on the traditional tools of power – diplomatic, military, institutional and doctrinal. The ESDP was, after all, a capability-orientated initiative regardless of whether it would bolster the European arm of NATO or construct the EU's capability for autonomous action, or both. The process rapidly gained momentum. By 2000, Jolyon Howorth went so far as to state that there "has been more progress in the CESDP in the 18 months since Saint Malo than in the entire 50 years preceding the summit".⁶⁸ The new comprehensive institutional framework grew, partly out of the existing CFSP structures, partly by internalising the existing structures of the WEU, and partly through creating new institutions. This study seeks to shed light on the EU as a strategic actor by focusing on behavioural patterns during some of the biggest challenges that have faced the Union over the past decade.

A common foreign and security policy for Europe

First a few words on the "securitisation" of the European Union. The end of the Cold War gave new impetus to the EU, sparking the strongest surge in integration so far. The prevailing mood in Europe was that the European Union would be the new mechanism to balance state sovereignty with regional cooperation, while maintaining harmonious relations with the United States. In the 1990s, the attitude towards the role of the US in Europe emerged as a primary fault line in European politics. The "Europeanist" perspective, most closely associated with the French position, advocated the EU as a separate pole in a post-Cold War multipolar order

and pushed for a new commitment to sharing military resources and common defence guarantees to this effect. It should be noted that this did not necessarily entail anti-Americanism, although it is difficult to combine it with a strong role for NATO. The Europeanists were opposed by the "Atlanticist" camp that, led by Britain, believed that the current international order was beneficial to Europe and was sceptical of moves that could diminish the American commitment to European security and therefore opted for a continued defence policy within NATO.⁶⁹ The Europeanist–Atlanticist debate was effectively about whether the Euro-American or the intra-European part of the transatlantic bargain was to be given priority. What both parties seemed to agree was that no-one can serve two masters and be faithful to both.

The 1992 Maastricht Treaty on the European Union (TEU) represents a turning point in the role of the EU in European security. The modest European Political Cooperation was replaced by the more ambitious Common Foreign and Security Policy.⁷⁰ The TEU went further than just writing the existing practice into the Treaty – it actually drew up new blueprints for foreign and security policy promising that the EU would "assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the constructing of a common foreign and security policy".⁷¹ The aim was to develop a policy that includes "all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence".⁷² The member states were asked to "work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations".⁷³ The Treaty even included an allusion to collective defence. The member states are expected to "actively and unreservedly support the Union's common foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union's action in this area".⁷⁴

Looking beyond the bold wording, the TEU had little chance of getting off the ground without a compromise between the competing visions of the Atlanticists and the Europeanists. Despite, or perhaps, because of this, the Commission was given very limited competences with respect to the CFSP. The CFSP was attached to the EU through a separate intergovernmental pillar, signalling that "war is too important to be left to the Commissioners", to paraphrase Georges Clemenceau. As established in the TEU, the CFSP, of which the ESDP was to be considered an integral part, was not a policy, or even a bundle of policies. It was a consultation mechanism among the governments of the member states in the context of the EU.⁷⁵ In apparent contradiction to the intentions of the TEU, the first half of the 1990s was characterised by a studious avoidance of military security even as a topic in an EU context. Care was also taken not to duplicate NATO by avoiding territorial defence altogether and focusing exclusively on "soft-end" crisis management tasks.

In the wake of the Maastricht Treaty, the members began to strengthen the WEU's operational capabilities. The Petersberg declaration which defined the WEU's new mission as peace-keeping and crisis management was soon taken up as the mission statement of the EU security policy.⁷⁶ Institutional adaptation to external change did not take place with the expected or desired efficiency. The definition of security seemed to change more rapidly. The 1990s saw heated discussions on the "new security architecture" in Europe as different institutions competed over the same tasks. It also became increasingly clear that although the threats facing Europe had changed, the member states' preferred countermeasures were still determined by many of the same factors that had been present during the Cold War. European views diverged, not only on the means and ends of the ESDP, but also on whether or not the EU should have such a policy at all. Behind the carefully crafted, seemingly strong wordings of the Maastricht Treaty lay a carefully balanced and fragile consensus seeking to satisfy the Europeanists, who desired stronger integration in security and defence, while appeasing the Atlanticists, who favoured a European security centred on NATO.

The EU failed in providing the leadership expected during the Yugoslav civil war. Having been handed authority to resolve the crisis by the Clinton Administration, the EU states found themselves unable to manage the crisis despite the political will to do so. There is, however, more than one side to the Bosnian debacle. The American intervention ultimately overshadowed the role played by the EU in resolving the conflict. The European states had pursued a policy with elements that we will revisit in the case studies: facilitating talks, positive inducements, peace-keepers and aid, and loyally supporting and upholding UN sanctions while maintaining a balanced, if not neutral, approach. When these measures were unsuccessful, the EU appeared ready to see the conflict resolved in the old way – on the battlefield. When it finally intervened, the US all but ignored the EU. In an interview, a former UN envoy to the Balkans expressed what he claimed to be widely held incredulity that the US was bypassing the EU and imposing a solution that closely resembled the EU-sponsored Vance-Owens Plan – which Washington had scuttled a few years earlier.

The events in Bosnia came in addition to and on top of a series of incidents such as Greece defying the common EU position on Macedonia and France's unilateral policies towards Algeria. This convinced many commentators that the CFSP was a token initiative that was little more than a supplement to – and vehicle for – national policies. John Peterson lamented: "Increasingly, non-European analysts belittle the CFSP as a device to legitimate EU inaction."⁷⁷ There were also serious questions concerning the EU's ability to act should it wish to do so. In 1993, Christopher Hill published an influential article on what he called the EU "capability-expectations gap". In the article he accused the EU states of

proclaiming a common foreign and security policy without practising it and promising common defence without committing the means necessary for it. Hill analysed the international role that the EU was expected to play, and identified a gap between what it had been talked up to do and what it was actually able to deliver. He saw the capability–expectations gap as having three components, namely, “its ability to agree, its resources, and the instruments at its disposal”, and he described the state of affairs as “unsatisfactory and even dangerous”.⁷⁸ The following year, this analysis was validated by the EU Commission’s *Durieux Report* which went so far as to describe the EU security policy as “rudderless”.⁷⁹

There were, however, some signs that change was under way. The reinvigoration of the WEU helped avoid the politically charged issue of introducing security and defence cooperation into the EU proper – a proposition Britain remained vehemently opposed to. In the mid-1990s the US encouraged the development of a European Security and Defence Initiative (ESDI) within NATO as the solution to the challenge of post-Cold War security in Europe. In this structure the WEU was intended to form a “bridge” between NATO and the EU. Launched unofficially at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in 1994, the initiative was intended to be a largely technical arrangement to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance by granting the WEU access to NATO’s military capabilities, something the EU states did not possess. The initiative was the strongest indicator so far of the willingness of the US to accommodate the EU in the European security architecture. Meanwhile, France signalled its intention of rejoining NATO’s military structure. However, the attempt at the “Europeanisation” of the Alliance was stalled, as we shall see in Chapter 4. In 1997, Philip Gordon reached much the same conclusion as had John Peterson and Christopher Hill, adding that:

This situation is unlikely to change significantly even over the longer term. So long as the United States is willing to remain engaged in European security and in NATO, and unless some unforeseen and overwhelming common external challenge was to emerge, the EU is likely to remain a fragmented and incomplete external actor, dependent on the United States for diplomatic leadership and military support.⁸⁰

Franco-British détente

Being nuclear powers, France and Britain had in a strategic sense been the most independent of the Western European countries during the Cold War. With Germany’s wings clipped, they alone could claim to be global powers in terms of interests, obligations and military capabilities. But the 1956 Suez crisis showed that they could no longer sustain their pretension to empire or to global sphere of interest on their own limited

resources. London and Paris drew different lessons from the crisis. To Britain, Suez marked a turning point which underlined the degree to which the US had become indispensable in matters concerning European security. London concluded that little could be achieved without US support. British leaders have since then consistently laboured to keep the US engaged in Europe, placing the notion of a “special relationship” at the heart of British security policy. The French came to much the opposite conclusion, summarised by German Chancellor Adenauer in a conversation with the French foreign minister, Christian Pineau:

France and England will never be powers comparable to the United States and the Soviet Union. Nor Germany either. There remains to them only one way of playing a decisive role in the world; that is to unite to make Europe [...]. We have no time to waste: Europe will be your revenge.⁸¹

The French lesson was to rely less on the US and more on Europe, in order to assert leadership in international affairs. France would need to coordinate closely with other European states, notably West Germany.⁸² In a sense one might think of it as Germany providing to France what the US provided to Britain in terms of added weight in the intra-European bargain. While Britain imagined itself as bridging the Atlantic, balancing European and Atlantic agendas, Gaullist rhetoric insisted that *Les Anglo-Saxons* would have to choose between Europe and America. There is also some evidence to suggest that the US actively encouraged the Franco-British estrangement. President Kennedy is quoted in official records as having said, “It is through the multilateral concept that we increase the dependence of the European nations on the United States and tie these nations closer to us. Thus we thwart De Gaulle [...]”⁸³ On another occasion the President is quoted as having said that the US had narrowly avoided a disaster which would have occurred if the British had decided to join de Gaulle in a nuclear arrangement.⁸⁴ There is much to indicate that the US has consciously played divide and conquer with France and Britain to this date. In an interview, a State Department official active during the Nixon years put this in plain terms:

We want the Europeans to cooperate, sure – but if French and British nukes were placed under joint command this would create a third force between us and the Russians, and we did not – let me rephrase that – we *do* not want that.

Objections to American primacy in NATO combined with differences of opinion over the nature of the Soviet threat caused continuous frictions within the Alliance. The disputes eventually led to the French withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structure in 1966. As President De

Gaulle explained to Chancellor Adenauer, “America only envisages an Alliance on the condition that it commands it.”⁸⁵ The relationship between Washington and Paris has since then lacked in closeness. The many French attempts at rapprochement were not met by Washington in a spirit of equality, so strongly desired in France. In Paris, many felt that the assumption that subordination guaranteed access or influence in the US was patently false. This basic lesson was repeated by Presidents Pompidou and Nixon, Giscard and Carter, and more recently, François Mitterrand and George Bush the Elder, and Jacques Chirac in his relations with Bill Clinton and George Bush the Younger. It is in this context that the French desire for European autonomy should be understood. But while jealously guarding its independent strategic outlook, it must be noted that France subscribed to the overall transatlantic bargain. Paris was consistently in favour of US engagement in Europe in order to counterbalance the Soviets throughout the Cold War, and supported the overall NATO strategy including US nuclear guarantees and the permanent stationing of troops in Europe.

A decisive moment for the development of the CFSP came when Britain committed itself to a European security and defence policy. Prime Minister Tony Blair announced this change of direction at the EU summit at the Austrian resort town of Portschäch in 1998.⁸⁶ At the time of the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord, few would have thought that the Allies would find themselves in a very similar situation only a few years later, this time over Kosovo, as we will see in Chapter 3. The Yugoslav civil wars impressed upon the Europeans their dependence on US military clout as well as the limitations of American commitment to European security. The humanitarian crisis in the Balkans therefore provided the ESDP with much of its original *raison d'être*. In 1998, on the eve of the Kosovo War, France and Britain met bilaterally in the French port of Saint Malo and issued the strongly worded statement that is sometimes referred to as the “birth certificate” of the ESDP.⁸⁷ The significance of the occasion should not be underestimated. For the first time since the Suez crisis, Europe’s two leading military powers together planned a common strategy without the Americans being present.⁸⁸

The Saint Malo Declaration reflects a shared desire to stop and reverse the strategic decline of Europe, but remains ambiguous regarding whether this should happen within the confines of – or in opposition to – American primacy. The Saint Malo statement charted a middle path between the French position – “The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage” with a “capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military force” – and the British view: “while acting in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members”.⁸⁹ In other words, French and British leaders declared

autonomy from the American security frameworks in Europe, while reaffirming allegiance to the same structures. The message agreed at Saint Malo was that the intra-European and Euro-American elements of the transatlantic bargain were of equal importance. The bargain was later captured in Tony Blair's one-liner, referring to the ESDP as being "separable, but not separate" from NATO.⁹⁰ French President Jacques Chirac gave his understanding of the new bargain with a slight change in the order of words in his speech in Toulouse in May 1999: "the European Union will not fully exist until it possesses an autonomous capacity for action".⁹¹

The Saint Malo agreement was triggered by immediate concerns over the escalating tensions in Kosovo. Britain and France were equally eager that Europe should play a more constructive role than it had during the Bosnian crisis. Both parties agreed that a show of leadership was required. It was the change in the British position that made Saint Malo possible. After all, as one French government official pointed out in an interview: the *Élysée* would have signed such a declaration at almost any given time since 1945. Among the many reasons why London appeared to be altering its policy on this matter, three deserve mention. First, London was keenly aware that the end of the Cold War had reduced the strategic significance of Europe in Washington and that the growing gap in military capabilities could only exacerbate this trend. A second concern was the uncertainty over the future role of the US, which caused a great deal of unease in Whitehall. Blair decided that European security structures had to be strengthened to ward off the isolationist impulses in the US and as a means to encourage Washington to continue to play a leading role in European security. In early 1999, he stated: "Let me assure you of this: European defence is not about new institutional fixes. It is about new capabilities, both military and diplomatic."⁹² Though it was a bilateral initiative, the Saint Malo declaration represented a renegotiation of the intra-European bargain. It is also important to keep in mind that Tony Blair had adopted a "pro-Europe" stance during his first years in office. By propelling Britain to the heart of an important integration project at a time when the country was side-lined by its non-participation in the other forward-looking projects such as a common currency, the euro (€), the ESDP added to Britain's credibility in an EU context.

Keeping the Americans out, the British in, and the French down

As we follow the first years of the EU security policies in the case studies, it may be useful to have a clearer idea of some of the prevailing trends in European security thinking during the 1990s. After all, the impact of the US on EU policies can only be assessed if we know something of the level of ambition among European decision-makers. What was the purpose of the EU security policies? What would be their geographical scope and

what sort of missions would the Europeans engage in? Would an EU strategic culture be based on the strength of arms or on the invisible hand of interdependence? Curiously, none of these questions figured prominently on the EU agenda at the time. It is noteworthy how little serious discussion took place among the member states over the future direction of the EU security policy.

The primary reason for the lack of purpose was the diffuse security agenda. As Jamie Shea noted:

In the post-Cold War era security has become muffled. Although the classic threat has disappeared, new security threats and challenges have proliferated and allies do not necessarily have the same perceptions as to what they are. The threats are today latent and whether or not to address them is voluntary as opposed to the imperatives of the Cold War threats exemplified by Soviet tanks on the inner-German border.

This trend made it possible to assemble the ESDP without the initiative ever being given a clear mission statement. The bilateral initiative was adopted as EU policy at the European Council meeting in Cologne in June 1999. The summit conclusions emphasised that the EU's common security and defence policy would depend on developing the necessary capabilities to act autonomously.⁹³ In the flurry of initiatives that accompanied the Kosovo conflict, it was not clear for a long time what exactly the Europeans had signed up to – whether the ESDP was a tidying up of crisis management capabilities or the vanguard of a European army. Some of the initial progress of the ESDP is attributed to this technique of applying “constructive ambiguity” as a way to avoid controversy.⁹⁴ The EU owes much of its track record on collective endeavours to its technique of defining practical objectives first and then leaving the questions of principle and implementation to a later stage. For this reason, it was easier to state what the ESDP was not, rather than what it was in 1999. The “defence” element of the European Security and *Defence* Policy was not linked to the territorial defence of the member states when, for most European states, their national defence rested on the guaranteed American support that most believed the collective defence article of the NATO Charter afforded.⁹⁵ In an EU context, “defence” was counter-intuitively meant to signify crisis management outside the EU territory as outlined in the 1992 Petersberg tasks.⁹⁶

Instead of the definition of the threats to be deterred or the interests to be defended, the ESDP was constructed around the types of mission that were envisioned. In this sense, the ESDP is a true product of the perceived voluntary nature of post-Cold War security. The reason why the EU was seen as a suitable vehicle for European security aspirations was idea-driven (as opposed to threat-driven), and has much to do with the broadening of

the term “security”, as discussed in the previous chapter. As Anne Deighton put it: “in the context of the post-Cold War worlds, a blend of economic, political and military instruments is surely indispensable for an effective security policy”.⁹⁷ Given the economic, diplomatic and media resources that the EU member states have at their disposal, it was assumed that the Union would be in a favourable position to become a powerful international actor sometime in the future. From the beginning, the ESDP was an institutional embodiment of the uneasy understanding – holding the promise for the Europeanists to deepen political integration and carve out a greater role for the EU in the world, and for the Atlanticists to make the Europeans more able and relevant partners in a transatlantic context.

From this perspective one might say that the ESDP had three primary goals: (1) to provide a new intra-European security bargain, notably through deepening integration in a way that would further diminish the possibility of the use of force among states in Europe; (2) to give the EU the means to affect policy, notably a limited but autonomous military capacity; (3) to construct a European post-Cold War security architecture in response to the fading role of the US in European security. The difficult task of balancing these positions was handed to NATO’s former Secretary General, Javier Solana. Based in the EU Council but operating in close coordination with the EU Commission, the main task for the High Representative was, as one member of Javier Solana’s staff put it in a memorable one-liner, to keep the dual bargain from collapsing by “keeping the Americans out, the British in, and the French down”. If one were to attempt to interpret the statement, one possible understanding could be that the US should be denied formal ties with the ESDP out of fear that the US would use such ties to dominate an organisation they are, after all, not a part of. Britain was considered vital to the initiative since the chance of a successful ESDP without Europe’s leading military power was as probable as a common currency without the weight of the German economy behind it. The need to keep France – Europe’s other great military power – “down” was due to the fact that France has long been viewed as a proponent of a more independent and activist EU foreign and security policy that might unsettle a hard-fought consensus. Solana attested to the difficulty in maintaining this situation: “It is no more difficult to make decisions in an EU of 25 than one with 15. The problem is the same as it always was: to get Britain and France to agree.”⁹⁸

To summarise, the American policies towards the European states over time constructed a framework of political and military dependence, despite supporting the creation of intergovernmental European defence structures independent of the United States. The transatlantic bargain after the failure of the EDC in 1954 featured increasingly asymmetrical power- and burden-sharing in the Euro-American half of the bargain. In the intra-European bargain the US supported European integration as the foundation, albeit from afar. The policy of “alliance without integration”

was the policy of successive White House administrations. In Europe the non-integration in security and defence matters was contrasted to the rapid development in other policy fields. While European leaders did sign a number of security cooperation agreements outside the EC frameworks, the primary connection to the United States was through NATO. The ever-ambiguous connection between the integration project and the Atlantic Alliance became increasingly ambivalent as the Cold War tensions subsided.

Despite all the talk of a rupture and a “new security” after the Cold War, the fact of the matter is that in the post-Cold War era prior to 1998 the transatlantic bargain remained remarkably untouched by the changes in the world order. Washington retained much of its military and strategic leadership in Europe through NATO, and by invitation from the Europeans. The attempts on behalf of the European Union to develop a foreign policy dimension looked all too much like a repetition of the failures of the past, amounting to little more than words. By 2004 this situation had changed dramatically. While the United States was still involved in European security, its role had been diminished. At the same time the EU was putting boots on the ground in three different parts of the world and had become a genuine forum for foreign and security policy-making among the European states. What had happened? In the three next chapters we will look into the three questions that helped bring about and shape the emerging EU strategic culture.

3 The Kosovo war

Having clean hands – poet Charles Péguy (1873–1914) once pointed out – can also mean having no hands.¹ This is a fitting image of the EU handling of the Kosovo conflict. When the Kosovo war broke out, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was still in its infancy.² Although much has been written on the diplomatic and military aspects of the conflict, the role played by the European Union has received notably less attention. This is due, not least, to the increasingly low profile of the EU as the situation came to the brink of, and then descended into, war. As tensions escalated, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was overshadowed by the Contact Group, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and great power politics. The Kosovo war is of special interest to the study of the American influence on EU security policies since the conflict was the first “live fire” test for the ESDP, which after all had been constructed in response to a near-identical set of conflicts in the Balkans only a few years earlier. It was therefore unsurprising that the EU was eager to redeem itself by playing a leading role in resolving the Kosovo question. This chapter shows that, despite the limited role played by the EU, the crisis was a defining moment in the construction of the European security policy dimension because it strengthened the determination among the member states to make the EU a more effective strategic actor.

The chapter has three main sections. Since the disputes that forced themselves onto the agenda during the spring of 1999 were continuations of long-running debates, the chapter begins with a brief outline of the crisis up to the year 1998 when the case study begins. The second section focuses on the contested questions between the US and the EU under several broad headings: sanctions and incentives (whether sanctions should be backed by coercive diplomacy, i.e. the threat of using force) and on what authority; and finally, imposed settlement (over whose authority could force be applied). In the third section, we will examine the difference in narrative that came out of the conflict – how, and to what extent the US influenced EU policies, and the characteristics of the EU strategic culture.

Most analysts agree that the immediate cause of the Kosovo war was the oppressive policies pursued against the Albanian minority throughout the 1990s by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) President, Slobodan Milosevic. These policies led to a violent uprising against Serbian rule which, in turn, triggered outside intervention. Although it is not widely acknowledged, the EU did play a key role in the Kosovo conflict – contributing diplomatic initiatives and helping to maintain cohesion among the European states throughout. In terms of influence on EU policies, the US applied a variety of techniques: from “binding” to the exploiting of information asymmetries and technological gaps; to process shaping; and bilateral pressure. European leaders frequently found their own positions and initiatives being influenced by policies made in Washington. The EU’s susceptibility to American pressure was compounded by a number of factors: difficulties in mobilising military and diplomatic capabilities; insufficient attention and resource allocation; lack of a binding common position on the issue. We shall return to these aspects in greater detail in the following.

The sources for this chapter are drawn from five categories. For anyone eager to understand the conflict in a historical context, Nobel laureate Ivo Andric’s epic, *The Bridge on the Drina*, provides a good background – as does Rebecca West’s *Grey Falcon*, *Black Lamb*.³ With regard to the actual events of 1998–99, the accounts of policymakers such as Wesley Clark, Wolfgang Petrisch, Bill Clinton and Madeleine Albright in the form of memoirs have been invaluable, together with interviews given by decision-makers which have been used extensively for verification and fact-checking in Brussels, Berlin, London, Paris and Washington.⁴ A large number of official sources are also available. Marc Weller and Heike Krieger’s collection of documents from 1974 to 1999 provides a helpful list of primary sources, as do the Public Papers of the Presidents at the National Archives in Washington, DC.⁵ A third category consists of commentaries on the unfolding events, including media sources such as television documentaries and newspaper reports.⁶ In addition, there are the post-conflict assessment reports by overseeing bodies such as the British House of Lords, the French National Assembly and the US Congress.⁷ Finally, there is a full array of scholarly analysis and commentary.⁸

Roots of the Kosovo conflict

Divided by more religious, ethnic, economic and historical fault lines than any other region, Kosovo was viewed by many analysts as that part of Yugoslavia where the status quo was least likely to endure after the end of the Cold War. Over the decades, the Serb minority in the region had fallen from nearly a third in the 1950s to 8 per cent at the beginning of the 1990s, when an estimated 90 per cent of the population of approximately 2 million was of Albanian descent.⁹ Ethnic tensions increased in

1989 when the autonomy bestowed on Kosovo in the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution was revoked, effectively making the region a part of Serbia.¹⁰ The region remained relatively calm during the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation. This led to the Kosovo question being side-lined throughout the international efforts to end hostilities.¹¹ The Kosovar delegation was not invited to participate in the actual negotiations at the 1992 London Conference which attempted to find a settlement to the conflict. Instead, Kosovo was placed in a “special group”, giving the impression that a diplomatic process was under way. The 1995 Dayton Peace Accord which finally ended the Yugoslav civil war barely mentioned Kosovo. According to informed sources the negotiations were sufficiently complex without adding more ethnic groups to the equation. Another important – and frequently forgotten – pretext to the conflict was the 1995 expulsion of an estimated 200,000 Serbs from the Krajina enclave by Croat nationalist forces. This created a refugee crisis in Serbia, and appeared to legitimise expulsion as a solution to ethnic unrest. A third catalyst for the violence in Kosovo was the collapse of the state structure in neighbouring Albania in early 1997. The proliferation of weapons at the military depots of the Albanian army helped the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA/*Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës* – UÇK) to an estimated 30,000 small arms.

The Kosovo Liberation Army at the outset was a marginal organisation given to intimidation and common banditry. The KLA had little support outside its strongholds in the Drenica region of Kosovo, and other elements of the autonomy movement avoided being associated with the group.¹² In 1996, the KLA initiated a campaign of small-scale strikes against Serb civilian and military targets. From early 1997 onwards, the situation in Kosovo deteriorated rapidly. Tit-for-tat violence between the KLA and Serb paramilitary forces escalated and by early 1998, Serb military forces moved in to regain control of the Drenica region. The Yugoslav army (*Vojske Jugoslavije* – VJ) and the Serb special police (*Ministarstvo Unutrasnjih Poslova* – MUP) assisted by paramilitary forces attempted to pacify the region by forced evacuation of insurgent strongholds. The operations targeted the civilian Albanian population suspected of aiding the KLA.¹³ These operations were predictably followed by a spread in hostilities and the strengthening of militant elements, notably the KLA. The action taken drew international condemnation of what was seen as the use of “excessive force” by Serb authorities and “terrorist acts” on behalf of the KLA.¹⁴

EU approaches to the Kosovo conflict

European attempts at resolving the Kosovo conflict must be understood in the context of the lessons derived from the Yugoslav civil war of the mid-1990s. The experience of the Bosnian crisis had impressed upon the Europeans the dangers of engaging in conflict management without the

necessary capabilities and frameworks in place. The EU's security policy tool kit at the time did not allow for much more than declarations, diplomatic initiatives, economic incentives and sanctions. It was therefore important for the Europeans to address Kosovo as multilaterally as possible so as to not end up in a "stand alone, fail alone" situation. This lesson had been bitterly learnt in the oft-cited moment in 1991 when Jacques Poos, on behalf of the member states, had declared that the unrest in Yugoslavia represented "the hour of Europe, not the hour of the United States". Events proved Poos wrong and the Europeans had to invite Washington to intervene when it became clear that good intentions alone would not stop the bloodshed.¹⁵

The internal EU agenda at that time was another complicating factor. The Santer Commission was mired in accusations of corruption and nepotism that eventually forced it collectively to step down at the end of 1999. In the Council, a number of politically sensitive processes, among them the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty and the upcoming European Parliament elections on 13 June 1999 crowded the agenda, rendering the central institutions ill-disposed to take the lead on an issue fraught with pitfalls and preciously few clear-cut solutions.¹⁶ This was, to some extent, offset by the rotating Presidency being in the hands of two leading member states during the crisis. Britain and Germany had a greater capacity to initiate EU policies than smaller member states.

The EU formally recognised rump-Yugoslavia, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, in April 1996. It did so without demanding a special status for Kosovo. Instead, the EU limited itself to observing that the improvement of relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the international community would depend *inter alia* on a "constructive approach" by the FRY towards the question of autonomy for Kosovo.¹⁷ The cautious approach reflected, in the words of one EU representative, a desire "to avoid conflict with the Serbian Government, an indispensable player in the brokering and implementation of peace agreements in Bosnia, which could hamper political and economic reform and the current process of democratisation".¹⁸

A consensus nevertheless emerged that the EU would have to play a leading role in resolving the Kosovo conflict. This was, in part, due to the change in government in key European capitals, most visibly in London where the newly elected Prime Minister, Tony Blair and Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, had placed the concept of an "ethical foreign policy" at the heart of British foreign affairs.¹⁹ An internal conflict involving irregular forces and large-scale human rights abuses was, at that time, seen as exactly the sort of post-Cold War security challenge that the EU would have to learn to deal with effectively.

At this early stage, there was considerable common ground among the member states. One might even speak of a common policy approach, although this was never formally stated in any single policy paper. The

strategic objectives of the EU were the following. First, there was an agreement regarding the need to act quickly stemming from a strong desire among EU members to redeem themselves for their handling of the Yugoslav civil wars by playing a stronger role in Kosovo. Second, there was a consensus in Europe that concerted pressure was the only way to influence Belgrade and the Kosovar insurgents. This pressure was expected to be more effective if Russia and the United States were also part of the group. Third, the members agreed that under no circumstances should the EU act in a way that could force them to shoulder responsibility alone; instead, a solution should be found within the confines of the United Nations (UN) frameworks.²⁰ A fourth assumption was that the situation offered no clear-cut solutions and would be best addressed through constructive engagement and offering incentives. Fifth, there was a consensus that a settlement could not simply be imposed, but would have to be brokered. Finally, there was agreement that the issues in Kosovo were about the protection of minorities and the upholding of human rights, not about self-determination or national rights.

The thrust of these six points pointed in the direction of a negotiated settlement between the Serbs and the Albanians.²¹ The EU's primary strategy in resolving the crisis involved the EU Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) and its Special Envoy, Wolfgang Petrisch. The EU worked closely alongside the West European Union (WEU) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).²² The Mission contributed resources directly to the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) initiated in October 1998. Although the Mission succeeded in drawing international attention to the conflict, it failed to defuse the crisis. As it became clear that the OSCE was unable to reverse or contain the situation, the Contact Group – a diplomatic coalition comprising France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Russia, the US and the European Union – became the primary driving force in the international response to the Kosovo question.²³

European leaders were generally more cautious than the White House administration in prescribing solutions to the conflict. The American approach to Kosovo was shaped by the perceived effectiveness of coercion in bringing about the Dayton agreement.²⁴ In this sense it can be seen as a bad omen that the EU had not even been invited to participate in the Dayton Peace Accords which brought the Bosnian war to an end. Much has been made of the perceived military weakness of the Europeans over the Kosovo crisis. One must, however, keep in mind the relative power balance between the FRY and the EU. All the larger EU states were militarily superior to the FRY and, when put together, their forces dwarfed those of Belgrade. That the EU was reluctant to even consider the military option was in part due to the complexities of EU foreign policy-making, but was also grounded in a commonly held view that attempts at coercion would only further entrench the Serb leadership and exacerbate the crisis.

The several thousand European troops under UN command in neighbouring Bosnia were obvious targets in any armed confrontation, complicating matters further. There were also concerns among neighbouring countries with Albanian minorities of their own such as Greece and Macedonia. These countries feared that punishing Serbia would encourage the KLA and pan-Albanian forces. There was also apprehension in Brussels over the continued need for Belgrade's support in ousting the war crime suspect, Radovan Karadzic, from leadership in the autonomous Bosnian region of Republika Srpska.²⁵ Yet, the overriding worry was that if threats were to be made, they would have to be lived up to, and few believed that the UN Security Council would mandate such an action. An even more pressing factor was that the EU could not realistically hope to muster the capabilities to deliver on any such threats. Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon point out that the EU concerns were "not only valid but also useful correctives to the inclination of some Clinton Administration officials to lash out violently at Milosevic without really having thought through the consequences of doing so".²⁶

Sanctions, coercive diplomacy and air strikes

The European Union approached the Kosovo situation in a "conflict prevention" mode under the broad headings "critical dialogue" and "constructive engagement". Over a period of two-and-a-half years, the European Union issued no fewer than 22 declarations, decisions and joint actions within the CFSP framework in relation to the Kosovo question. When entering the "hard power" spectrum, the EU focused on economic rather than military measures and clearly favoured incentives over coercion. Initially, there was much focus on confidence-building measures such as the building of a civic society and education reforms.²⁷ The plan was to encourage the parties to embark on a "supervised dialogue" that, in time, might defuse tensions and facilitate a negotiated settlement. Most of the sanctions following the Bosnian conflict had been lifted as part of the Dayton peace settlement, but from 1996, the FRY was this time the target of sanctions aimed at pressing the government to take a more cooperative stance on the Kosovo question.²⁸

The EU soon found the cooperative elements of its crisis management approach obstructed. The attempts to engage the FRY by offering trade incentives were hampered by the lack of hard currency to buy Western goods in Yugoslavia, and by the fact that the country's main trading partners in the former communist bloc, notably Russia, were not bound by the EU sanctions. The EU's attempts to influence events were restricted by the fact that the FRY, unlike other former Yugoslav republics, was not seeking EU membership even in the long term. This undercut some of the Union's leverage in influencing the Serb treatment of minorities, an approach that had proved highly effective in its dealings with applicant

countries. Also, perhaps as a result of the experiences in Bosnia, Belgrade was not inclined to allow Western agencies to establish themselves inside the country and open up “soft power” channels to influence public opinion in Serbia. The EU also found that the democratic opposition in Serbia was actually in line with the Milosevic regime on the Kosovo question. With these channels closed, traditional diplomacy and sanctions soon became the primary tools of the EU.

The EU attempted to maintain an even-handed approach by pressuring the Serb government while attempting to stem the flow of money and weapons to the KLA from the Albanian Diaspora in Western Europe and the United States.²⁹ In late 1997, as tensions rose, the EU became increasingly involved in the Kosovo question. The German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, and his French counterpart, Hubert Védrine, sent a letter to the Serbian President indicating that the EU could be persuaded to restore trade preferences in return for a negotiated settlement.³⁰ The deadline for this was ignored and the Serb military launched fresh operations. Despite this, the Contact Group chose to postpone freezing the FRY’s assets abroad for another month because of diplomatic signals that the FRY might be willing to comply. A similar pattern repeated itself over the next three months, with Serb authorities continuing military operations in Kosovo while engineering diplomatic manoeuvres to stave off sanctions.

The Kosovo question moved sharply up the agenda when Britain took over the rotating EU Presidency in January 1998, partly as a result of the events in Kosovo, but more importantly, due to the assertive leadership of Tony Blair. The result was two new common EU positions, the more forceful of the two spelling out the EU’s goal as: “to put pressure on Belgrade to find a peaceful settlement to the Kosovo problem”.³¹ This position imposed a range of economic and military sanctions against the FRY and the regime in Belgrade. The mainstay of the EU sanctions regime was the arms embargo that had remained in place since the Bosnian war.³² As the violence escalated, the Union initiated sanctions against investments in Serbia and Serb-owned assets abroad.³³ Later, a “blacklist” was issued containing the names of senior Serb officials who were not allowed to enter the territories of member states.³⁴ In June 1998, the EU Cardiff Summit conceded that the measures had failed to meet their objectives and agreed that the conflict had reached “a new level of violence”.³⁵ In response, the leaders agreed in principle to ban flights of Yugoslav airlines to and from the EU member states.³⁶ The EU also supported the suspension of the FRY from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

Failed conflict prevention

Chris Patten – the then European Commissioner for External Relations – highlighted the problem with the early EU crisis management approach:

"In 1998 alone the EU adopted 163 foreign policy declarations usually a week or two after they could have influenced events."³⁷ Also, the sanctions were inflexible and ineffective. These shortcomings were compounded by selective compliance among the member states. Direct investments from EU members circumvented with impunity the Council regulations on economic and financial relations.³⁸ An Anglo-Italian venture to set up a stock exchange in Belgrade and the sale of 49 per cent of Serbia Telecom to OTE Greece and Telecom Italia are but two examples.³⁹ Other initiatives also got bogged down. The flight ban was not enforced for several months due to determined resistance from Greece, while Britain cited legal complications.⁴⁰ In April 1998, the EU finally agreed to freeze Serb funds abroad after the US threatened to abandon the Contact Group if progress was not made.⁴¹

For all the talk about the need for a dynamic sanctions regime, the EU essentially adopted the American approach of punitive sanctions that would remain in place until "substantial progress had been made with respect to human rights and self-governance in Kosovo".⁴² This effectively acknowledged the fact that dynamic sanctions regimes tend to work better in theory than in practice. The EU soon found that it was difficult to go back on sanctions that had been imposed and that it was nearly impossible to agree on new ones. The fear of upsetting hard-fought consensus led to the EU getting stuck in ineffectual policies. Russia sought to roll back sanctions against the FRY in the UN and Greece championed a similar position within the EU. Perhaps most importantly, the sanctions had little effect on the popular mood of the Yugoslav population, toughened by years of hardship during the Bosnian crisis. No doubt, the FRY's resilience was also fortified by the Union turning of a blind eye to fundraising for the KLA by Albanian communities all over Europe. The EU states were also cautious about taking steps that could alienate Russia, a country that was seen as critical in "delivering" the FRY to the negotiating table. Finally, there was some apprehension regarding the need for tough policing of the region and a general reluctance to lend support to the political violence of the KLA, an organisation whose means and ends the EU did not support.⁴³

The EU's crisis management from 1996 to mid-1998 was aimed at creating a favourable climate for political dialogue that, in turn, was intended to lead to conflict resolution. The diplomatic measures and targeted sanctions approach was successful in containing the situation, but did little to resolve it. Marc Weller points out that despite going further than the UN equivalent, the EU sanctions were applied in a "strangely haphazard and half-hearted way".⁴⁴ This was to no small extent a reflection of a degree of understanding and support for Belgrade in a number of member states. States such as Spain and Britain had themselves been forced to deal with the problem of groups taking up arms to achieve political objectives. While some states such as Italy had economic interests and others such as

Greece shared a cultural closeness with the Serb people, there was also a general reluctance in Europe to lend legitimacy to a violent minority by treating it on an equal footing as a legitimate government. As the crisis escalated, the EU's common policy approach came undone. One source in the EU Commission described the situation: "Turning up the heat was likely to land us in worse dilemmas morally, politically, legally – you name it – without bringing us any closer to achieving the overall goal." A source from Solana's staff summarised the conflict prevention phase as follows: "The escalation effectively removed the EU from the equation. We did not have the capabilities. End of story."

The US and the EU approached the agency of sanctions differently. While the EU tended to treat sanctions as a serious step that required extensive deliberations, in America sanctions were regarded as a warning – a first step. The EU regarded coercion as a diplomatic tool which when skilfully applied alongside positive incentives could be effective. In contrast, interviews carried out with State Department officials in Washington indicate that the imposition of sanctions was seen as a warning shot with the added benefit of weakening the adversary's ability to fight. One obvious explanation for this difference is that sanctions were at the top end of what the EU could realistically be expected to achieve, and at the bottom end of the American scale of coercion. Rather than this translating into complementary action, the Euro-American partners remained ill-matched. The European Union ended up in the undesirable position of not only failing to apply sanctions in the sophisticated manner that could have rendered them effective, but also found itself trailing events as well as the US sanctions. Despite being applied within the UN framework, both the US and the EU sanctions regimes remained uncoordinated and largely ineffective. Simon Duke summarises the pre-crisis management in the following words: "Both the US and the EU showed their complete incapacity for any type of conflict prevention, preferring instead reactive conflict management as matters deteriorated."⁴⁵ As the EU debate was getting serious about sanctions, the debate in Washington shifted towards coercive diplomacy.

Coercive diplomacy and imposed settlement

By early 1998, it was becoming increasingly clear that cooperative measures were failing. The US, like the EU up to this point, had concerned itself with Kosovo in close coordination with regional and international organisations. The shift towards coercive diplomacy sidelined the OSCE, and brought the Contact Group and NATO to the fore. The EU remained plugged into the process, but Washington's determination to move the process onto a level where the EU suffered from capability shortfalls lessened the relevance of the Union during the armed phase of the conflict. According to a high-level NATO official, "The support for NATO's pol-

icies also curbed the ‘soft power’ potential of the EU since Belgrade now saw the EU as running the errands of Washington.” In an interview a FRY government official posted in Brussels at the time noted that the Commission had seemed “overly keen to keep its distance and maintain its self-image as honest broker, while in fact it was clear that it was no such thing”. A member of the HR-CFSP staff added: “One must keep in mind that the Amsterdam Treaty that created the EU security structures had not yet come into force and the EU had no clear mandate at this stage. We did not offer help and we were not asked.”

According to a senior Department of Defense Official, the conventional wisdom in Washington at the time was that the surest way to get results with Belgrade was to spell out the consequences of non-compliance. As described in the previous chapter, the US had initially ceded the handling of the Yugoslav crisis to European agencies, notably the EU. The Union, through deferral, had in effect chosen to let the conflict burn itself out. A former foreign policy adviser to Bill Clinton stressed the strong sense in the White House that the American willingness to threaten with and use armed force had been instrumental in bringing the conflict in Bosnia to an end. Based on past experience, American leaders now openly questioned the good faith of the Serb leadership. Belgrade had developed a talent for procrastination during the Bosnian conflict. The Clinton Administration concluded that UN-centred multilateralism would achieve nothing more than ineffective sanctions, arms embargoes and occasional peace-keepers.

The strategy adopted in the case of Kosovo was largely a direct result of the in-house deliberations and compromises in Washington in 1998. The US had unilaterally threatened Serbia with military force on several occasions during the 1990s.⁴⁶ What set Kosovo apart from previous US engagement in the Balkans was that this time the goal was not to change the outcome of a single battle, but actually to resolve the deeper questions behind the conflict. This made parts of the Washington establishment jittery. Ivo Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon describe the debates in the Clinton Administration in 1998, where one faction led by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and NATO Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (SACEUR) Wesley Clark, stood against a second group led by National Security Adviser Samuel “Sandy” Berger and Defense Secretary William Cohen. The former group saw the situation in Kosovo as analogous to that in Bosnia four years earlier, and argued that the Serbs were on course to committing new atrocities that could be prevented if they were confronted with credible counterforce. It followed from this view that the US should apply such force and, if necessary, do so alone. Albright was also concerned that policy setbacks in Haiti and Somalia had made the government look weak and that decisive action was needed to counter the impression that the administration was “in” politically and “out” militarily.⁴⁷

Sandy Berger was sceptical and pointed out that Kosovo was the sovereign territory of the FRY, and that the KLA had taken up arms first. He argued that targeting the Serbs would effectively aid the KLA by weakening their motivation to seek a negotiated settlement. Further, the US could not move unilaterally since air strikes would endanger the troops, mostly European, that were policing neighbouring Bosnia. A senior Department of Defense Official noted in an interview that Cohen made no secret of his doubts regarding whether it would be in the US national interest to enter into another Balkan conflict. Both Berger and Cohen made it clear that they would not recommend military action to the Congress or to the President without explicit NATO consent and support.⁴⁸ The compromise between two opposing camps in Washington made it an American objective to keep the Europeans onboard while solving the crisis. In keeping within the bounds of the remaining elements of the EU consensus, that is the need to act quickly and in concert, the US successfully crafted a new transatlantic consensus centred on coercive diplomacy and imposed settlement.

At this stage, the Kosovo crisis had become a question of mandates. By mid-1998, the no-nonsense approach of the Albright faction and the lack of tangible progress in negotiations made European leaders appear more willing to consider coercive diplomacy. By June 1998, the EU condemned the "wide-spread house burning and indiscriminate artillery attacks of whole villages [indicating] a new level of aggression on the part of the Serb security forces".⁴⁹ The position expressly identified these practices as a new phase of "ethnic cleansing", one of the most damning terms in diplomatic vocabulary at that time. Marc Weller writes: "There was however, a veiled threat of force, although at that stage it seemed to the Union that such activities would require a UN Chapter VII mandate."⁵⁰ The question of force soon became a question over the roles and hierarchy in the regional organisations and mechanisms of Europe and the international community. The UN and EU positions largely coincided with each other, as was reflected in the carefully ambiguous Security Council Resolution 1199 which would later be used by NATO to justify the war. It should be noted that the UN resolution closely mirrors the demands made by the 1998 Cardiff European Council to such a degree that it is fair to assume that the EU shaped the UN approach.⁵¹ The rationale behind convening a "Contact Group" for the Kosovo crisis had been that since it comprised four out of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, they hoped this would guarantee UN support for any deal that they brokered. But when Russia made it clear that it would not support the threat of force, it effectively meant that the Security Council was deadlocked. Russia refused to change its position and removed itself from the process, thereby eliminating any hope of a UN mandate. The Contact Group kept on meeting for some time, but in October 1998 the events on the ground forced Western leaders into contemplating the use

of force. By this stage the Contact Group was unable to agree on anything more than a three paragraph statement repeating previous positions.⁵²

The prevailing mood in Washington in the autumn of 1998 favoured the side-stepping of Russia and the UN, and pressing on with coercive diplomacy. A number of European countries including France and Germany firmly opposed such a path. Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon describe this as a "theological debate" between the "Catholic" countries (who saw a Security Council mandate as an absolute), and a more pragmatic north-west European "Protestant" faction (who saw a mandate as desirable but not absolute if the coalition was broad and action was taken in the spirit of the UN Charter), and the Atlantic "agnostics" (US and Britain, who argued that a coalition of liberal democracies such as NATO had all the inherent legitimacy it needed to take such action).⁵³

By this stage, the events on the ground were curbing policy options. In September and October 1998, an estimated 200,000 Albanians were forced from their homes.⁵⁴ European sources note that Washington now began pressing the armed force option "incessantly".⁵⁵ This pressure was applied bilaterally. One case can speak for many. Owing to its history and its incoming left-of-centre government, Germany was the country where it would be most difficult politically to participate in military action without a UN mandate. Therefore, the Albright faction in Washington identified Berlin as the linchpin in their efforts to deliver the Europeans for coercive diplomacy.⁵⁶ Berlin would have to be brought on board if the interventionist faction were to prevail in the White House. One Washington insider observed: "Albright knew that there was little chance of persuading the President to draw a line in the sand unless the Europeans were onside."⁵⁷ During the phase of transitional government after the federal elections in Germany, German leaders were put under what German Foreign Minister Kinkel called "immense pressure".⁵⁸ On 12 October 1998, President Clinton demanded a clear answer from Germany as to whether it would participate in military action without a clear UN Security Council mandate. The deadline was so tight that, according to the then newly elected Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, he and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder found themselves with literally minutes to make a decision of war and peace.⁵⁹ As a high-level Norwegian official mused: "By singling us out one by one, putting us on the spot, and giving us the question 'are you in or not' the US prevailed. In the end no-one wanted to be the first to say no."

With a workable consensus in place, the US lost no time in threatening the FRY with NATO air strikes should they fail to comply with UN Security Resolution 1199 which demanded immediate ceasefire and dialogue.⁶⁰ According to a NATO Official, Denmark, Spain, Greece, Italy and Germany unofficially expressed concerns over the legality of these measures. Tensions were soothed by American assurances that Milosevic would back down as he had done in 1995 in Bosnia – that it would probably not

be necessary to act upon the threats. The agreement to threaten the use of force was followed by a new round of three-way shuttle diplomacy between the US, Pristina and Belgrade. Meanwhile, Germany, now holder of the EU Presidency, worked feverishly to get Russian support for the new position. The US strategy appeared to have been vindicated when the talks resulted in the so-called Holbrooke–Milosevic Agreement winning some concessions, most notably the agreement to deploy unarmed observers in Kosovo.⁶¹ The Europeans were informed about these negotiations but were not invited to take part in them. When news of the negotiations emerged, British Prime Minister Tony Blair was particularly incensed. He had expected the US to move in step with its European allies. In London, the Holbrooke–Milosevic Agreement (also known as the October Agreement) was seen as fundamentally flawed in that the observers were unarmed; it had after all been tried in Bosnia with a fairly grisly result. The in-house deliberations in Washington culminated in the “status quo plus” proposal. A classified strategy paper leaked to the *Washington Post* defined the common ground between the Berger and Albright factions: “Our fundamental strategic objectives remain unchanged: promote regional stability and protect our investment in Bosnia; prevent resumption of hostilities in Kosovo and renewed humanitarian crisis; preserve US and NATO credibility.”⁶²

Meanwhile, events on the ground helped to bring the views of the US and the EU into line. Most important among these events was the Racak massacre of 15 January when the bodies of 45 Kosovar Albanian civilians were found outside the village.⁶³ A US Department of Defense Official pointed to the Racak incident, as more than any other single event, shifting the mood in Washington from containment to military coercion. Secretary of State Albright seized upon the massacre, portraying it as the final straw – evidence of a pending humanitarian catastrophe. Britain, the US and France agreed that an ultimatum would be given to the parties to accept an interim settlement by a set date. Albright made it clear to the Europeans that the US would put its weight behind a multilateral peace process on the condition that diplomacy would have to be backed by a credible threat of force.⁶⁴ The initiative remained firmly with Washington. In Brussels, there was concern that the use of force would mean shedding the EU’s cloak of neutrality.⁶⁵ The EU made a last-ditch attempt to provide leadership with the General Council warning both the Kosovars and the Serbs of the “severest consequences” if they failed to seek a negotiated settlement, but again to little effect.⁶⁶

Secretary of State Albright found that the Europeans (with the notable exception of Britain) remained reluctant to consider the use of force even after Racak. One reason for this was that the Europeans were wary of manipulation – of being tricked into supporting what was in reality a secessionist project. In the BBC documentary *Moral Combat*, a KLA soldier is shown apparently describing how provoking Serb atrocities in the hope

of triggering Western intervention was a deliberate tactic on behalf of the KLA. Barton Gellman of the *Washington Post* quotes a US official as saying: "One of our difficulties, particularly with the Europeans [...] was getting them to accept the proposition that the root of the problem is Belgrade."⁶⁷ Another problem was that European leaders were less certain that the threat of force would bring the Serbs to heel. In his memoirs, General Wesley Clark described the rift "between those in Washington who thought they understood war and those in Europe who understood Milosevic, the mainsprings of his power and the way to fight on this continent".⁶⁸

Considering that the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy had been operational for some time, one would expect US bilateralism to be countered by the EU's emergence as a forum for policy coordination among the EU member states. This did not happen. A Commission Official involved in the EU handling of Kosovo claimed in an interview that there was a sense that little could be gained from addressing the Kosovo question head on. "Instead we left the issue sitting, the Council and the Commission simply did not talk about it. Kosovo was the elephant in the room." A source close to the British Prime Minister said that the view in London was that a lack of shared understanding in the EU on desired outcomes made policy coordination difficult. The reason for this could well have been that sanctions were at the high end of EU capabilities and consensus, and that no state insisted that the EU was the correct forum for such debate – as indeed had been agreed in the 1992 Treaty on European Union. Procedures and frameworks were simply not in place to handle such an escalation.

The Rambouillet conference

It was at this moment that the US proposed a peace conference to solve the question once and for all. According to a State Department official, the consensus in Washington was that the parties would be given one last chance – an imposed settlement brokered by the contact group and backed by NATO forces under the threat of force. Interviews indicate that President Clinton discussed the new consensus with London, Paris and Berlin. Other European capitals were not so much consulted as informed. The meeting that convened in early 1999 had more to do with intra-Contact Group relations than any real signs that the parties were ready to negotiate a settlement – which would soon become apparent. The Rambouillet meeting which opened on 6 February 1999 was primed to be a re-run of the Bosnian peace accords, a "Dayton in Europe". The desire to prove that this was still a European process was illustrated by the reconvening of the Contact Group at a French château instead of an American location, and under the joint chairmanship of the French and British Foreign Ministers, Védérine and Cook.⁶⁹

What happened at Rambouillet has been the topic of much debate. What remains clear is that the talks between the Serb and Albanian delegations failed. A number of possible explanations have been put forth. Was it because President Milosevic could not participate in person for fear of being apprehended and dragged before an international tribunal, as Anne Deighton has suggested?⁷⁰ Or was it because the negotiators provided only “carrots” to the Albanians and “sticks” to the Serbs, as Ivo Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon have argued?⁷¹ Was it the Serbs who underestimated the determination of the allies, as Madeleine Albright has claimed?⁷² Or was it a result of American bias? Journalists Peter Beaumont and Patrick Wintour quote one British official as saying: “the US effort was to get to the end with the Serbs as baddies”.⁷³ All these factors may have played a role, but the main reason for the outcome at Rambouillet was that the talks were structured in such a way that only two results were possible – an agreed settlement or military action against the FRY. Of equal importance was the marginal influence exerted by the European states. Rather than hammering out a common policy, the EU states put their national views bilaterally to Washington in the hope of shaping American policies – to little effect.

The EU did play a role in this process too. At Germany’s insistence, the EU’s Special Envoy Wolfgang Petrisch served as main negotiator at Rambouillet alongside Boris Mayorsky from Russia and Christopher Hill from the US.⁷⁴ As negotiations soon became entangled in the finer points of international law, the EU lacked the necessary expertise and had to “borrow” skilled personnel from the European Court of Justice.⁷⁵ The EU representatives had a difficult task at hand, as the European Contact Group member states did not like to be reminded to take European positions into consideration. For instance, Britain and France met to discuss their positions bilaterally without inviting Germany, Italy or the EU representative. Instead they were picked off one by one. One participant in the negotiations summed up this process in the following way: “What remained a fact was that European states all had their own views that were not the same and which did not correspond with the American view. In the end it was only the American view that mattered.” The American dealings with the Contact Group displayed a now-familiar pattern in which an inner trilateral directorate comprising Britain, France and the US was formed within the Contact Group.

Schwegmann lists “a substantive constraining role” as the primary achievement of the EU in the Contact Group.⁷⁶ This assertion was disputed in interviews with both NATO and EU officials. The EU had been invited to play a part at Rambouillet. On several occasions, the EU (alongside Germany, Italy and Russia) was kept in the dark by the inner steering group. One such occasion was on 16 February 1999, when during a break in negotiations, the American negotiators issued a unilateral ultimatum during a last-minute visit to Belgrade. The EU representative in the

Contact Group, Wolfgang Petrisch, had few other options than to attempt to gloss over the incident at the following news conference.⁷⁷ Rambouillet left a sour taste in the mouth of many, as indicated by the Russian delegation's refusal to attend the signing of the treaty, and their rumoured attempt to persuade the EU representatives to do the same.⁷⁸

Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon summarise the Euro-American relations in the run-up to the war. On the one hand, they quote a US official as saying, "the idea of us using force over the objection of allies who have troops on the ground, subject to retaliation, is fantasy-land. Allies don't do that to each other." On the other hand, they point out: "Washington's refusal to consider other possibilities [than the use of force] left the allies with little choice but to follow the U.S. lead."⁷⁹ Although it is difficult to assess the validity of the statement, Madeleine Albright's personal secretary, James Rubin, later admitted, "Our internal goal was not to get a peace agreement at Rambouillet." The real goal was "to get a war started with the Europeans locked in".⁸⁰ A number of countries, notably Germany and Italy, were deeply uneasy about this development, which resulted in a last-ditch peace proposal from the Italian Prime Minister, Massimo d'Alema, to Russian Prime Minister, Yevgeni Primakov, during his visit to Bonn in early March. Apart from angering Washington, the proposal had little apparent effect. Wheels were already being set in motion.

Before the Kosovo conflict, a "gap" between Europe and the US over the legitimacy of the use of force had been much discussed. The Kosovo crisis showed that this gap was by no means as deep as many would have assumed. Skilful US leadership successfully negated European qualms; the primary reason was the continued agreement on goals combined with Europe's failure to come up with a viable and non-violent alternative for achieving this goal.

Air strikes and ground troops

Hostilities commenced on 23 February 1999. Operations got off to a sour note when the US accused "untrustworthy" allies of having passed on strategic documents to Belgrade. Soon it became clear that this would be first and foremost an American operation. The US would shoulder most of the burden of the military operations. American warplanes flew 80 per cent of the 10,484 strike missions, supplied 90 per cent of the command, control and communications facilities and launched over 90 per cent of the "smart" weapons.⁸¹ On the European side, the decision to carry out an air campaign placed most of the burden on the powers that possessed the relevant air force capabilities, namely France, Britain and Germany. During the armed phase of the conflict the EU sought to maintain its image as an impartial broker, and at the same time supported the Alliance and its strategic objectives as reflected in the Berlin European Council communiqué of 25 March 1999: "On the threshold of the 21st Century Europe cannot

tolerate a humanitarian catastrophe in our midst." The EU states concluded, "we are responsible for securing peace and stability in the region".⁸²

In practical terms, this meant supporting the war while at the same time dissociating the EU from the violence perpetrated by NATO. This point was perhaps best illustrated by the fact that NATO's Secretary General, Javier Solana, who had already accepted the post as High Representative for the CFSP (HR-CFSP), avoided playing the role of the "face of the Alliance". This thankless task was left to Press Spokesman Jamie Shea. As the military campaign turned into a war of attrition, such legitimacy was more important than most would have thought at the beginning of the conflict. Apart from diplomatic support, the EU went ahead with a previously planned partial oil embargo and banned flights to and from destinations in the FRY. It can also be argued that the EU's support for the war was important for the regional support among the applicant states in Central and Eastern Europe.⁸³ While supporting NATO, the Union was also careful to cultivate its humanitarian self-image by promising €250 million as direct humanitarian aid for the refugees.⁸⁴ Anne Deighton points out that even if this was the limit of EU competences, the Union remained an important arena for legitimacy and engagement at a time when the UN was hamstrung by a lack of support from Russia and China.

The NATO air campaign had two main thrusts: a strategic campaign against Serbia and a tactical campaign against Serb forces in Kosovo.⁸⁵ At a very early stage, President Clinton made it clear that he wished for this to be a "zero casualty war", seeking simultaneously to minimise allied casualties and collateral damage as well as enemy casualties. This was achieved. NATO did not sustain a single combat casualty and casualties on the Serb side too were relatively light for an armed conflict of this magnitude.⁸⁶ The downside of this policy was that it hampered NATO's ability to meet its strategic objectives effectively. The military tactic chosen was ill-matched to meet the humanitarian ends. Air power does not provide direct control over territory or population. The campaign failed to stop the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Once operations were underway, the widely held assumption that the FRY would back down, after what most expected to be a short-term operation, proved flawed. Instead of immediate surrender, the air strikes triggered "Operation Horseshoe" – a Serb bid to change the ethnic make-up of Kosovo through ethnic cleansing.⁸⁷ One week into the air campaign, hundreds of thousands of deportees were streaming across the borders into neighbouring countries. In his account of the war, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) Clark admits that NATO had not expected or indeed planned for such an escalation.⁸⁸ The FRY armed forces learnt to take advantage of the impaired visuals of the Alliance. Extensive use of camouflage and "dummies" led NATO leaders to believe that they were decimating the enemy's ground forces, when in fact they were not.⁸⁹ The aversion to casu-

alties and the predictably cloudy Balkan spring reduced NATO to operating night sorties on empty buildings and Psychological Operations (PsyOps) aimed at turning the FRY population against the regime in Belgrade. The restrictive rules of engagement led to the cancellation of many missions and the allocation of more resources per target than was strictly necessary. While this went on, one million civilians were forced from their homes amidst massacres and wilful destruction of property.

As the operations dragged on and anti-war movements gained momentum, tensions rose within the Alliance. The decision to present the conflict as something short of war made the media in many European states feel exempt from the standards of loyalty that would normally be applied in a war situation. Subsequently the war also had a political cost for the governments involved. One of the most controversial and deliberate destruction caused during the war was the bombing of the headquarters of the government television station on 22 April. NATO justified the attack on the grounds that the television station was part of the Yugoslav government's control network.⁹⁰ The ability of the Europeans to control the selection of targets became a hotly disputed topic. Interviews with FRY government officials have indicated that the Allied commanders were correct in their assertion that the Serbian military was indeed using civilian factories for military purposes. Some argued that Europe had shaped the conflict with its own initiatives and by moderating those of the US President. President Chirac of France boasted that "there was not one single target that was not agreed upon by France beforehand".⁹¹ There is much to indicate that the truth is somewhat less straightforward.

Anticipating American dominance, France had insisted that NATO agree upon a three-phase system in order to safeguard against uncontrolled escalation. The first phase focused on the destruction of air defence targets. The second phase would focus on Belgrade with more targets and the third would include attacking thousands of targets all over the country. The idea was that even if the US dominated tactical considerations, Wesley Clark was not at liberty to move from one phase to another without the explicit agreement of the North Atlantic Council. This tactical straightjacket was arguably the most important European contribution to the way the war was fought. The US entered into political negotiations to obtain approval for 807 of the 979 sorties, in addition to those initially planned. This does not necessarily mean that individual members were in a position to pick and choose missions. In truth, interviews indicate that only Britain and France were in any real position to deselect targets. For other states this "veto" was more of a postponement than a final say. Generally speaking, there were clashes over certain targets, primarily sensitive infrastructure. The French, in particular, favoured a gradual escalation and wanted to leave important and obvious targets such as the bridges across the Danube as stakes in a parallel diplomatic dialogue. The US, meanwhile, was eager to force the Serbs into submission, or as general

Clark put it: “to use force the most decisive way possible”.⁹² Although the “war by committee” disputes appeared significant at the time, the complementary nature of the French and American tactics is evident from the few actual disputes over target selection.⁹³

The ground troops dispute

The question of ground troops figured prominently in inter-allied discussions. Some countries, notably Britain, believed that ground troops would be needed to ensure victory. In addition to the obvious advantage of actually engaging the enemy, a ground war would have also lowered the technological threshold of the conflict and enabled the Europeans to shoulder more of the burden of operations and thereby gain more influence on how they were to be carried out. This possibility was, however, ruled out by Washington. On 23 March 1999, the American President announced: “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war.”⁹⁴ This was a pledge that would have been extremely difficult politically to back out of. In addition to offending his European allies by taking this decision unilaterally, the American President also angered many European capitals by the manner in which the announcement was made – on television with no prior allied consultation. By ruling out ground forces, the President provided comfort to Belgrade, which arranged its forces accordingly.⁹⁵ According to the British dissemination report:

[the] failure of the Alliance collectively to make manifest its political determination and provide a convincing show of military capability to undertake a forced ground entry into Kosovo, significantly weakened the credibility of its efforts to coerce Milosevic into compliance with its demands.⁹⁶

From an early stage, Britain alone favoured a land invasion. This view was strongly opposed not only by Washington, but also by Berlin. In Germany there was a sense of having been removed far enough from its pacifist roots and Chancellor Schröder made little effort to conceal his displeasure with the British talk of ground troops. He even went so far as to suggest that Germany might veto such a move: “The strategy of an alliance can only change if all parties agree, so I trust NATO’s strategy is not going to change.”⁹⁷ Interviews in the Chancellery describe a deeply strained German leadership fearful that the Kosovo conflict would force the Green Party to break out of the coalition.

There has been much discussion about why the American President chose to bind himself on the issue of ground troops. The dispute had been simmering from the time of the Holbrooke–Milosevic agreement in 1998 which failed to arm the monitors who were to be dispatched to the region. This leaves the question of whether the decision was taken out of

fear of shattering of the Alliance or if it was dictated by America's internal politics, though the two options are not mutually exclusive. President Clinton acted in accordance with the dictum that the US President actually faces relatively few domestic constraints in resorting to armed force – provided that it is done quickly and with little cost in blood and resources. Clinton judged that the American public had not been sufficiently prepared for such an escalation. A second consideration was that the President's relationship with the Republican majority in Congress was at this stage deeply strained over the so-called "Lewinsky affair". With the launch of Allied forces in March, Congress gave the President a specific mandate of 58 to 41 votes to undertake "military operations and missile strikes in cooperation with our NATO allies against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia".⁹⁸ The President was therefore reluctant to take decisions that would require further mandates. The fact that the announcement was made on national television without prior consultation seems to indicate that, at least in the early phases of the war, domestic concerns trumped the sense of an allied community.

As the air campaign dragged on without yielding tangible results, strains within the Alliance became increasingly apparent. From April 1999, the British government openly challenged the US position, advocating that NATO should reconsider the ground invasion option. In an interview a source close to the British Prime Minister stated that Tony Blair's visit to Kosovar refugee camps on 3 May reinforced his belief that ground forces would be needed, even if this meant that Britain would have to shoulder a disproportionate part of the burden. This attempt to apply pressure was not only unwelcome in Washington, it was also seen as inappropriate. In the television documentary *Moral Combat*, a US official is quoted as saying: "The British were told – look if you think you've come here to turn the President, it's not going to happen." The German and French were also less than enthusiastic about the prospect of a ground invasion. In Berlin, there were fears that such a move would force the traditionally pacifist Green Party out of the governing coalition. In Paris, President Chirac was apparently shocked to find that the British were able to field 60,000 combat troops while France could not make up the remaining 40,000, to achieve "the critical mass" of 100,000 troops that military planners deemed necessary to carry out a land invasion of Kosovo.

In a parallel development in the EU, the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, acting as the holder of the rotating EU Presidency, had already begun exploring ways to bring the bombing to an end. On 14 April, at an informal meeting over Kosovo in Brussels, the German Presidency presented six steps towards ending the war that it had already discussed with Russia.⁹⁹ The "Fischer plan", in which the G8 and the UN Security Council were to be the primary parties, was initially dismissed out of hand by the White House. Instead, air operations were intensified to "extend the range and tempo of operations [in order] to maximise the

effectiveness of the operation".¹⁰⁰ Still, Belgrade showed no signs of being willing to lay down arms. When the option of ground troops was once again brought to the table at a meeting of Defence Ministers in Bonn in late May 1999, President Clinton appeared to be wavering. This time plans were drawn up and force levels in the region were increased. The dispute over ground forces was resolved by Belgrade surprisingly conceding defeat in early June.

The Kosovo conflict is inextricably linked to the notion of "war by committee", which is usually taken to mean decision-making through the lowest common denominator. There can be little doubt that NATO's formal decision-making procedures during the Kosovo conflict were cumbersome and over-complex. Had formal procedures been applied strictly, they almost certainly would have hampered operations. Informal mechanisms were developed, notably through the Quint, anticipated reaction and American primacy. Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon conclude that "President Clinton's evident reluctance to lead, either at home and abroad" was the primary factor holding back operations. "Domestic politics rather than strategic requirements dominated American decision-making to an unfortunate degree."¹⁰¹ The constraints of Alliance and domestic politics pressed simultaneously in opposite directions, raising the stakes of intervention while limiting the available means. It was, as one French official later described it, "*Une façon terrible de faire la guerre*" – a terrible way to fight a war.

The Quint

From a European Union perspective, the primary problem was that as the conflict evolved, member states failed to keep the EU institutions informed about the running of the war. The EU establishment seemed happy to keep their hands clean. When questioned about the information received by the EU, one Council official stated: "We saw it [the war] on TV – in the beginning we knew about as much as the smaller NATO members, later we knew less. Instead we focused our attention elsewhere." According to a leading NATO official, the EU was, by this stage, concerned with avoiding "guilt by association". Anne Deighton asserts that it is "inconceivable that NATO action could have continued had the EU taken a publicly hostile position".¹⁰² This view is misguided. The two organisations are for the most part made up of the same states, which were unlikely to sabotage themselves *en masse*. Her statement nevertheless draws attention to an important point: if the EU had come out clearly in favour of one of the European policy positions – be it ground troops or renewed diplomatic efforts – there would have been some chance of tipping the scales in Washington. A top EU official involved in this process said: "At that stage the stakes were so high and the Americans so white knuckled, that attempts at autonomous EU peace initi-

atives would almost certainly have been taken as an attempt to subvert NATO.”

This leads us to one of the primary questions of the Kosovo War: What made the Allies stick together? President Milosevic seemed to pin his hopes on NATO falling apart under the strains of war. Yet disagreements did not lead to fragmentation. Greece, where 95 per cent of the population were opposed to the war, did not attempt to rupture the consensus. Russia abandoned the multilateral process, but was unable to offer Serbia any effective assistance. Germany, with its Foreign Minister from the Green Party, did not balk. Italy resisted underhand attempts at bilateral negotiations from Belgrade. Why? Some analysts point to a secret directorate as the answer to this question. During the Kosovo war, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Britain and the US formed a low-profile steering group – the Quint. Robin Cook noted: “during the Kosovo Crisis [...] the five would speak by telephone conference every evening”.¹⁰³ It began on 29 March at Germany’s insistence as an informal vehicle for deliberation among the leading countries. *The Observer* elaborates:

At tea time each day in London – and after lunch for Madeleine Albright in the US – they would review the progress of the war and the prospects for a negotiated peace. And the original Quint of the foreign ministers developed through the campaign so that by the end there were parallel Quints of chiefs of the defence staff and the political directors from the five chancelleries, all telephoning each evening.¹⁰⁴

The Quint remains “secret” in the sense that none of the officials and policymakers interviewed would speak of it on the record. Catherine Gegout concludes that the presence of the Quint was the major obstacle to the formation of common EU policies over Kosovo.¹⁰⁵ Anne Deighton draws the opposite conclusion: “The Quint set the EU’s own diplomatic agenda not least by bridging the often opposing opinions of the four EU members on how the campaign would be carried out most effectively” and “The Quint led and facilitated the delicate work of sustaining an EU consensus.”¹⁰⁶ My own research concurs with the latter view, with the added qualification that the EU played a pivotal role in maintaining the overall NATO consensus not least because of the role played by the German EU Presidency – a country with impeccable multilateral credentials. This was not only in the long term in which the EU had trained states to subordinate national inclinations to a common purpose, but also as an arena in which European ministers met regularly throughout the crisis. Interviews carried out indicate that even if the war was not officially on the EU agenda, it was discussed on many levels, maintaining a unity of purpose. As important as the sense of fellowship was, it was also felt that the US was

capable of punishment that far exceeded any domestic political profit that could be gained from defecting. The fear that a failure to achieve the mission would deal a mortal blow to NATO – the primary European security institution – also played an important role. It was strongly believed that NATO's credibility was at stake and its failure to prevail could weaken the institution that most EU members depended upon for their territorial security. Another factor was that the violence perpetrated by the FRY government silenced most of those who had bemoaned the lack of a UN mandate. The scale of violence directed against an ethnic minority made a compelling case for forcing Belgrade to concede.

The Quint performed a similar function among key partners, creating a solidarity that further fortified the Alliance against fragmentation. It is not coincidental that the Quint and the EU Presidency were instrumental in persuading Russia to agree to the "Fischer plan" for ending the war which would, in turn, leave Belgrade with no other way out than to concede. Sources differ as to whether the initiative to engage Russia came from the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, or whether Germany, working through the EU, deserves this credit.¹⁰⁷ There is probably some truth to both views. After the April peace initiative was blocked by Washington, Germany approached Russia and this resulted in the bilateral talks between Moscow and Washington which culminated in the formation of a three-man group to negotiate the final terms with Belgrade. US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott represented NATO, Victor Chernomyrdin represented Russia and Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari was chosen as the EU's envoy. Ahtisaari immediately set out to negotiate a common position, not between Belgrade and NATO, but between Moscow and Washington. Once a single text was agreed upon, Milosevic was given a message from Moscow that it was time to sue for peace. Ten days later, NATO troops entered Kosovo with the consent of Belgrade.

In this phase, up to the end of June 1999, the German Presidency led the way in providing the basis for a political solution to the conflict. It is worth noting that the Europeans were right, according to American defence expert Barry Posen, to take credit for the negotiations that ended the Kosovo War.¹⁰⁸ As the conflict entered its final stage, the EU governments showed both the willingness and the ability to maintain common positions.¹⁰⁹ They successfully pushed for a prominent role for the EU in the final round of negotiations. The Europeans managed to get Russia to return to the negotiating table with Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin joining Ahtisaari in delivering the ultimatum to Milosevic. The EU's role was emphasised when Ahtisaari gave his report on the successful mission at the EU Summit (3–4 June) in Cologne, and not at NATO in Brussels. The symbolism was clear – the EU was restoring peace in Europe. That is not to say that German leaders entirely passed up on personal and national aggrandisement for the benefit of the EU. The EU further strengthened its role in post-crisis management in Kosovo by taking

charge of the civilian administration and turning the province into a de facto protectorate. The Union provided the majority of aid to Kosovo (approximately €5 billion) and from the onset, its member states made up the bulk of the NATO mission policing the region.¹¹⁰

American influence and EU strategic culture

So what can be said about American influence on EU security policies over the Kosovo conflict? What remains clear is that this influence was significant. It is unlikely, bordering on inconceivable, that EU policies towards the FRY would have developed in a similar manner in the absence of US input. Keeping in mind the criteria for “American influence on EU security policy” listed in Chapter 1, we see that at key junctions – the decision to threaten with the use of force, the decision to use force in the absence of a UN mandate, and the decision to rule out the use of ground troops – a change in EU policy can be attributed to American influence. When there was an initial discrepancy between the policy preference of the US and a leading EU member state or EU foreign policy chiefs over how a security challenge should be handled, it was the European side that reformulated their position. US demands or preferences were communicated explicitly either through official channels or through reliable unofficial channels, and the final outcome of the EU policy process was close to the signalled American position.

The presence of the CFSP/ESDP nexus did little to alter the familiar pattern where the *modus operandi* in NATO gave the US a disproportionate say over strategy and tactics. In terms of influence, the handling of the Kosovo crisis is a testimony to the sophistication of American diplomacy. The US employed a variety of techniques vis-à-vis the EU members: (1) *binding* (e.g. ruling out the use of ground forces); (2) *exploiting information asymmetries* (e.g. understating the likelihood of the actual need to use force and keeping some allies better informed than others and exploiting the *technological gap* to gain a near monopoly over tactics); (3) *process-shaping* (e.g. presenting allies with yes/no decisions under time pressure, forcing a decision at Rambouillet, and forging and reforging informal directorates); (4) *pressure* (e.g. pressuring the inexperienced incoming German government to accept the American view); and (5) “*institution shopping*”, whereby the US shifted the process between various multilateral forums, favouring those more likely to follow the American line (the Kosovo question moved from the UN via the Contact Group and NATO to the Quint without losing the multilateral image that the White House was so keen to preserve). The primary American tactic was, however, “bilateral multilateralism” – bilaterally forging separate agreements with France, Germany and Britain, which later were introduced as the platform for a multilateral consensus. In sum, various techniques placed the initiative firmly with Washington. And once the US position

was known, the European allies positioned themselves around it, lining up for or against it.

America's success in combining multilateralism with primacy has much to do with the skilful selection and use of different arenas at different stages – combined with a “no deal” option by expressing a willingness to go it alone. The Kosovo crisis displayed two modes of decision-making, one formal and highly institutionalised with rigid rules and hierarchy, trailed by the other and more important approach of ad hoc multilateralism. The informal or executive system was controlled by less rigid rules, and decisions were made in an executive atmosphere which allowed for greater process control in terms of managing disputes and the sharing of information, as was the case in the Contact Group and the Quint. The main advantage of this approach was the degree of selection – how many parties were to be invited to the table. The higher the tensions rose, the smaller the inner circle became. Legitimacy was traded for efficiency.

As a strategic actor, the EU was faced with Richard Tanner Johnson's four dilemmas confronting foreign policy decision-makers: (1) choosing between pursuing the “best” policy and the most “feasible” policy; (2) responding quickly or allowing for extensive deliberation; (3) selecting information or evaluating as much information as possible; and (4) whether to act through strict consensus or through majority decisions.¹¹¹ The answers to these questions not only help explain why the EU was susceptible to US pressure, they also say something about the EU strategic culture.

- 1 The Union can rightly be criticised for choosing to pursue the “best” policy over the most “feasible” policy over Kosovo. The EU displayed a curious mix of desire to lead and inability to do so – mainly due to a lack of defined policy goals. The absence of an agreed strategy, connecting means to ends in a realistic manner, invited an unwarranted belief in the viability of “soft power”. This was uneasily coupled with its internationalist ideals of legality and collective action as a sound basis for foreign policy. The EU ended up in an unbalanced position in which it appeared to be more focused on the means, that is on declarations and economic incentives rather than on the ends, in terms of actually resolving the Kosovo question. The EU was culpable of continuing its constructive engagement approach long after it had proved inadequate in resolving the questions at hand. As the international agenda shifted towards coercive measures, the EU got stuck in a sanctions regime that was as inflexible as it was ineffective. The EU displayed an unwarranted belief in the merits of economic rewards and diplomatic dialogue. After the conflict, Steven Everts notes that the EU appeared to be most concerned with “issues that have a greater chance of being solved by political engagement and huge sums of money”.¹¹² The weakness of this approach became

evident in high-pressure situations, when the EU institutions found it difficult to arrive at meaningful policies, and subsequently failed to carve out a role independent of that of NATO.

- 2 The EU allowed for extensive deliberation instead of responding quickly. In dealing with the Kosovo question, the EU applied constructive ambiguity both in terms of means and ends. It was clear throughout that the EU was uncomfortable in dealing with an agenda that it itself had not set. The EU acted as if it were hoping that the conflict would be solved of its own accord, resulting in the Union getting stuck in reactive decision-making and repeatedly failing to prepare for escalation. In this sense, the EU states got locked in by their own deferral, by their unwillingness to limit their options. If anything, the Kosovo crisis illustrated that the EU decision-making procedures were woefully inadequate to deal with an international crisis of this scale. Through its slow pace, the EU landed itself in the situation of being the reactive counterpart to America's proactive leadership. Collective decision-making prevented forward-looking decisions from being taken, and the lack of a security culture and habitual leaks prevented many issues from even being discussed. These two factors led to a *modus operandi* which allowed for dissent to translate into inaction.
- 3 The EU was not prone to act on select information, preferring instead to get as complete a picture as possible. One obvious example of the difference in response was seen in the handling of Washington and Brussels in response to the Racak massacre. Much of the European reluctance to deal with Kosovo was a result of the generally high level of knowledge about the region among decision-makers. Kosovo made it very clear that the EU lacked the sort of "if A then B" response patterns that strategic actors use to process information.¹¹³ For instance, the Albright faction filtered the information they received through, *inter alia*, the notion that Milosevic was a dictator and dictators only understand one language, that is force, and that the Serbs, if allowed to do so, would repeat the atrocities seen in Bosnia in Kosovo. The arguably better informed Europeans lacked similar predefined categories that coupled certain events to certain patterns of response. The lack of a culture of secrecy inhibited candid deliberations on strategic and tactical matters for fears of leaks. The lack of experienced staff and an effective process made it difficult to generate meaningful policies at a time when they could have influenced events. The problem was that the enthusiasm for issuing statements in the run-up to the conflict created expectations of a unified European response. The EU seemed to be caught off-guard by each escalation of the Kosovo crisis. This was in part a result of the absence of an effective EU intelligence-sharing mechanism that could issue early warnings. Although there is little to suggest that the frequent calls for more information were a conscious excuse for inaction, this approach,

nevertheless, led to the stalling which continued the unfortunate trend of EU foreign policies arriving well after they could actually influence events.¹¹⁴

- 4 The ease with which the EU's Kosovo policies were thwarted by the pro-active approach of the US had much to do with the mode of decision-making in the CFSP. The EU relied on consensus rather than majority decisions in addressing the situation, which encouraged lowest common denominator declarations "calling for" this and "urging" that. The underdefined seniority between national and EU policy positions encouraged selective compliance. In doing so, it traded efficiency for legitimacy. This invited a lowest common denominator approach that effectively barred the EU from making a significant contribution to the actual crisis management. The inability to generate decisions during the Kosovo crisis is an important reason why the EU did not become the primary forum for coordination among the member states, and why it was not recognised as an actor in its own right by the United States. The EU states also failed to form a bloc to balance the US within NATO. Whether this was a result of the EU's pattern of behaviour or a result of its approach is hard to say. In fairness, the crisis demanded military and institutional capabilities that the EU simply did not possess. Consequently, the members found it difficult to arrive at common policies even when their relative positions were not very far apart, as was evident in the case of the sanctions regime. The impact of American influence was strengthened by the weakness of institutional frameworks in which the lack of credible capabilities made it difficult for the EU to come up with alternatives. But this undesirable situation seemed to encourage innovation. The poor workings of the formal channels encouraged the development of new channels. Notably, the Kosovo crisis enhanced the role of the rotating Presidency as an EU foreign policy actor, and the Quint encouraged policy coordination among Germany, Britain and France.

The transatlantic bargain and the Kosovo war

The transatlantic bargain is an understanding among the European powers on the one hand, and between Europe and the United States on the other. The events of Kosovo were to have a significant impact on both. In the aftermath of the war, Strobe Talbott concluded:

The ultimate verdict on Kosovo will depend both on the situation on the ground and the effect that the war and its aftermath have, over time, on transatlantic attitudes, relations and institutions. On this subject, I sense a basic difference of view on opposite sides of the Atlantic.¹¹⁵

It would appear that Talbott was right. Two very different narratives came out of the conflict. In the US, the Kosovo war came widely to be seen as, on balance, a negative experience. Interviews in Washington indicate a prevailing sense that the US had intervened more in Europe's interest than its own and had in that process helped out allies who lacked the capabilities and willingness to act. The bitter taste of the victory has been explained by what was seen as the dangers of "war by committee". Allowing the NATO states to have a say on how the campaign should be run was seen as an invitation for political considerations to prevail over military needs, thus prolonging the conflict. Influential voices, like those of the future Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, openly questioned the concept of multilateral engagement as a viable mode for US foreign policy.¹¹⁶ The conclusion was that the US should avoid again having to fight a war "by committee".

In Europe, many blamed American jingoism for bringing NATO into war through ham-fisted diplomacy at Rambouillet, and for inviting failure by publicly ruling out a land invasion. That said, the European tolerance for imperfect outcomes lead most of those interviewed to regard the intervention as a partial success. Robert Cottrell claimed in *The Economist*: "Once begun, this became an American war run from the White House and the Pentagon over which the Europeans had little political influence."¹¹⁷ This led to complaints; as one EU Commission Official put it: "the US acted as if they were in this venture alone". Europeans tend to focus on how the US chose to monopolise decision-making and must therefore bear much of the responsibility for the flawed intervention. On the other hand, there was a tendency in Europe to pin the shortcomings of the resolution of the Kosovo crisis more on the unclear links between the capabilities and ambitions in Washington than on any ineptitude in getting other countries to go along. A report from the EU Institute for Security Studies concluded: "The Kosovo conflict confirmed Europe's military shortcomings and the ambiguities of America's international position."¹¹⁸ The Kosovo crisis was perhaps the most important factor triggering the Saint Malo declaration's implicit agreement that US dominance was a direct result of European weakness. Prime Minister Blair and his ministers also looked back on the Kosovo crisis in early 1998, when they had been struck by the impotence of the European Union. According to Tony Blair, the Americans had been left to dominate the field, in part because the Europeans had proved incapable of "getting their act together".¹¹⁹ The debate on ground troops was a testimony to the notion that, had the Europeans been able to shoulder more of the burden, the Atlanticist and Europeanist camps would have agreed. The speed with which the until then theoretical EU security and defence dimension hardened in the months from Saint Malo to the Cologne European summit is directly linked to the EU having experienced crisis management, shoulder to shoulder with the US.

Whilst giving important insights into the nature of American influence on EU policies, the factors outlined above fall short of fully explaining EU behaviour. The EU also developed security policies with a firmer policy base, as was the case with its enlargement policies. It is to this process we will now turn.

4 EU and NATO enlargements

The enlargement of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization into Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) raised questions concerning the institutional architecture in Europe as well as the future orbits of the two organisations.¹ As a result, the two processes were heavily politicised. Dual enlargement, as it came to be known, is of special interest to the study of the influence of the United States on EU security policies. The process was arguably the first time that the two actors interacted strategically on an equal footing on a major policy issue. As Geoffrey Edwards pointed out: “Elements over the debate on enlargement play into those on the very purpose, nature and scope of the ESDP, others exacerbate possible problems, including the relationship between the EU and NATO and the United states.”²

This chapter sets out to answer a simple question: To what extent did the United States influence EU policies over dual enlargement during 1998–2004? The basic argument presented runs as follows. The EU approached enlargement as a strategic act and retained a degree of autonomy not seen during the Kosovo crisis. In the drawn-out process of enlargement the EU policies were formed in ad hoc cluster-patterns that seemed to diminish the scope and impact of American influence. While there is little to suggest that the US significantly influenced the question of sequencing, the question of financing ended in a standoff. On the question of primacy the US dominated. The US sought to apply a variety of techniques to exert influence: from public diplomacy to agenda shaping and from promise of rewards to influence by proxy. Notably, the US used primacy in NATO to meet strategic objectives. The EU’s capacity to resist attempts at influence was strengthened above all by the Commission and the presence of a clear accession strategy that tied means to ends.

This chapter is structured into three sections, beginning with a look at the preparations for enlargement, from the end of the Cold War up to 1998. The second section deals with three core transatlantic disputes over enlargement: the question of sequencing – which organisations should enlarge first, which countries should be offered membership and when; the question of financing – how were the economic costs and burdens of

enlargement to be split; and finally, the question of primacy – which actor should reside at the centre of the security architecture in Europe. The final section assesses American influence on EU policies over dual enlargement before assessing what dual enlargement tells us about EU strategic culture and the transatlantic bargain.

A word on sources: in the case of the EU–NATO enlargements, the problem is not that material is kept beyond the reach of academics; on the contrary, the amount of primary sources is overwhelming – a novelty for security scholars. Ronald Asmus and Karen Smith’s works on NATO and EU enlargements, respectively, are both useful points of entry.³ Thanks to dual enlargement being a relatively slow-moving and low-profile process, interviews have proven to be particularly useful. The material and information in this section is, therefore, to a large extent based on interviews with officials and observers in NATO, the EU and in Washington, Brussels, Paris, London and Berlin. This is supplemented by practitioners’ memoirs and commentaries.⁴ Official sources and documents from the EU, NATO, the US and EU member states have been helpful in mapping the enlargement processes.⁵ Throughout the 1990s, much of the academic focus remained stubbornly on the enlargement of the EU by one set of scholars, and the Atlantic Alliance by another set of scholars.⁶ Significantly less work has been done on analysing these processes from a joint perspective. Michael Rühle and Nicholas Williams were among the first to explore seriously the questions arising from the failure to coordinate the two enlargement processes.⁷ The two were later joined by Martin Smith and Graham Timmins’ *Building a bigger Europe – EU and NATO enlargement in a cooperative perspective* in 2000 and Frank Schimmelfennig’s *The EU, NATO and the integration of Europe* in 2003.⁸

Why see EU and NATO enlargements together?

Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards have asserted that “the EU–NATO relationship is a reflection of the broader US–European partnership”.⁹ If that is the case, then the situation is dire. The awkwardness that characterises EU–NATO relations is famous. Even when encouraged to play together by their political leaders, the two interact with all the grace of cousins who secretly detest each other but have been brought together by their unaware parents. The two actors had never interacted more intimately than over Eastern enlargement. In the early 1990s, it was widely expected that the EU and NATO enlargements would be closely coordinated. This was not to happen. The EU and the US failed to coordinate their enlargement strategies bilaterally. Tellingly perhaps, the EU–US Summit which brought together the US President and the “Troika” (the Commission, the HR-CFSP and the rotating Presidency) was not a primary venue for any of the issues discussed in this chapter. A pattern emerged in which the Atlantic Alliance trailed the EU until the

mid-1990s, when the roles were reversed and key EU decisions trailed the NATO equivalents, usually by a matter of months. Throughout, the link between the two processes remained unofficial and under-articulated.

This helps explain the tendency among scholars to view the EU and NATO enlargements separately. But there are a good number of reasons for challenging this practice. Decisions by and for the EU, and their NATO equivalents, mutually influence each other. Neither institution could ignore the criteria for membership set by the other. In addition, the two institutional heavyweights in Europe had a largely overlapping membership. They also took in new members for similar reasons. US Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott believed that there were “three main reasons” behind bringing Eastern Europe into the Western institutional frameworks: the defence against renewed Russian expansionism, the need to stabilise the emerging democracies individually, and the need to stabilise Europe as a region. The desire to display solidarity with states that had been left out in the cold during bipolarity as well as a wish to ensure continued peace and stability in Europe were the primary factors driving enlargement both in the US and the EU.¹⁰ The decisions made by the EU at Copenhagen, Essen and Cannes between 1993 and 1995 are indicative of a new strategic maturity and commitment on behalf of the EU.¹¹

Enlargement – a strategic act?

Before moving on to the early enlargement process, a question that needs to be addressed is whether the two enlargements can be seen as strategic acts, as defined in Chapter 1. Scholars dealing with this topic are usually quick to point out that after the end of the Cold War security took on a broader meaning than military security alone. While security was frequently invoked by proponents of enlargement to justify the endeavour, the meaning of the term was usually left vague. Most sources agree that enlargement had the benefit of mitigating instability along the fringes of Europe. For the EU, security and economic issues had become intertwined, not least due to the persuasion that trade and aid would foster economic and political stability in Eastern Europe which, in turn, would benefit EU security. As Christopher Hill rightly points out, the outer boundary of the EU is of vital importance to Europe and to the international system. Enlargement is a major influence on the character of that boundary. If one accepts these two propositions then it makes sense to approach enlargement as a strategic decision.¹² This view is helped by the fact that the enlargement of the European Union was perceived as such among decision-makers, as confirmed and reconfirmed in interviews. Dual enlargement takes place with a somewhat different *modus operandi* than the other two case studies.

Approaching enlargement as a strategic act means placing emphasis on “supply” as the salient factor. This is not to underestimate the role played

by the demand for membership among the applicants. Although the applicants' negotiating position was weak in that they were set to become *en masse* consumers of EU and NATO benefits, the applicants rallied strongly against any suggestions that they might be offered anything short of full membership. In his book on dual enlargement Frank Schimmelfennig claims that the EU applicants shaped the discourse with reference to identity, ideology, values, norms and past practice in a way that strengthened their bargaining positions and facilitated their accession.¹³ Although he certainly has a point, applicant demands fail to explain why certain states were preferred over others, what time they were invited to join the two organisations and the conditions placed on their membership. Schimmelfennig goes on to state that although his findings for the EU cannot be projected onto the NATO enlargement, there may be a valid case to do so. He, however, steps back from this claim, and ends up concluding that given that the US is the superior power in the Alliance, the impact of the CEE's "rhetorical action" is uncertain.¹⁴ But why not turn the causal arrow? To ask: When the US, as the dominant power, determined NATO enlargement, is it not more likely that the world's most powerful state directly or indirectly impacted the parallel EU enlargement?

While the EU enlargement, more than any other previous EU attempts at foreign policy, was directed from Brussels, the NATO enlargement was clearly guided from Washington. American distrust of the EU as a strategic actor was uneasily wedded to genuine admiration for the Union's power of transformation. US leaders saw EU membership not only as a desirable but also as a necessary venture for the NATO applicants. Despite a growing number of shared initiatives between Brussels and Washington there is little evidence of any clear strategic thinking in Washington with regard to EU enlargement.¹⁵ President Clinton, especially during his first two years in office, was more willing than his predecessors to think anew with regard to the security arrangements in Europe.¹⁶ He was, as we have seen, initially happy to cede the handling of the Yugoslav crisis to the EU. The EU's failure to stem the civil war impressed upon US leaders the continued need for NATO. After a period of uncertainty, Washington wholeheartedly swung towards the large-scale enlargement of the EU and the Atlantic Alliance. The strength of belief in the superiority of these values is reflected in the enthusiasm with which Europe imposes them on others, notably, prospective members. The American position on NATO enlargement was closely linked to domestic politics in that it became an issue in the election race between the incumbent President Clinton and the challenger Robert "Bob" Dole.

The enlargement doctrine

For the EU, enlargement was, in principle, a matter of "when" and not "if". The vision of a united Europe had been a driving factor in European

integration from the outset.¹⁷ The goal was to “extend the community of peace and progress to a wider circle of European states”.¹⁸ Indeed, “enlargement” would become the catchphrase in the overall EU approach to security. The core rationale behind the adoption of the enlargement slogan was much the same as that which underpinned the “peace through integration” argument for European cooperation, namely that the best security policy was to transform “the other” into oneself. The EU “enlargement doctrine” (in the sense of a body of axioms fundamental to the exercise of foreign policy that holds true across a spectrum of acts and actions) can somewhat simply be thought of as the old anti-communist “domino theory” in reverse. Enlargement was an attempt to put this “doctrine” to strategic use. As accession drew nearer, “enlargement” became a byword in EU strategic thinking much like “containment” had been in America’s Kennan doctrine.¹⁹ In this sense, it can be argued that EU enlargement was not only a strategic venture, but also a defining project in EU foreign policy.²⁰ At the heart of the “enlargement doctrine” was the goal of furthering “the European way” by encouraging applicants to internalise the blend of the rule of law, human rights, protection of minorities and the merits of market economy.²¹ The primary strategic objective of the EU enlargement doctrine was to bring stability to Europe’s periphery and increase European integration. The secondary objectives were to maintain overall efficiency while deepening the integration project, especially with regard to foreign and security policy. Although the US shared these objectives, it also desired to retain primacy in European security while encouraging the European states to shoulder a greater part of the security burden.

The democratic enlargement doctrine was not the only reason for the “securitisation” of EU enlargement. It might even be argued that enlargement constitutes half the *raison d’être* of the EU – as captured in the twin concepts of “widening” and “deepening”. Historically, the act of widening by taking in new members (from the EEC of six to the EC of nine, later 12 and, eventually, to the EU of 15) would lead to deepening through an increase in the number and scope of the tasks handled by integration (from the Coal and Steel Community, to the Treaties of Rome, to the Single Market and the Treaty on European Union).²² From an early stage, integration in the area of security and defence policies was intended to precede and accompany Eastern enlargement. John Peterson expressed a commonly held view when he said in 1993: “the prospect of a community which includes as many as twenty members and constructs its own security arrangements seems plausible by the end of the 1990s”.²³ And indeed, in the period leading up to the 2004 accession of ten new member states, delivering on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and more specifically, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was an obvious “deepening” project preceding Eastern enlargement. This would have been technically possible even if it had meant placing specific

demands on the applicants that were not placed on the existing members. Heather Grabbe points out that “the Commission was able to demand that the candidates make changes in areas which are not officially part of the bloc’s remit in the existing Union such as macroeconomics, the treatment of minorities and reform of the judiciary”.²⁴ The problem was, of course, that the Commission had largely been shut out of these areas and rather than chasing the CFSP/ESDP up the agenda, these chapters were among the first to be closed during the actual accession negotiations – and the EU directed its attention to the symbol-laden Constitutional Treaty.

For NATO, the question of enlargement was less clear-cut. When the Warsaw Treaty Organisation dissolved in July 1991, many expected the Atlantic Alliance to follow suit. Alliances generally do not outlast their original purpose, making NATO what Paul Cornish calls “a historical novelty”.²⁵ During the 1990s, three interconnected questions became known as NATO’s “self-preservation challenge”. First, despite half a century of debate, NATO had proved incapable of generating anything resembling an equal transatlantic burden-sharing. The US bore a disproportionate share of the cost of the Cold War defence. This trend was compounded by a steadily growing gap in technology, and military capabilities across the Atlantic had come to threaten interoperability. Second, much the same situation was reflected in the case of power-sharing within the Alliance, where the US had grown accustomed to holding a position of primacy akin to that held by the USSR in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. Finally, the collapse of the USSR left NATO without a common enemy to justify its policies and without an agreed purpose underpinning its future. A RAND Corporation study published around that time is widely regarded as having had a vital impact on the shaping of American policies. The study recommended transforming NATO from a collective defence alliance into a communal security grouping based on common democratic values.²⁶ In the absence of a shared threat, the emphasis shifted from the collective defence Article 5 to that of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty which refers to the promotion of stability, well-being and collaboration amongst the allies. NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept is replete with references to the Alliance’s role in furthering stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area through dialogue and cooperation.²⁷ For this reason Eastern enlargement came to be considered by many as the solution to NATO’s self-preservation challenge. Some, including former US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, hoped that the act of enlargement would give a new momentum to the Alliance.²⁸ The desire of the CEE countries to join NATO was taken as proof of NATO’s continued relevance, as captured in Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott’s remark: “If NATO didn’t exist it would be necessary to invent it.”²⁹

Preparing dual enlargement

Europe's military revolution, as one study called it, launched the EU into policy areas traditionally occupied by NATO, while the Alliance's new-found interest in non-military security in Europe took it into areas covered by European integration.³⁰ The end of the Cold War posed a set of challenges for NATO. Unlike the EU, the Alliance had been born out of the division of Europe, its strategic means and ends tied to a single and existential threat. The period of rapid system transition, 1989–91, confronted arguably the most successful alliance in history with lingering questions about its future relevance. Maintaining NATO, never mind enlarging it, after the Cold War was far from an obvious choice.³¹ For some time, concerns that the US might follow the Soviet Union and disengage caused alarm in most European capitals.³² The European states stood shoulder to shoulder in their renewed invitations for the US to remain engaged in Europe. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher captured the prevailing mood in her quip, "You don't cancel your home insurance policy just because there have been fewer burglaries on your street in the last 12 months!"³³ Fears that the US was somehow abandoning Europe translated into a strong conservatism vis-à-vis NATO. As a matter of fact the Europeans were worried that expansion might undermine the inner cohesion of the Alliance, as was illustrated by NATO's 1990 London Declaration which went no further than offering "regular diplomatic liaison" to the former Warsaw Pact members.³⁴

In Washington, decision-makers remained undecided about the road ahead. Was America to remain a European power; was it to down-scale its level of engagement, or was it to disengage entirely and let the Europeans shoulder the burdens of their own defence? The botched coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in July 1990 convinced President Bush the Elder that it was too early to dissolve NATO. Subsequently NATO began an internal restructuring of its own military forces and command structures in order to respond more efficiently to new security challenges.³⁵ In the "two plus four" talks that began in May 1990, comprising East and West Germany plus the four victors of the Second World War, the two German states were permitted to settle the details of their own cohabitation, while the Americans, the British, the French and the Soviets held their final peace conference. This process proved less thorny than many had anticipated. The Soviets withdrew peacefully, the Warsaw Pact disintegrated quietly and a united Germany remained in NATO. For other states in the former Soviet sphere, the US encouraged the 46-member North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).³⁶ Frustrated by the guarded welcome from the West, the leaders of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary met in the Hungarian town of Visegrad in February 1991, where they declared their common objective to be "total integration into the European political, economic, security and legislative order".³⁷ This was a bold move. We must

keep in mind that at this stage it was still far from certain which, if any, of the former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation would be offered full membership in either NATO or the EU or what conditions would be placed on their membership.

The Union got off to an early start in engaging CEE countries on substantial issues. Building on ties that had been formed under the European Political Cooperation (EPC) the EC signed bilateral trade agreements with European states as new regimes came into power.³⁸ This was arguably as much cooperation as either side could handle, as Eastern Europe was in the throws of regime transition, while the EU was progressing towards the most important treaty of all, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU) with the EFTA enlargement hot on its heels. Until this treaty was ratified in late 1993, serious debate on prospective members was simply put off. The early EU approach was organised around the PHARE programme launched in 1990 and was bolstered the following year by the "Europe agreements" covering free trade, cultural exchange and political dialogue and the 26-member Partnership for Peace (PfP) security cooperation programme.³⁹ The process went smoothly at this early stage. EC engagement failed to raise the same level of anxiety in Moscow as NATO activities did. Consequently, President Yeltsin accepted East Germany's entry into the European Communities with a minimum of fuss, but resorted to veiled and not so veiled threats whenever the topic of NATO enlargement came up.⁴⁰ EU enlargement was on the whole more popular in the electorates than the NATO equivalent. This underscored the widely held perception that the EU and NATO moved in different spheres – that the EU was about economy and NATO was about security.⁴¹

In 1992, the European Council commissioned a report on the internal and external implications of enlarging the Union. The report *Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement* was presented at the Lisbon Summit in June 1992, where the EFTA applicants – Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden – were invited to join the Union.⁴² The decision whether to enlarge into Central and Eastern Europe was put off at that time, shelved alongside the pending applications of Cyprus and Malta. The advanced countries were able to negotiate accession in record time and were welcomed as full members of the Union in January 1995, as soon as the TEU came into effect. The EFTA enlargement strengthened those voices that argued that the Union could be enlarged by taking in groups of countries at one time rather than on an individual basis. Michael Rühle and Nicholas Williams gave voice to a prevailing sense of momentum in the integration project when singling this out as the point when the EU became the major political driving factor in Europe.⁴³

The year 1993 was pivotal for both the EU and NATO. That year, both organisations agreed in principle to expand into the former Soviet sphere. The decision to enlarge coincided with a further drop in tensions between

Russia and NATO. There was still some opposition to EU enlargement, mainly current members' concerns over diluted influence and the recipient states' fear of reduced benefits from the EU's common budgets. The EU Commission's report, "*Towards a closer association with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe*", agreed upon at the Edinburgh European Council in 1992, laid out a rough draft of what would later become the "Copenhagen Criteria" for joining the EU.⁴⁴ In June 1993, the EU's Copenhagen Summit took the first step towards Eastern enlargement: "The European Council today agreed that the associated countries in central and eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union" on the condition that each applicant "is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required".⁴⁵ The criteria included the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, sustaining a functioning market economy, and the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union. A final requirement was that each applicant should have the capacity to enact and implement the entire *acquis communautaire*, the body of laws, rules and regulations agreed upon by the member states.⁴⁶

While the final decision of membership was left in the hands of the member states in the European Council, the interpretation and enforcement of the criteria were the responsibility of the Commission.⁴⁷ To the dismay of some, the Commission transformed what Heather Grabbe called "motherhood and apple pie conditions" into thousands of pages of detailed conditions for the applicants to fulfil.⁴⁸ This points to a qualitative difference in EU and NATO enlargement strategies. While the EU saw itself as a club where minimum requirements would have to be met in order to achieve membership, NATO offered membership as an incentive for CEE countries to carry out unpopular and difficult reforms, but did not make membership hinge on compliance. Also, the NATO enlargement criteria were never formalised in any great detail. The Alliance had no formal equivalent to the *acquis*, and although a 1995 in-house *Study on NATO Enlargement* suggested that any affiliation would have to depend on the applicant's ability to meet certain criteria, the NATO requirements were always left more vague than the EU equivalents.⁴⁹ The difference in speed was, as mentioned, a result of the difference in complexity of the two organisations. Since NATO's accession criteria were less rigid than those of the EU, the time of accession was, to a greater extent, a matter of political consideration.⁵⁰ Had the NATO criteria been committed to a single document they would likely have included democracy, market economy, civilian control of the military, cooperative foreign policies and neighbour relations, a credible PfP track record, interoperability with NATO forces, the willingness to participate in NATO activities, being a net contributor to NATO budgets, and finally, fidelity (expressed and expected) to the Alliance leader. In the past, the political criteria for

NATO membership had been rather less stringent than those of the EC, or even for the Council of Europe. Both had suspended Greece and Turkey when these countries were under military rule, while NATO had taken no similar steps.

Throughout the 1990s, the NATO and EU outreach programmes remained stubbornly decoupled. In 1997 Heather Grabbe and Kirsten Hughes suggested that “NATO and EU members frequently refer to the two enlargements as ‘parallel processes’ in order to dampen the expectations that one will affect the timing and contents of the other.”⁵¹ Europe’s failure in the Balkans made President Clinton question the Union’s ability to shoulder strategic responsibility. In terms of enlargement, the US President was frustrated about what he perceived as procrastination and indecisiveness on the part of the Europeans in terms of bringing the new democracies into the EU. A US Pentagon official said in an interview that this had “seriously deflated” any desire there might have been to couple NATO and EU enlargements. There is some evidence that the EU’s steady progress in drawing the CEE states closer served to drive NATO enlargement up the American agenda from the second half of 1993. The formal applications from Hungary and Poland for EU membership rattled Washington, where the prevailing mood was still in favour of offering the CEE states something short of full NATO membership. This development, bolstered by the Commission’s call for “structured cooperation” between the applicants with the CFSP to “consult frequently on foreign and security issues of mutual concern”, caused unease in Washington since it suggested that the parties would consult without America being present.⁵²

During the early 1990s, the EU had led the process towards enlargement, with the US finding itself in the unfamiliar position of reacting to EU foreign policy initiatives. This changed in 1994 when NATO swung decisively towards offering the prospect of full membership to a large number of countries.⁵³ This shift essentially came about in Washington. In 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher declared that NATO enlargement “was not on the agenda”.⁵⁴ But less than a year later, the US State Department was drawing up detailed plans for NATO expansion. Alongside the early advocacy of Senator Richard Lugar, the State Department study provided an important impetus to the American endorsement of NATO enlargement. The study is also thought to have been influenced by the “German connection” between German Defence Minister Volker Rühe, and the US Ambassador to Berlin, Richard Holbrooke, in harness with Clinton’s foreign policy adviser, Anthony Lake. A source close to Chancellor Schröder said in an interview that the German understanding of this effort was that an ad hoc partnership had been formed on the topic of enlargement in order to “shape and keep up the momentum of dual enlargement in accordance with shared interests”.

It was Richard Holbrooke who drew up detailed plans that were pre-

sented at the NATO Meeting of Foreign Ministers in December 1994.⁵⁵ The in-house study presented to the foreign ministers was to become the backbone of the NATO pre-accession strategy. These plans were, according to one leading NATO official, “so finalised that they verged on a *fait accompli*”. Interviews carried out in the EU and NATO indicate that this attempt at jockeying the NATO process ahead of that of the EU met with what one might call “passive resistance” from the Europeanist camp. A group led by France argued that NATO had better adjust to being a “threatless alliance” before expanding. The June 1991 North Atlantic Council in Berlin agreed upon “internal adaptation” to the new circumstances.⁵⁶ The strategy was to expand and, at the same time, establish a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO intended to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance. In this architecture, the WEU was intended to serve as a bridge connecting NATO and the European Union. The Corfu European Council in June 1994 declared that accession negotiations with Cyprus and Malta would begin within six months of the Intergovernmental Conference planned for 1996. After the Amsterdam Summit, the best-prepared CEE applicants were added to this priority list.⁵⁷

It is important to note that the applicants greeted the emergence of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) with a dose of scepticism. The CEE states responded “late and defensively” to the EU invitations to partake on the fringes of the endeavour.⁵⁸ In the early stages of the development of the ESDP and before accession in 2004, CEE policies were concerned with overcoming their status as “outsiders”, but because of their loyalty to the United States and to NATO, they were also very sceptical about the ESDP project. While Budapest, Prague and Warsaw were eager to be granted access to the decision-making arena, their policies remained decidedly unenthusiastic about the EU security policy dimension. Marcin Zaborowski notes that: “Every opportunity was used to stress that the EU’s involvement in security should be limited and should not seek to duplicate or negate the alliance’s pre-eminent role.”⁵⁹

During 1997, the broad lines of the European Union and NATO accession strategies fell into place. The July NATO Summit in Madrid and the December Ministerial Meetings paved the way for welcoming the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into NATO. The same year the EU Commission presented the Agenda 2000 to the member states and agreement was reached to begin accession negotiations with five states, adding Slovenia and Estonia to the three countries selected by NATO.⁶⁰ The EU Amsterdam Summit in June 1997 brought the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) to its conclusion and the EU machinery could now turn its full attention to the question of enlargement. By 1998, the concerns over Russia that had shadowed much of the early enlargement process had been largely overtaken by the three interconnected questions of sequencing, financing and primacy.

Sequencing, financing and primacy

Three issue areas were of particular relevance in the transatlantic debates over enlargement: first, sequencing – which organisations should enlarge first, which countries should be offered membership and when; second, the question of financing – how were the economic costs and burdens of enlargement to be split; and third, the question of primacy – which actor should reside at the centre of the security architecture in Europe. Each will be examined in detail in the following.

Sequencing – a question of who and when

While most experts agree that the US by and large determined the sequencing of NATO enlargement, opinions are divided as to the extent to which the US influenced these questions in the EU process. The charge that the US used EU membership as a strategic reward was put in plain words by Gilbert Achcar in *Le Monde Diplomatique*. “The US promises prospective EU membership to those states whose cooperation it needs.”⁶¹ University of Georgia Professor Howard Wiarda gives this perspective an academic guise, stating:

The rhetoric and mythology of this process suggests that, on these parallel paths to European integration, the United States can largely dictate NATO expansion, while European countries decide on EU enlargement. This is a polite fiction [...] The United States is also extremely influential on EU enlargement.

Wiarda concludes: “if the US insists that some of the countries or all be admitted to either NATO or the EU, it is unlikely that Europe will be able to say no”.⁶² A somewhat different argument is put forward by Martin Smith and Graham Timmins. The two note a strong pattern in which the EU mirrored NATO through the concept of “incremental linkage”, that is “when specific developments in one organisation provoked matching or corresponding developments in the other within a relatively short period of time”. After the mid-1990s the dominant pattern is that of the EU trailing NATO (Table 4.1).⁶³

Frank Schimmelfennig calls this a “highly speculative thesis”.⁶⁴ He explains dual enlargement from the perspective of applicant pressures, arguing that the EU suffered from “rhetorical entrapment” rather than external pressures, or indeed strategic thinking.⁶⁵ Similarly, Karen Smith’s notion of security-driven enlargement leaves little room for external influence: “all in all, US encouragement or pressure has not forced the Community/Union to act”.⁶⁶ This tension highlights the obvious question arising from her analysis, for after singling out security as the salient factor in EU enlargement she then all but ignores the United States – the

Table 4.1 Synchrony and chronology of EU and NATO enlargements

<i>NATO</i>	<i>EU</i>
September 1996: Study on NATO enlargement published	December 1995: Madrid Summit commits itself to beginning accession negotiations in 1996
July 1997: Madrid summit – three new countries invited to join NATO	July 1997: Commission opinions on new applications published
March 1999: three new countries join NATO	December 1997: EU Luxembourg Summit
April 1999: NATO Washington Summit launch Membership Action plan in explicit preparation for nine new member states	December 1999: The Helsinki European Council committed the EU to active membership negotiations with all applicants
November 2002: Prague summit – seven new countries invited to join NATO	December 2002: Copenhagen European Council EU pledge to admit ten new members by 2004
March 2004: seven new countries join NATO	May 2004: ten new countries join the European Union

linchpin in the European security order. Although the “rhetorical entrapment” perspective dominates current discourse, a shortcoming of this argument is that it fails to explain sequencing, that is why only certain countries were offered membership. After all, a country like Slovenia was better prepared for either of the enlargements than the “Visegrad three”, and the notion that all ten applicants met the criteria for EU membership simultaneously is absurd. Other strategic considerations clearly played a part.

The 1999 Visegrad enlargement

The first point that must be noted is that the US, while frequently indicating its desire for NATO–EU overlap, never demanded that EU members would have to become members of NATO or vice versa. The EFTA countries were not pressured to take NATO membership. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were singled out by both the EU and NATO. There were a number of reasons for this. Besides being among the most advanced economies, these states also bordered EU and NATO territory. The states also benefited from the concerted effort of the Visegrad channel and German patronage. In Washington, Congressional pressure stemming from concerns over the CEE Diaspora vote, notably from the large Polish community, certainly played a part in this selection, as did a desire to add momentum to the Alliance. Spurred by domestic pressures, the Clinton Administration moved at full speed towards enlargement, with NATO’s

significant 50th anniversary in 1999 as a favoured date for accession. This plan ran into trouble, in part because of the strong Russian opposition, but also due to a lack of endorsement by the US military establishment.⁶⁷

In Europe, some countries were dismayed at the way in which the US was pressing ahead with enlargement without proper allied consultations. A foreign policy adviser to Gerhard Schröder described in an interview how Germany attempted to make the US slow down, as the lack of genuine inter-allied consultation was rapidly eroding support for enlargement among the existing members. Although the US had support from roughly half of the NATO members, the need for consensus in the formal admission helped to persuade the US to step back from “Big Bang” enlargement in 1999. At the same time, France and Italy lobbied for their respective favourites – Romania and Slovenia – to be included in the first round of NATO enlargement. This was unceremoniously turned down by Washington in spite of strong voices in Europe arguing for them being taken in. At the July 1997 NATO Madrid Summit, only three countries were offered membership.⁶⁸ Secretary of State Albright told the Foreign Relations Committee that the decision for small-scale enlargement reflected the desire “to preserve NATO’s integrity and strength”.⁶⁹

At the Madrid Summit in December 1995 Chancellor Kohl had sent up a “trial balloon” suggesting that the EU also commit to a “Visegrad first” strategy. Germany certainly received a more sympathetic hearing for this idea in Washington than it did among its European partners. Efforts were no more successful when France joined Germany in a bid to shape EU foreign policy-making on sequencing. In a speech following the same summit, President Chirac gave unsolicited “assurances” that three or four of the applicants would join the EU in 2000 or 2001, again to little effect (except, of course, illustrating to the applicants who was in a position to deliver goods and who were not). The Visegrad enlargement showed that the US did heed European concerns, although they coincided with other weighty arguments to postpone large-scale enlargement. A second key consideration was that the US had the final say in the selection of prospective members in NATO. Meanwhile, the EU did not match NATO’s Visegrad enlargement. On the contrary, the Commission showed its independence by opening negotiations not only with the NATO front-runners, but also added Slovenia and Estonia to the Visegrad Three.

The Baltic question

Much the same process is discernible in the case of Baltic enlargement, where the express US desire for the EU to enlarge before NATO into the former Soviet Union failed to trigger the desired response. Not least because of what they had endured under communism and the dramatic manner in which they had won their independence, the three Baltic countries had the sympathy and support of the American establishment. At the

same time, according to key personnel interviewed, there was a great reluctance in the West to challenge Russia, which was still vehemently opposed to NATO expansion into former Soviet territories. Moscow by this stage was widely considered to be a spent force that could only grow weaker. President Clinton chose to bide his time and focus on economic cooperation and invited the leaders of the three states to Washington to sign a "Baltic Charter" on US–Baltic cooperation in January 1998.⁷⁰ Although the charter appeared outwardly to concern only economic cooperation, it was widely understood as a preparation for NATO membership. Faced with strong Congressional pressure to enlarge NATO into the former Soviet republics, and the heated Russian opposition to this, Clinton appeared to be offering EU membership to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania by issuing a thinly veiled request for the EU to enlarge first into the Baltic.

American policies clearly played an important role in nurturing a sense of entitlement among the applicants, but they failed to have the Baltic States singled out as a "special case" as the relatively advanced state of accession preparations and the strong support from the Nordic states might have warranted. This debate ended with the 1999 Washington Declaration which launched the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP). Unlike earlier initiatives such as the PfP, MAP was an explicit preparation for NATO membership. Nine countries were listed: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia and Albania. The list reflected the support these countries had given NATO in the Kosovo conflict. In December 1999, the Helsinki European Council committed the EU to active membership negotiations with all ten CEE applicants, including the three Baltic States.

The main problem facing those wanting to make the case that the US determined EU accession is that it is difficult to see how any of the countries included in Eastern enlargement would not be EU members today had it not been for American pressures. An argument can be made that the acceptance into NATO served to bring Bulgaria and Romania's accession date closer than it might otherwise have been, although this is difficult to assess. The US had also, however, made it known it would like to see more states as EU members, notably Georgia, the Ukraine and, above all, Turkey. There can be little doubt that the US remains a strong proponent of Turkish membership, while a large majority of EU states are opposed to this. While Georgia and the Ukraine have been told not to get their hopes up, Turkey has – not without controversy – been allowed to complete much of the accession process. In the run-up to the 1999 Helsinki Summit, Turkey was accepted as a candidate for EU membership "after sustained pressure from the US administration".⁷¹ Apparently, the US lobbied a number of governments bilaterally, pressing the issue in London with what one Whitehall official called "exigency". Faced with procrastination, the US tactics became blunter and more public. By the

time the EU was selecting new members among the applicant countries, no-one in Europe's political classes could claim to be unaware of the US support for Turkish EU membership. There can be little doubt that the public display of American support for membership helped to foster a sense of entitlement in Turkey. Many observers believe that the concessions granted by the EU to accept Turkey as an applicant will amount to "decision by deferral" – that is, the EU has made so many small steps towards offering membership that it will be less problematic to push ahead than to backtrack. If Turkey is invited to join the EU, this would indeed be a powerful testimony to the American influence on EU policies.

Regatta or "Big Bang" enlargement?

Perhaps the most important question in the EU and NATO enlargements was whether countries should be admitted individually or collectively. After the Visegrad enlargement, NATO was poised for the large-scale enlargement that President Clinton had wanted all along. The topic of sequencing provoked much debate at the European Councils in Amsterdam and Luxembourg in 1997. In the case of the EU, whether new states were to be admitted one by one or as a "Big Bang" was a political decision. In the end, leaders agreed to adopt a "regatta principle", tying accession dates to the ability to meet the accession criteria, and declared that accession for all applicants would be made on an individual basis. Each would be invited to join when it was judged by the Commission to be ready to shoulder the burdens of membership. Lists of criteria that were to be fulfilled by the individual applicants were drawn up. This was intended to ensure that the applicants would be able to cope with the burdens of membership, but it was also an attempt to de-politicise the process. The Commission steered the applicants towards membership in accordance with the predefined criteria. Benchmarking was consciously used to prevent the applicants from forming a bloc and instead dealt with them individually (a tactic not dissimilar to how the US runs NATO). The existence of predefined criteria made the Commission resilient to applicant demands for special treatment as well as to American pressures – and also, to ward off cold feet among the existing member states.⁷²

At the same time, a pre-accession strategy targeting all ten applicants was adopted, but without a fixed time-frame.⁷³ The Agenda 2000 included assessments by the Commission of the progress made by the individual applicants. The general trend confirmed the overall view that political reforms outpaced economic reforms in most countries and that the most notable shortfalls were in the areas of market economy and the judicial system. All ten applicants were invited to the European Council held in March 1998. The progress report of November 1998 broadly affirmed the findings from the previous years. EU sources claim that the decision to opt for a "Big Bang" enlargement was taken for the sake of convenience and

the fact that all the applicants (with the exceptions of Bulgaria and Romania) were moving forward in strides.⁷⁴ This is not the whole truth. The decision of the EU to go for a “Big Bang” enlargement was a rupture in the agreed EU strategy for enlargement. The December 2002 Copenhagen European Council where the EU pledged to admit ten new members by 2004 came only weeks after the NATO Prague Summit where seven new countries were invited to join NATO. This invites the question of whether this was a case of American influence.

The decision to enlarge NATO on a large scale certainly fed into the EU debate, but it is difficult to conclude that this influence was decisive. A number of explanations have been put forward to explain the shift towards “Big Bang” enlargement. Heather Grabbe pointed out that all the EU applicants had actually reached an acceptable degree of preparedness and were on a similar level of development – though with Bulgaria and Romania trailing far behind. A complementary account is given by Giovanni Grevi. In an interview he argued that “Big Bang” enlargement was, above all, a political decision brought about by the “post-Nice disillusionment”. The 2000 EU summit had failed in significantly reforming the cumbersome decision-making procedures of the Union. Hopes that enlargement would somehow force internal reform had subsided. At the three consecutive IGCs (1996–97, 2000 and 2003) the member states had failed to make fundamental changes to the inner workings of the EU and had twice ducked the question of reforming the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Karen Smith points to the Kosovo War as an important factor that made membership a bargaining chip in the need to shore up support for the West in the region.⁷⁵ In a conversation Michael Rühle added that the two enlargements were both impacted by the new international climate:

11 September made it much easier for NATO to have a “Big Bang” enlargement. Global terrorism changed the security focus away from Europe and from the traditional East–West context. For example, it made Russia–Baltic relations seem less dramatic.

Finally, Christopher Hill suggests that one of the main reasons for opting for a “Big Bang” enlargement was the belief that leaving out certain states might create an environment of perpetual uncertainty, although this would be balanced by the discipline stemming from a fear of exclusion. Another main argument was that it would be better to take them in and continue to socialise with them than leave them out to fester. An EU Commission official took a similar line of argument, pointing to a growing sense that the surge in integration was ebbing and enlargement would have to be carried out while there was still a degree of enthusiasm for the project: “Basically, the new states were brought in like laundry before the rain.”

All in all, there is little to suggest that the US had a strong influence over EU policies with regard to sequencing. One Commission official seems to be correct when she asserted in an interview that since American views were known, attempts to pressure the EU were just as likely to be counterproductive, and “at the end of the day the US does not decide who gets into the Union”. What influence Washington did have over sequencing was exerted largely through leading by example through NATO. The question of incremental linkage is problematic, most of all because the US and the EU share goals. This brings us back to the question of causality. In the introductory chapter we noted Jack Nagel’s stipulation that there must be a causal link between preferences and outcome, not merely intent and effect. The factor that above all makes it difficult to conclude that the American influence was “significant” is that the EU would likely have enlarged in a similar manner without US pressures and that when Washington encouraged the EU to do something that went beyond the established consensus, this failed.

Financing – squaring the bill

Estimates of the fiscal costs of dual enlargement fluctuated wildly (Table 4.2). In the case of NATO enlargement, the question was who would have to pay for extending integrated military structures and the upgrades necessary to ensure inter-operability between the former adversaries and the allies. The primary factor in the EU equation was the degree to which the EU’s generous Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and European Social Funds (ESF), which made up five-sixths of the EU common budgets, would – or indeed *could* – be extended to the applicant countries. If so, this would entail a fundamental re-balancing of the contributor–recipient equation within the EU.

Above all, the estimates convey a sense of uncertainty over the economic implications of enlargement. Predictions were made without a clear idea of which countries were to be included and when. The figures were nevertheless important factors in the debates on how the bill should be split. The assessments added to the acute dilemma that both organisations found themselves in. In the case of NATO, there were no common budgets that could ease transition. Money would have to be taken from national budgets. For the EU, enlargement was expected to create great imbalances in the EU’s agricultural market and to increase the EU budget significantly if the pre-enlargement redistributory frameworks were kept in place. As the rapid economic growth seen throughout much of the 1990s slowed down, European governments found themselves strained further by the Monetary Union criteria for levels of public spending.

A primary problem was the unfeasibility of asking the applicants to increase defence spending while pressuring them to slash public expenses in order to balance their budgets. The costs of unification made Germany,

Table 4.2 Comparative financial costs of EU and NATO enlargements^a

EU		NATO	
Berlin European Council 1999	Gradual increase from €89.5 billion in 1999 to 103.5 billion in 2005	NATO's own estimate 1998	€1.3–2 billion
Agenda 2000 1997	Total cost: ECU 79.9 billion	Congressional Budget Office 1998	\$100 million 1998–2008
Danish Government 1996	ECU 14–20 billion per annum (ESF only)	Pentagon Report to Congress 1997	\$9–12 billion (from 1997–2009)
Baldwin 1994	ECU 63.6 (CAP + ESF per annum)	Cato Institute	\$70 billion
Unofficial Commission estimate 1995	ECU 38 billion (ESF only, per annum)	RAND Corporation 1996	\$10–110 billion (overall range) \$42 billion likely figure
Baldwin 1994	ECU 63.3 billion (CAP + ESF per annum)	Congressional Budget Office 1996	\$60–125 billion (total)

Sources: "Costs, benefits, burden-sharing and military implications of NATO enlargement", Senate Foreign relations Committee; Smith and Timmins (2000b): 65; Grabbe and Hughes (1998): 40; Grabbe, H. (2001). "Profiting from EU Enlargement" *Centre for European Reform* London: 33–45; and Asmus, R. D. *et al* (1996). "What will NATO Enlargement Cost?" *Survival* 38(3): 12.

Note

a Then year dollars and ECU [later Euro, €].

the largest contributor to the EU budget, jittery about simply extending the existing redistribution mechanisms. Current beneficiaries were understandably reluctant to part with their privileges. This was certainly the case with smaller states such as Portugal and Ireland, but more importantly, France was unwilling to take a cut in the generous subsidies it received through the CAP, and Britain was opposed to giving up the budget rebate that had been won by Margaret Thatcher in 1982. The result was that there was very little willingness among the member states to pay for hard security enlargement through NATO or indeed through the EU.

There were questions about whether the new states should be equipped with Western military hardware; whether they should be helped to a European average; whether the frontline defences should be extended to the new outer borders of the Alliance; and finally, whether enlargement could be used to rebalance the transatlantic burden-sharing equation. The estimates of the 1996 RAND Corporation survey established a wide range depending on the level of ambition in terms of military capabilities, and

suggested that an ambition level in the mid-third of the estimates was appropriate, as was also reflected in the official 1997 US Department of Defence estimate.⁷⁶ The great difference between the 1998 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimate and the 1997 Cato Institute forecast depended on whether the adaptation and transformation of West European forces were taken into account. The “direct costs” referred to the absolute minimum assistance needed to ensure a degree of interoperability among the allies. The inflated level of ambition in America caused the Europeans – fearful of being handed the bill – to steer clear of the debate. In the lull following the end of the Cold War, there was little will among European leaders to increase military expenditure, certainly not to American levels.⁷⁷ Instead of being a practical discussion among members on how to facilitate new members, the debate over the cost of NATO enlargement became an intra-American debate, pitting the Clinton Administration against the budding neo-conservative movement.

Three ways to split a bill

When it came to covering the economic costs of enlargement, the positions of the EU, the US and the applicants were relatively straightforward. Each of the three groupings wanted the other two to cover as much as possible while they themselves reaped the maximum rewards. The applicants hoped to receive large fiscal transfers that would raise them to a par with Western states in a short time. As Bulgarian Foreign Minister Salomon Passy put it: “The iron curtain from the Cold War must not be replaced by an economic curtain. In order to be useful allies and partners we need assistance.”⁷⁸ The EU would like to see the US pay for the military upgrading and for securing the outer borders of the applicants. As one Commission official stated: “It is only fair that American eagerness to lead should also entail a willingness to pay.” In Washington, leaders wished to encourage the European states to shoulder a greater part of the defence burden. As one commentator concluded at the time: “The US clearly anticipates that the costs to the US will be minimal and the costs to its European allies will be higher.”⁷⁹

On the American side, there was not much opposition to the EU, led by the European Commission, setting the agenda in engaging former adversaries, provided they would also shoulder most of the financial burden. Burden-sharing was a recurring theme in Washington throughout the 1990s. Some Congressmen, mostly conservative, were convinced that Europe was “freeloading” on American tax-payers, and should be made to increase their defence expenditure. Attempts were made to strengthen the European pillar of NATO and bridge the growing gap between American and European military capabilities. There can be little doubt that although the Americans questioned the EU’s ability to make strategic decisions, Washington did not fully appreciate the economic and military

weakness of the applicants. The CEE states were woefully under-equipped militarily and, in the words of one expert, “could not fight their way out of a paper bag”.⁸⁰ This situation was made even more dire by a sharp drop in defence expenditure. By 1995, the defence spending in the Visegrad countries was roughly half of what it had been in 1989.⁸¹

Once all the allies were plugged into this debate, a consensus was reached that only “direct costs” would be discussed. That meant those improvements in command, control and communications facilities that were needed to link the new members to the current members. This was referred to as the “Norwegian model”, in which the applicants would host little permanent NATO infrastructure and be expected to maintain a defence capable of holding an aggressor only for the days and weeks necessary until an allied counterforce could be assembled. The figure of \$1.5 billion cited in the 1997 NATO study referred to “direct costs” over a period of ten years.⁸² When this debate became a factor in US domestic politics it also made it more difficult to reach a formal consensus within NATO which, in turn, led to a down-scaling of the level of ambition. There was a consensus that the CEE countries would have to shoulder most of the burden of meeting NATO standards. There was an overall European reluctance to being made to pay for what was seen as an essentially American venture. In the end, American calls for Europe to bear a disproportionate share of the financial burden were muted, not only for fear of causing resentment in Europe, but also because, according to Simon Serfaty: “It might exacerbate a debate on the costs of EU enlargement, first as a response to the U.S. calls for burden sharing, and next because of a real concern over the nature and scope of these costs.”⁸³ Figures for the period 1990–96 showed that while the US shouldered 11.34 per cent of the assistance to Eastern Europe, the EU covered 53.76 per cent.⁸⁴

Bankrolling enlargement

For the EU, the overall solution arrived at was the “Agenda 2000” compromise adopted at the Berlin European Council in March 1999.⁸⁵ This meant that the applicants would not be eligible for direct payments to their farmers until 2006. It also meant that the EU pushed the most problematic budgetary questions triggered by enlargement into the future. That said, the Agenda 2000 did stress that EU enlargement would mean substantial additional costs for the existing 15 members, even if these were to be spread out over a longer period. In the Union’s budget for the years 2000 to 2006, an estimated €80 billion were earmarked for costs in connection with and in preparation for accession. In these assistance programmes, the EU applied the same ground rule as that applied for NATO enlargement: the greatest expenses would have to be shouldered by the applicants themselves. In terms of security, the EU concentrated on

offsetting the result of the unbalanced NATO enlargement through focusing *inter alia* on ensuring firm civilian control over the under-financed and disgruntled armed forces of the new members.

A Euro-American burden-sharing understanding emerged under which NATO focused on military preparations, while the EU encouraged Security Sector Reform (SSR). The EU defined SSR as “democratic accountability, civilian control over security structures, clear demarcation between internal and external security mechanisms and approaches, the rule of law, an independent judiciary and a strong civil society”.⁸⁶ It can be argued that a beneficial consequence of this was that in country after country the once-mighty armed forces were starved of money and thereby starved of power – to a level befitting a democracy. While NATO focused on “transformation and enhancement” in the military field, the EU demanded “not just proof of their democratic credentials but also precise performance standards in a number of fields on non-military security”.⁸⁷ Interviews confirm that this was due, in no small measure, to the limited competences of the Commission in the field of military security. When the Europeans proved reluctant to pay the large sums envisioned by some in Washington, this impacted the American position on financing. Senator and Presidential candidate, Bob Dole, had sponsored the “NATO enlargement Bill” which in addition to pledging support for democracy in the former communist countries, pledged US\$60 million to help Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary adapt militarily to NATO requirements and standards.⁸⁸ One Polish diplomat involved in the accession negotiations noted that during this phase there were high expectations – encouraged by the American debate – that NATO enlargement would bring a windfall of defence material, contracts and money for the applicants.

When the American gesture was not met with corresponding measures in Europe, the US shifted towards a “soft enlargement”, significantly lowering the ambition to improve the military capabilities of the NATO applicants. Rather, emphasis was placed on helping the applicants develop niche capabilities relevant for operating alongside the Western allies in foreign theatres. A bare minimum was done towards promoting interoperability. As a result, the new NATO members joined the Alliance in a state of military imbalance: some top-notch isolated capabilities like skyscrapers on a plateau of under-paid and under-equipped territorial forces. The capabilities of the applicants were, for the most part, improved by the gifting of surplus, mostly dated, equipment by European allies, and the advantageous leasing of contracts for US military hardware, notably fighter aircraft. The rationale behind the American largesse was put forward by one adviser to George Bush the Elder: “The aim is to get the new member countries hooked on US technology, so that they won’t buy European hardware further down the road.” This aspect is sometimes forgotten. Eastern Europe was seen as a new frontier for military equipment which the US arms industry was determined not to miss out on. The

American weapons industry, expecting to capture its usual large share of the new market, lobbied heavily in favour of NATO's expansion and aggressively challenged any potential EU-encouraged patronage of European industry.

The way NATO enlargement was financed is a testimony to the famously short attention span of the Washington strategic establishment. The US had started off with a very high level of ambition which effectively deterred the European allies from joining the debate. This was initially followed up by some direct financial assistance to the applicants. When Washington realised that the West European states would not play the role assigned to them and carry the brunt of the effort after America's magnanimous gestures, the new strategy was to shift the expenses to the applicants. This was an impossible request, not least because the tight fiscal discipline demanded by the EU in its accession process made it impossible for the applicants to plough funds into military transformation. So the applicants pledged to make the investments and were, in due course, granted NATO memberships – only to fail to live up to their promises. The Pentagon deserves criticism for failing to appreciate just how shallow the preparations for NATO membership had been. In 1999, Hungary, one of the first new NATO members, was singled out in SIPRI's military review as the militarily weakest country of its size in Europe. NATO enlargement was allowed to weaken the Alliance by adding states with outdated and ineffective military capabilities, and by failing to extend the Alliance's frontline defences into the new territories. In strategic terms, this left NATO (and the EU) with an exposed Eastern flank.⁸⁹

The decision to enlarge on the cheap was to have an important impact on the nature of the enlarged Alliance. In the case of EU enlargement, large fiscal transfers from the existing states attempted to ensure that the Union would continue, more or less, in its pre-enlargement format, but with the CFSP/ESDP placed low on the list of priorities. In an interview a foreign policy adviser to President Bush the Elder mused that while the EU seemed to take a high-minded approach, Washington informed the applicants in no uncertain terms that the US expected loyalty in return for security guarantees. The US found it less easy to pressure EU governments on the question of finances since Washington could not credibly threaten to scuttle NATO enlargement as that project was seen as more important for the Americans than for the Europeans. The manner in which NATO enlargement was carried out signalled a further shift in the American commitment towards blunt nuclear deterrence over conventional forces, leaving the future value of Article 5 in question. The EU enjoyed greater success with its SSR activities, bringing the applicants into line with the member states when it came to the societal role of the armed forces. NATO Official Jamie Shea went so far as to say: "Dual enlargement was great since the EU did the work for us and we took the credit."⁹⁰

Primacy – a question of leadership

The questions of finance and sequencing can be seen as flowing into the larger question of primacy – what role would NATO, and thereby the US, play in the European security architecture after the end of the Cold War? The term is chosen with care – the US sought to maintain itself as the primary force in NATO and the Alliance as the primary security institution in Europe. Also, as G. John Ikenberry points out: “This is not an empire; it is a US-led democratic political order that has no name or historical antecedents.”⁹¹ This is not to say that the issue of primacy is an abstract concept. As the former European Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten put it: “Even for a senior foreign official dealing with the US administration, you are aware of your role as a tributary: however courteous your host, you come as a subordinate bearing goodwill and hoping to depart with blessings.”⁹² The fragile Europeanist–Atlanticist consensus between France and Britain described in Chapter 2 soon became entangled in the enlargement process. Christopher Hill observes: “the most important way in which enlargement raises security issues is in relation to the EU’s emerging defence dimension and its impact upon NATO”.⁹³

In the present context the question of primacy is mainly about which organisation would be at the centre of the European security order, which would have the “first pick” at challenges and would ultimately have the first claim to the loyalty of the new member states.⁹⁴ Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger summarised the American position in 1989: “Regardless of how big the EC gets, or what issues European governments devolve to common decision making, the need for a strong American voice in European affairs will not be diminished.”⁹⁵ According to a leaked version of the Pentagon’s 1992 Defence Planning Guidance:⁹⁶

NATO continues to provide the indispensable foundation for a stable security environment in Europe. Therefore, it is of fundamental importance to preserve NATO as the primary instrument of Western defense and security, as well as the channel for U.S. influence and participation in European security affairs. While the United States supports the goal of European integration, we must seek to prevent the emergence of European-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO, particularly the Alliance’s integrated command structure.

Alongside the security argument in favour of enlargement, a less frequently stated, but no less important, factor in US considerations is that NATO enlargement was seen as a cost-effective way to retain and extend American primacy in Europe. As Karl Kaiser points out, a commonly held view was that failing to preserve the Alliance would weaken America’s posi-

tion in Europe and deprive it of a valuable instrument for influence. After all, if the only concern were to promote peace and stability in Eastern Europe, one might ask why this should be an American rather than a European task and why a military rather than a political-economic organisation was seen as the appropriate means for carrying it out. The 1996 United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO states unequivocally that the Alliance is the “principal vehicle for continued United States leadership and influence on European security issues”.⁹⁷ The question of primacy was not only a phenomenon in the US domestic debate about national interest – it was also communicated to the applicants and EU states. A senior White House official was quoted in the *Financial Times* in 2003: “For the US the issue of NATO’s primacy in Europe is of real importance to us. We have made that clear.”⁹⁸ There clearly was a degree of reciprocity over this issue, as the applicants were equally eager to trade support for firm security guarantees.

So how did the US seek to retain primacy in European affairs? Perhaps the most visible move was the retention of a large US military presence in Europe long after the military threats to justify this had abated. In order to placate the Houses of Congress – ever conscious of spending – troop levels were reduced by two-thirds from the Cold War strength of over 300,000 personnel. Martin Smith and Graham Timmins refer to the remaining troops in Europe as a “subscription cost” and claim that: “Both the Executive and Legislative Branches in Washington evidently realise and accept that force reductions below the 100,000 mark might call into question and undermine US claims to leadership.”⁹⁹ By the end of July 1991, the leading European NATO members had unilaterally announced large reductions in their force levels without even pretending that this was done after consultations. With the capability gap widening faster than during the Cold War, there was real concern in the US that the Europeans were allowing themselves to become too dependent on American strength of arms. The second priority was to head off European calls to reconstruct European security architecture in a way that would increase the EU’s centrality at the expense of the United States.

ESDI, ESDP and Berlin Plus

The Yugoslav civil wars had impressed upon the Europeans the need for effective security cooperation. The two obvious options were either to reform NATO or to develop new frameworks. In the early 1990s, an agreement was reached on developing a “European pillar of NATO” in response to these challenges. At the 1996 Summit in Berlin, the allies agreed to construct a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO.¹⁰⁰ The aim was to overcome the capability gap by preparing the most operative forces for NATO-centred coalitions. After mapping the shortfalls of the Europeans with regard to the sorts of missions that they

were expected to handle, NATO, with significant US input, assembled the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) which identified no fewer than 58 areas in which the Europeans needed to improve their capabilities.¹⁰¹ This entailed creating military units that could, if need be, operate under WEU (i.e. EU) command while having access to NATO (and thereby, the US) assets such as intelligence and strategic air-lift and so on.

In Europe, the American decision to add more militarily feeble states to NATO was eased by the understanding that the US would wholeheartedly support the development of a genuine ESDI. In an interview, a leading French diplomat stated that the Quai d'Orsay clearly saw this as a bilateral bargain in which the US would support an actual European identity within NATO, while France, in return, would not obstruct NATO enlargement.¹⁰² In an interview a source close to President Chirac stated that ESDI was important to the French leadership because they hoped it would lead to the creation of a European command structure which could balance the US within the existing frameworks. However, in the months following the Berlin Summit, the US blocked attempts to amplify the European profile in NATO. In July 1996, Washington dismissed the suggestion that the SACEUR post could be held by a European. In August, the US refused to pass the Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH) on to European hands.¹⁰³ The ESDI remained firmly within the NATO framework, which meant that the US would have a veto on the EU's access to NATO assets. British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkin wittily compared the autonomy offered by the ESDI to "as much autonomy as that enjoyed by an adolescent borrowing the family car out on a Saturday night".¹⁰⁴ At the 1997 NATO Madrid Summit, France made it plain that it would not reintegrate with NATO as previously announced. Less publicly, other European states failed to meet the DCI requirements, entrenching the transatlantic capability gap and allowing it to grow through NATO enlargement.

The ESDI was overtaken by a near-identical initiative with a more ambiguous transatlantic link – the ESDP. In an interview William Drozdiak pointed out how the increased functional overlap between NATO and the EU made the question of primacy acute. Despite assurances to the contrary, the very existence of the ESDP was an implicit challenge to NATO's relevance. In this situation, the ambitions of the EU were becoming a serious concern in Washington – "a dagger at NATO's heart", as one US policymaker dramatically put it.¹⁰⁵ Other members of the US establishment were seemingly less concerned. Defence Secretary William Cohen told NATO ministers in October 2000 that it was right and indeed natural for an integrated Europe to seek to develop its own security and defence position: "We agree with this goal not grudgingly, but with wholehearted conviction."¹⁰⁶ This was a tricky issue since the US supported the British vision of an EU security dimension designed to enhance European capabilities in coordination with NATO, but was wary of the French talk of

European autonomy. As Geoffrey Edwards notes: "there has been a degree of ambivalence bordering almost on schizophrenia in American thinking which has been marked in this as during other European efforts to establish a more autonomous security and defence policy."¹⁰⁷ Subsequently US support was subject to significant political conditions.

The American conditions were spelled out in Secretary of State Albright's "Three D's" directed at European leaders: no duplication, no discrimination and no decoupling. This was a direct response to the Saint Malo Declaration and was frequently repeated in the years that followed.¹⁰⁸ The first "D" stemmed from an understandable concern that the Europeans would spend their limited resources on capabilities already available. The second "D" referred to discrimination against NATO Allies who were not members of the European Union, and pertained directly to enlargement (and was an indirect reference to Turkish membership in the EU). The third "D" – decoupling – referred to the American fear that the EU might be used by the European states to counterbalance the US, or in American terms, "gang up on" America. The compromise formula arrived in three successive texts. The first was the Brussels Document of 25 October 2002, which in the section "ESDP: Implementations of the Nice provisions on the involvement of non-European Allies" resolved questions regarding the participation of non-EU NATO members.¹⁰⁹ The second was the Copenhagen Council meeting on 12 December which contained the core of the Berlin Plus agreement and which guaranteed *inter alia* that the ESDP would not be used against Turkish interests in Cyprus.¹¹⁰ Finally the declaration of the Berlin Plus was a comprehensive package of agreements between the EU and NATO based on the conclusions of the 1999 NATO Washington Summit. These were uneasily joined together in a framework agreement signed on 17 March 2003.¹¹¹

Alliance politics – to defect, de-align, abrogate or cooperate?

For the EU, the American approach to enlargement raised tensions. It was increasingly difficult to argue that NATO and the EU operated in different spheres. The CFSP/ESDP nexus was clearly the most likely candidate for the "deepening" of integration that would customarily accompany the "widening" through enlargement. In order to bring into focus the options faced by the EU states – individually and collectively – it is useful to apply Glen Snyder's theory of Alliance Politics.¹¹² The potential strategic response of a lesser power to claims of primacy in an alliance falls into four broad categories: defect, de-align, abrogate and cooperate. The two absolute strategies are either to defect (weak or no commitment to alliance ventures) or to cooperate (strong commitment and support for alliance ventures).¹¹³ Snyder points out that "Each horn of the dilemma has both prospective good and prospective bad consequences [...] the

principal 'bads' are 'abandonment' and 'entrapment', and the principal 'goods' are the reduction in the risk of being abandoned or entrapped by the ally." According to Snyder, alliances in the international system are never absolutely firm. The two relative strategies are to de-align, or "fail to make good on explicit commitments", or to abrogate, taken to mean "fail to provide support in contingencies where support is expected". As Snyder emphasises: "In both the latter variants, the alliance remains intact but the expectations of support which underlies it will be weakened."¹¹⁴

The most obvious defection option for the EU states in the context of enlargement would have been to veto or insist on requirements for NATO enlargement, for example the extension of frontline defences.¹¹⁵ France alone considered this alternative, but Paris concluded, according to a high-ranking member of the French armed services, that France was likely to find itself isolated on this issue. On the other hand, the approach of the EU institutions cannot be labelled as cooperative towards NATO enlargement. This is perhaps best captured in a statement by Hans van der Broek, EU Commissioner for external relations with countries from Central Europe to Russia, who said that the Union took no position on NATO expansion because it had no "competence" on NATO enlargement.¹¹⁶ The argument can be made that the EU states de-aligned by failing to finance NATO enlargement and by failing to meet the obligations that they had signed up to through the DCI; instead, many of the same goals were taken up outside the context of the Alliance. Yet upon closer examination, it becomes clear that the DCI was never regarded as a firm pledge or explicit commitment. The very existence of the ESDP could also be taken as a sign of de-alignment, but the autonomy of this venture was compromised by the Berlin Plus agreement, which gave NATO unspoken primacy over the EU, and, above all, failed to adopt a collective EU defence clause.¹¹⁷ Rather, the European approach to enlargement failed to provide support in contingencies where support was expected, or what Snyder calls "abrogation". Competing demands were not made on the applicants in the name of the EU with regard to military capabilities or fidelity. Yet, the EU states did not formally subordinate their security dimension to NATO. The CFSP was simply played down in the politics of enlargement and kept quiet, encouraging the perception that the EU and NATO moved in different spheres. As a result, the EU failed in its secondary strategic objective to enlarge in a manner that would help deepen the integration project – at least in the field of foreign policy.

Dual enlargement left American primacy intact, albeit with lingering questions as to its future sustainability. There are a number of obvious reasons why this happened. First of all, it was understood in all quarters that the US could deliver something that the EU could not: credible security guarantees. This, combined with the "constructive ambiguity" shrouding the ESDP, made it difficult to even formulate expectations to applicants. As mentioned earlier, during most of the accession processes it

was entirely unclear whether the ESDP was a coordination of crisis management capabilities or a more comprehensive venture. Although the established practice of the EU was to hold applicants to bargains that members had opted out of (as was indeed the case with Denmark and the CFSP), the intra-European bargain underpinning the initiative did not allow for the EU to demand the fidelity of the member states, only encourage it.¹¹⁸ Another factor worth noting is that the applicant states showed little interest in the previously mentioned offer of “structured cooperation” on CFSP matters that was made to them during accession.¹¹⁹ Behind all these considerations lies the fear of abandonment felt by a majority of EU states. At the end of the day, the US could issue credible threats to disband NATO, while the EU could not issue credible security guarantees to fill such a potential gap.

As Julian Lindley-French and Franco Algeri assert, “Part of the rationale for enlargement of the EU is security through the extension of stability to Central and Eastern Europe. Thus the fate of a strategic ESDP will be intrinsically linked to the political success of enlargement.”¹²⁰ Christopher Hill elaborates the same line of argument:

Things could go either way: enlargement could strengthen the EU confidence and military resources, while also precipitating a great leap forward in integration – in this case NATO would be at risk [...]; or enlargement could so burden the EU financially and in terms of decision making that the CFSP becomes even more circumscribed, with the Union turning into a vast flabby territorial entity unable to rouse itself and even more dependent than before on externally provided security.¹²¹

There can be little doubt that dual enlargement failed to strengthen European security, at least in the short term. Karsten Voigt, the German Foreign Ministry’s coordinator for German–American relations, has publicly noted that Eastern enlargement eroded what majority there might have been in favour of an autonomous Europe at the launch of the ESDP. The US proved more successful in influencing the EU over the question of primacy than it had been over sequencing and financing. Enlargement brought NATO out on top in the “alphabet soup” of Europe’s many security institutions, but also did not weaken the EU’s position as the most credible contender in any future challenge to American primacy in the post-Cold War security architecture of Europe.

American influence and EU strategic culture

The question of American influence on EU enlargement policies is less clear-cut than it had been over the Kosovo conflict. While it remains clear that the US exerted a degree of influence over EU enlargement policies, it

is less certain how significant this influence was. Keeping in mind the criteria for “American influence on EU security policy” from the introductory chapter and the above discussions of sequencing, financing and primacy, it remains clear that the US was certainly a factor in the shaping of EU policies, but this is insufficient to label it as being “significant” in the two former categories. With regard to primacy the US maintained a leading position, although this position was qualitatively different than it had been in the first years after the Cold War. When there was an initial disagreement between the US and a leading EU member state or EU foreign policy chiefs over how a policy issue should be handled, the EU initiated a process to forge a common position (e.g. over the Baltic accession, the financial burden-sharing, and the ESDP–NATO connection). US demands or preferences were communicated explicitly through both official and unofficial channels, but the final outcome of the EU policy process was not always close to the signalled American position.

Viewing dual enlargement from the vantage point of influence therefore leaves a sundry impression. Washington found its influence diluted by a lack of access to the governance process where EU decisions were made. When the US did influence the EU processes it was through: (1) *leading by example* (using primacy in NATO with the intention of triggering corresponding moves in the EU); (2) *public diplomacy* (public support for membership may have speeded up the accession process for certain countries); (3) *discourse shaping* (notably, the overall vision of “democratic enlargement” but also to encourage certain perceptions in the applicants such as an entitlement to EU membership); (4) *influence by proxy* (the US frequently used bilateralism as a means to access the EU process, lending support to EU members that already supported or came to support American views, in this case notably Germany and Britain); and finally (5) *the promise of rewards* (implicit and explicit – most applicants came to believe that NATO membership would carry greater economic benefits than it did, but also when dealing with France over the Berlin Plus bargain). The primary American tactic was that of “incremental linkage” – to use its primacy in NATO to initiate specific developments with the intent of provoking matching or corresponding developments in the EU.

In order to understand the – by the standards seen over Kosovo – limited role played by the US in EU enlargement, one must keep in mind two factors. First, the level of knowledge in Washington about the EU was very low. Despite the initiatives listed earlier, there cannot be said to have existed an effectual bilateral US–EU connection. New channels such as the biannual summit proved largely symbolic.¹²² The relationship remained what Christopher Hill and Michael Smith described as “highly compartmentalised”.¹²³ The US was reluctant to engage the EU as an actor on a bilateral level on security policies. The second issue was that EU enlargement policies were closely connected to the EU process of governance. As indicated earlier, the EU is at any time engaged in negotiations

at a number of parallel tables, which often influence each other. The Eastern enlargement took place amidst some of the biggest projects in integration history, notably the monetary union, but also the institutional reforms leading up to the proposed EU Constitutional Treaty. In these “grand bargains” the US had a limited hand. America’s partial success in determining NATO enlargement and, thereby, to an extent shaping EU enlargement had much to do with the way decisions are made in the two organisations. The European Commission has experience in dealing with the US over economic policies and even seemed to relish scrapping with Washington. Had the original plan, whereby the Council determined the criteria for accession and the Commission enforced them, been strictly enforced, one might speculate that the EU and NATO enlargements might have diverged more than they actually did.

In Chapter 1 it was noted that the effectiveness of a strategic culture can be measured by the degree to which ideas and expectations are reflected in patterns of behaviour and vice versa. So what does the dual enlargement process tell us about the EU as a strategic actor? The EU succeeded admirably in its primary strategic objective of bringing stability to Europe’s periphery. The EU also to a large extent succeeded in the secondary objectives of enlarging in an autonomous and cost-effective way that strengthened the inner cohesion of the Union. When dealing with dual enlargement, the EU was confronted with Richard Tanner Johnson’s four dilemmas facing decision-makers: (1) choosing between pursuing the “best” policy or the most “feasible” policy; (2) responding quickly or allowing for extensive deliberation; (3) selecting information or evaluating as much information as possible; and whether to (4) act through strict consensus or through majority decisions.¹²⁴ The answers to these questions help explain why the EU was less susceptible to US pressure than it had been over Kosovo; they also tell us something about the emerging EU strategic culture.

- 1 In its approach to enlargement the EU found a functional balance between pursuing the “best” policy and the most “feasible” policy. EU policies across time and policy instruments evolved to reflect changes in the applicants and the international order. The Commission ensured that the Union went far in the direction of doing the “best” in terms of preparing the applicants for membership without being “impractical” in terms of allowing the process to become long drawn out. Heather Grabbe calls the Commission “the unsung hero of the enlargement project, because it kept the show on the road”, charting a course between those who would like to slow down enlargement and applicant dismay at the general Copenhagen Criteria being translated into detailed and substantial legislation and institutional reforms.¹²⁵ The drawback with the central role of the Commission was that the lack of competences in foreign and security policies

effectively undercut chances that enlargement could be used to boost the CFSP. The EU showed dexterity in not getting stuck in dated policies, as exemplified by its replacing the regatta approach with “Big Bang” enlargement. The point could be made that a greater degree of politicisation would have helped resolve other questions. The Union can be criticised for pressing ahead with enlargement despite being unable to agree upon fundamental reforms of the inner workings of the EU, and for not finding a way to carry out enlargement in a manner that would boost CFSP as a security policy forum.¹²⁶ This was to a large extent a result of the difficulties in reconciling the competing national interests of the member states. The EU failed to plan for how NATO enlargement might impact EU accession and thus failed to reap either the synergies of coupling the two processes or the autonomy of formally disconnecting the two. This, however, does not challenge the overall picture of the EU enlargement being better planned and better executed than that of NATO.

- 2 The EU responded as quickly as could be expected with regard to enlargement, outpacing NATO at the vital early stage – and completing the accession process within the established time-frames. In approaching enlargement, the EU allowed for extensive deliberations among the existing members and with the applicants. The unhurried accession allowed for the carefully crafted ambiguities, consensus-building and horse-trading generally favoured in EU policy-making. The EU decided to complete previous tasks before approaching enlargement. The European countries also gave impetus to slowing down the American headlong rush towards NATO enlargement and avoided setting deadlines in terms of EU enlargement, thus making progress conditional on compliance with predefined criteria. The bureaucratisation of the enlargement process allowed progress to be unencumbered by advance or retreat in other policy fields. This did, however, lay the Union open to criticisms of sluggishness and American charges of what William Wallace calls “the inability of its European partners to make strategic decisions”.¹⁷ It also allowed the Union to become less dependent on American leadership. In doing so, the EU drew upon expertise from previous enlargements and proved to be a highly effective actor when enforcing an agenda that they themselves had set. This is illustrated by the set of political goals operationalised first being transformed into the Copenhagen Criteria and later into detailed goals by which the progress towards accession could be measured. By comparison, the NATO process seemed haphazard and overdependent on political moods in Washington. If anything, the enlargement process illustrated that the EU Commission can, in a de-politicised environment, be a highly effective strategic actor.
- 3 In its approach to enlargement, the EU preferred to gather as complete a picture as possible. Subsequently, EU enlargement took place

on the basis of a generally high level of knowledge regarding the state of affairs in the applicant countries. The steady progress of the EU enlargement process owed much to the defining of specific benchmarks meant to increase readiness for accession. Also, there can be little doubt that the EU's approach afforded a more precise picture of the state of affairs in the applicant states than that of NATO, where planners took a surprisingly long time to reconcile themselves to the full extent of military weakness of the former adversaries. Enlargement again illustrated the importance and use of "models" in the processing of information by strategic actors. The EU is "designed" to cope with a task such as enlargement. The system of governance of the EU based on meeting predefined requirements allowed the EU to initiate and supervise a deep transformation of the applicant states. During enlargement the EU did so in a "collective problem solving" mode centred on the Commission, characterised by multidimensional games and issue-linkage and an intergovernmental mode emphasising actual negotiations. This contrasts to NATO where a failure to secure financing for an extension of NATO frontline defences was, if anything, exacerbated by NATO also failing to prevent defence spending from falling among the applicants. The greatest problem was that the incremental approach increased chances of getting "locked in by deferral". There is, however, some evidence to suggest that adding to a project using many small (often unplanned) steps instead of a few (extensively planned) large jumps undercut the EU's ability to pressure non-compliant applicants, and equally important, to use the enlargement to force compliance among current members.

- 4 While the EU made the key decisions over enlargement by unanimity, the implementation of these policies was made through various forms of explicit and implicit majority decisions in the Council and within the Commission collegiate. The information-gathering and benchmarking narrowed the scope of dissent. In the questions that could not be contained by this approach, such as the question of "Big Bang" and the EU budgets, solutions were found through traditional concert diplomacy that was more open to American interference than the Commission process. In doing so, the EU succeeded in de-politicising some of the most controversial questions and allowed for a workable decision-making process. By shrouding potentially contentious issues in ambiguity, the Union made a strategic approach to enlargement difficult.¹²⁸ The elaborate decision-making process and the sacrifice of proactivity that went along with it led the EU to the reactive position that Martin Smith and Graham Timmins call "event linkage" with the NATO enlargement, where a less elaborate decision-making process increased rapidity.¹²⁹ The EU states failed to form a bloc to calculatingly balance the US within NATO. The manner in which the US forced the issue of enlargement in 1995 isolated the Alliance as the

preferred forum for the Europeans to discuss enlargement. This strengthened the EU process and led to the Commission being treated as an actor in its own right by the applicants, and also by the United States. This was also clearly a result of the EU being financially and institutionally better equipped than NATO to undertake enlargement. The EU enlargement enhanced the role of the Commission as an EU foreign policy actor while weakening NATO as the primary venue for Euro-American security dialogue.

EU policies over enlargement differ from Kosovo in that the US did not manoeuvre between various international forums. The US found it difficult to access EU governance. The EU proved to be more resilient over enlargement than it had been over the Kosovo war, denying pressure through a mix of tactics such as ignoring, procrastinating, bargaining and actual refusal. The marked difference between the Kosovo conflict and Eastern enlargement has much to do with the role played by the Commission in the EU process. The power and function of the Commission have no parallel in any other international organisation and the enlargement process highlighted the importance of the Commission in the external policies of the EU as a whole. In 1989, the G7 handed the task of coordinating assistance, first to Poland and Hungary and later to the rest of Central and Eastern Europe, to the Commission. This involvement from a very early stage significantly strengthened the Commission as a foreign policy actor and raised its international status. Simon Nuttall observes on the question of enlargement that the Commission for the first time “was a foreign policy actor in its own right”.¹³⁰ The decision to formalise the accession process enhanced the Commission’s foreign policy role, giving it a central place in shaping the EU enlargement policies. Much of the central role played by the Commission meant that once the strategic decision to enlarge had been made, the work of setting and assessing membership criteria was of a bureaucratic nature. The American preference for dealing with the EU through NATO or bilaterally through individual member states proved insufficient in generating the critical mass to shift the EU positions with the ease to which the US had grown accustomed.

The transatlantic bargain and dual enlargement

Taking ten new countries into NATO suggested a pending renegotiation of the Euro-American security bargain. From a military perspective, there can be little question that NATO enlargement weakened the Alliance. The applicants uniformly and persistently failed to meet NATO’s concrete targets for military reform. The inclusion of the militarily weak countries entrenched the existing capability–expectations gap. This was bound to have an effect on the burden–power-sharing equation in the Alliance.

With the US unwilling to maintain conventional forces in Europe, it began planning a missile defence system for deterrence which – predictably – caused new transatlantic tensions. In the enlarged NATO American primacy grew more pronounced than it had been during bipolarity. The manner in which the US dictated NATO enlargement was one indication that military inequality would translate into asymmetry in other areas. Enlargement transformed NATO from an alliance designed to ward off a specific threat to becoming a reservoir for potential coalitions of the willing, assembled according to need for out-of-area operations. During the 1990s most European states slashed their defence expenditure and focused on “niche capabilities” that could operate alongside the US in out-of-area operations. Any notion that the Europeans could use NATO for their own purposes without US leadership grew unlikely with the stalling of the ESDI. The new Europe-centred alternative, the ESDP, remained too vague, too ambiguous to be a realistic alternative to the security guarantees offered by the most powerful state in the world. Subsequently, the EU found its own security dimension eclipsed by US policies. Dual enlargement is, in a sense, a story of a clash that never happened. The EU and NATO took in the same states for much the same purpose and yet did not come to blows. The explanation for this is that all parties found it expedient to evade questions of primacy by casting enlargement as less of a strategic act than a moral obligation. The US did not press the issue of primacy while the EU did not press for the autonomy of the CFSP/ESDP. The US had been invited to retain its role as a European power and had accepted the invitation. Dual enlargement helped renegotiate the inner workings of the transatlantic bargain while keeping the overall framework where NATO remained at the centre of the European security architecture and the US remained at the centre of NATO.

The expansion of the two leading security organisations affected the intra-European security bargain less than one might have expected. The US remained engaged, Germany voluntarily bound itself together through deeper integration and the continuation of NATO and France and Britain maintained their positions within existing frameworks. In the three IGCs leading up to Eastern enlargement the member states failed to carry out institutional reforms. As we shall see in the next chapter, the EU enlargement served to strengthen unofficial decision-making procedures in the Union. The inclusion of the populous but otherwise weak Poland dealt a blow to Spanish and Italian aspirations to taking a seat alongside the big three. The balancing skills displayed by the Commission indicated that it could play an important role in the intra-European bargain in the future. The continued invitations for US engagement were largely due to the fragility of the intra-European bargain. France and Britain had agreed at Saint Malo for the need to reverse Europe’s strategic decline, but they had not agreed whether it was to be done within or outside the American framework. The primary reason why the CFSP

was kept off the enlargement agenda was due more to a fear of triggering division among Europeanist and Atlanticist camps within Europe than to American pressures or applicant opposition. For the EU, the problem was that for all the talk of “peace through integration”, the Union was unaccustomed to employing its means to meet strategic ends, which is a primary reason why enlargement was allowed to weaken the foreign policy base of the EU rather than to strengthen it. Karen Smith laments: “After the eastern enlargement it is possible that the logic of integration will stall, having produced the very policy that now renders uncertain its future vitality.”¹³¹ Kenneth Waltz concurs: “Just as a wider EU means a shallower one, so a more inclusive NATO means a less coherent and focused Alliance.” Writing in 1998, he also predicted that after enlargement, disputes would proliferate and increase in intensity.¹³² This could seem a premonition of the deepest crisis across the Atlantic in living memory, which is the topic of the final case study.

5 The Iraq crisis

The run-up to the 2003 Iraq war saw a jarring deterioration in transatlantic relations. Although neither the United States nor the European states had intended for the European Union to play a role in the Iraq conflict, the Union became embroiled in what would become the biggest crisis across the Atlantic since the end of the Cold War. During the run-up to the Iraq conflict, the Union played a central role as a focal point for European policy coordination. The Iraq crisis is of special relevance to the study of American influence on EU strategic culture because the disputes were over the cornerstones of the US and EU strategic outlooks. By 2003, the European Security and Defence Policy had undergone significant improvements in terms of capabilities and institutional frameworks as well as in terms of affiliation to NATO, but the crisis saw the consequences of the absence of an agreed strategic concept. At a time when many in Europe looked to the Union to provide foreign policy leadership, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) crumbled under American pressure and the competing national interests of the member states.

The structure of this chapter is a little different from the preceding ones. Since the EU played no role in the actual war, the focus in the first section of the chapter focuses on the countdown to the conflict as a case of transatlantic politics. A brief summary of the Iraq question is followed by an examination of the shifting relations among the Europeans, and of those between the EU states and the Bush administration from the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, until the outbreak of war in March 2003. The Iraq crisis was essentially a clash of strategic outlooks. Therefore, the second section consists of a comparison between the three concepts at the heart of the transatlantic crisis in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the US and the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS): the difference between failed states and rogue states; preventive engagement versus pre-emptive strikes; and effective multilateralism versus unilateralism.¹ The third section examines how, and to what extent, the US influenced EU policies as well as what the crisis tells us about the EU strategic culture.

The 2003 Iraq war unsettled more than just the regime in Baghdad. The US-led intervention left both the Euro-American and intra-European

security bargains in need of repair. This chapter disputes the widely held notion that the confrontation has ruptured or permanently harmed the transatlantic link.² Instead, it posits that the disputes were parts of an overall renegotiation of the transatlantic bargain, and also an important lesson in the development of an EU strategic culture. The EU played an important role in the run-up to the conflict. In its attempts to sway its European allies, the US applied a variety of techniques: from influence by proxy to discrimination and public diplomacy, decoupling and agenda-setting. European leaders were unable to agree on an effective alternative to Washington's approach. The EU's receptiveness to influence was compounded by other factors: the lack of an agreed security strategy, the ambiguous connection between national and supranational preferences, and the lack of a consensus culture. We will return to these issues in greater detail later in the following.

The Iraq war remains deeply controversial. Narratives and even facts are hotly disputed. Efforts have been made to ensure that the analysis charts an even course by relying on as broad an array of sources as possible. To place the conflict in the context of American Middle East policy over the past five decades, Douglas Little's book, *American Orientalism* (2002), is a good starting point.³ In examining the war in a transatlantic context, Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro's *Allies at War* (2004) has deservedly found a broad audience.⁴ With regard to the actual events of 2001 to 2003, the accounts of policymakers in the form of memoirs – by Chris Patten, Hans Blix, Richard Clarke and Paddy Ashdown – have proved a helpful supplement to interviews with foreign policy scholars and practitioners.⁵ A third category consists of commentaries on the unfolding events. Most leading media outlets provided extensive coverage throughout the crisis. Some official sources are also available, notably documents from the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the US Library of Congress.⁶ Finally, there are metres of academic analysis and commentary on the conflict.⁷

The Iraq crisis in a transatlantic perspective

The seeds of the 2003 Iraq conflict were sown in 1991. That year, an American-led coalition responded forcefully to the Iraqi invasion of the neighbouring state of Kuwait. "Operation Desert Storm" began on 24 February. In less than a week of military setbacks, the Iraqi leadership was forced to unconditionally accept the United Nations (UN) resolutions on the Kuwait question.⁸ The regime led by Saddam Hussein was subsequently left intact while the US retained a strong military presence in the neighbouring countries. The UN sanctions against the regime in Baghdad remained in place, notably because Iraq had failed to convincingly account for its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programmes that were assumed to be in breach of international treaties.⁹ A number of sub-

sequent UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) – from 707 in 1991 to 1382 in 2001 – found that the regime in Baghdad had failed to comply with these resolutions.¹⁰ Although some states, notably France and Russia, were inclined towards lenience, the US remained strongly opposed to the lifting of sanctions in the absence of significant progress, especially on the disarmament issue. The American position was spelled out in the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act.¹¹

Throughout the 1990s, the extent of Iraq's WMD programmes remained contentious although there was an international consensus that Saddam Hussein had failed to live up to his obligations. Over the years, what effectively amounted to a policy of UN-sanctioned containment grew increasingly controversial.¹² At the time of the 2000 US Presidential elections, the disturbing humanitarian consequences of the sanctions became a topic of public debate, yet there were few signs that a policy change was underway. After the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, key players in the Bush administration began to press for military action against Iraq. From October 2002, the US stepped up its diplomatic efforts to gain international acceptance for using military measures in order to disarm Iraq. That month, the President obtained Congress's approval for the use of armed force to protect America's national security against the threat posed by that country.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was, from the outset, at odds on how to deal with Iraqi non-compliance with earlier resolutions. While the US made the case that the threat of using armed force was required to encourage or force compliance, France and Russia, both of whom had nurtured economic ties with Iraq in the past, remained opposed to such a course of action. The UN Security Council Resolution 1441 of November 2002 struck a compromise in that it gave Iraq "a final opportunity to comply" with its disarmament obligations, giving the country 30 days to make available a complete disclosure of its WMD programmes to the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).¹³

With the adoption of Resolution 1441, international attention shifted to the UN weapons inspectors in Iraq, headed by the Swedish diplomat Hans Blix. The weapons inspections took place against a backdrop of increasingly antagonistic debates in the Security Council – which by this stage was firmly split between the US, supported by Britain, and France, supported by Russia (and non-permanent member, Germany). In February and March of 2003, the Anglo-American camp pressed for a UN mandate to attack Iraq, but was denied by France, which made it clear that it would, if necessary, veto such a resolution.¹⁴ On 17 March, the US abandoned its efforts to win a UN mandate, and issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to surrender himself in 48 hours. Two days later, the war began.

EU approaches to the Iraq question

The European Union's involvement in the Iraq crisis must be understood in the context of the ambiguities of the CFSP. Many saw the Iraq question as being beyond the geographical and mission scope of the EU. Besides, the policy agenda of the EU was already crowded. A European Convention had assembled in 2002 with the goal of drafting what was heralded as a "Constitutional Treaty" for the Union. The effectiveness of the Commission was restricted by Romano Prodi, who was widely seen as an unusually weak President. In the Council, the final compromises that would pave the way for EU enlargement in 2004 were drawing heavily on resources. In the Corthenberg building, the limited personnel and economic resources of the CFSP establishment were already strained by the three EU operations that were planned for 2003: the EU Police Mission in Bosnia, Operation Concordia in Macedonia, and a second Police Mission, "Proxima" also in Macedonia.¹⁵ To make things even more complicated, the EU Presidencies of Denmark and Greece were, on account of being small states, in less of a position to provide strategic leadership than, for example, Britain and Germany had been over Kosovo. All in all, there was little will in the EU to develop a proactive approach to the Iraq question – the tactic was rather to try to ignore it.¹⁶

As the Iraq question was bitterly divisive – both within Europe and across the Atlantic – a feeling was voiced in several interviews that Iraq was simply too difficult a matter to be introduced to the EU agenda. The desire to stay clear of the question was illustrated by a conspicuous lack of mention of Iraq in the EU's foreign policy documents.¹⁷ The EU had never had any bilateral contractual relations with Iraq. The country was neither part of the EU's Mediterranean dialogue nor was it included in the EU cooperation agreements with Asian countries. Then over a period of two years, the EU issued some 19 declarations, decisions and joint actions within the CFSP framework in reference to the Iraq question. Given the lack of direct contacts with Iraq, the EU had, since 1991, limited its role to implementing the UN Security Council's sanctions while seeking to minimise the humanitarian costs of the sanctions.¹⁸ By 2003, the EU was the largest provider of humanitarian aid to Iraq. Europe was also the primary customer of the UN oil-for-food programme that was meant to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, in part brought on by the UN sanctions.¹⁹ Without much afterthought, the EU thereby implicitly questioned the Anglo-American tactics against the regime in Baghdad by directing most of its attention to the humanitarian costs of such policies.

Although there was no common EU policy on Iraq, there was considerable common ground among the member states. The eagerness to stay clear of the Iraq issue was never acknowledged in any policy paper. On the contrary, there was an agreement that Iraq could be and should be contained.²⁰ Second, there was a consensus in Europe that peace and security

in the Middle East could be achieved only through economic development and respect for international law, human rights and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. From an EU perspective, the Israel–Palestine conflict, more than any other single issue, was at the crossroads of peace in the region.²¹ This had been a long-standing EU policy – from the 1980 Venice Declaration, in which the Communities officially recognised the Palestinian right to self-determination, to the 2003 ESS which listed the resolution of the conflict as a key strategic priority.²² A third assumption was that while accepting that the UN sanctions would have to remain in place, it was also important to shape the sanctions in order to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. An adviser to Javier Solana offered the explanation that it was perhaps as a consequence of the EU's strategic abstention that the Iraq question appeared on the EU agenda primarily as a humanitarian issue.

In sum, the EU strategy towards Iraq, to the extent it can be labelled as such, was based on economic trade, humanitarian aid and diplomatic ambiguity. But the deliberations clearly pointed towards the EU staying clear of the Iraq question altogether. As interviews have confirmed, the expectations in Brussels in 2000 were that the US was in the process of reconciling itself to the failure of its current approach, and that the sanctions against Iraq would likely be phased out in the short to medium term.

11 September and the European response

A second milestone on the road to conflict was the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC. In Europe, the attacks triggered an outpouring of public sympathy and government solidarity with the US. The French newspaper *Le Monde* proclaimed “Nous sommes tous américains”; in the German Bundestag, Chancellor Schröder pledged “Uneingeschränkte Solidarität”; and NATO theatrically invoked the collective defence Article 5 for the first time in the history of the Alliance.²³ The following day, the EU Commission activated the Civilian Protection Unit into a 24-hour alert mode to be able to respond immediately to any US call for assistance.²⁴ Washington initially enjoyed firm European backing for its tough line against regimes that sheltered those behind the attacks. A joint statement from the “Troika” (the Commission, the HR-CFSP and the rotating Presidency), backed by the European parliament and the member states, declared: “The US administration and the American people can count on our complete solidarity and full cooperation to ensure that justice is done.”²⁵

The US did little to acknowledge the invocation of Article 5, treating it less as a promise of military action – as it had often been portrayed during the Cold War – than as a political statement of sympathy. NATO was sidelined for an even broader coalition – a “global coalition against terror”. Within this coalition, the US assembled a select group of key allies for the

ensuing campaign in Afghanistan, as Jolyon Howorth observes: “preferring to discuss military operations via multiple bilateralisms rather than through the framework of the Alliance itself”.²⁶ This reflected the point put forward by the former US national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, namely that many in the Washington establishment now saw the European Union and NATO as ineffective at best and irrelevant at worst.²⁷ While many European leaders couched their response to the attacks in the dual terms of Europe and America, the primary engagement was carried out on an intergovernmental level. The German debate is particularly instructive in this regard, as the European dimension was more clearly articulated in Berlin than in Paris and London. On 19 September 2001, Chancellor Schröder made a strong plea that “especially now, Europe must speak with a common voice”.²⁸ A few weeks later, the Chancellor observed that this had not happened: “Because the wishes of our friends in America are addressed to the nation states in Europe, to Britain, France and Germany, Europe does not play a role. That is because Europe is not ready yet to satisfy these wishes.”²⁹

Afghan campaign and German election

The inability of the CFSP to respond effectively to unfolding events is no secret. After 11 September, a common understanding emerged that in this case rhetorical support would have to be backed up by more than declaratory diplomacy and pledges of economic aid. In September 2001, representatives of the “Troika” visited a number of countries in the Middle East, and also Central Asia in the following month, with the explicit aim of shoring up support for the global coalition against terrorism. The European Conference with the Central and East European states in October 2001 had a similar emphasis. Diplomatic initiatives were supported by economic schemes such as the signing of a cooperation agreement with Pakistan, a regime with a patchy – to say the least – record in a great many areas, but one with which the US nurtured close ties.³⁰ The Belgian Presidency figured prominently in these efforts. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was conspicuous by its absence in the EU response to 11 September. In the months prior to the terrorist attacks, the new project had seemed to gain in importance and relevance in terms of the future development of the EU. It was therefore noteworthy that the first blow in the “war against terror” was to be dealt with the political backing of the EU, but outside the ESDP structures.

The European support for taking action against Afghanistan – a country believed to be sheltering the perpetrators of the attacks on America – could, with relative ease, have been made out to be a venture in the same mould as Kosovo.³¹ When military action was finally taken, the main concern for many European countries was that they were not invited to play a more central role in the operations.³² Taking military action

against Afghanistan was acceptable to the Europeans not least since measures were coordinated with the indigenous “Northern Alliance”, and the vile nature of the Taliban regime had little support even among Europe’s unreformed left. Although a number of European states made significant military contributions to the Afghan campaign, there can be little doubt that this was an American venture. The Euro-American division of labour seemed set: the US would take primary responsibility for rooting out the *al Qaeda* network and bringing about a regime change in Kabul, while the Europeans would take the primary responsibility for the post-crisis management through NATO’s International Security Stabilization Force (ISAF).

With military operations underway in Afghanistan, EU leaders met in Ghent in October. France, Britain and Germany took the opportunity to convene a “mini-summit” on the fringes of the European Council, explaining that the importance of giving the US effective support necessitated special coordination. The meeting was publicly criticised by the Commission President, Romano Prodi.³³ A few days later, the British Prime Minister invited his two colleagues for an Afghan “war council” in Downing Street. The meeting became farcical when the leaders of Spain and Italy as well as the HR-CFSP, the Belgian EU Presidency, and finally, the Dutch Prime Minister, all invited themselves to the parley.³⁴ The importance of these deliberations was apparent at the Laeken Summit, the following month, when a suggestion by the Belgian EU Presidency implying that the European troops in Afghanistan could be seen as EU troops was immediately refuted by each of the EU-3. They did so in spite of knowing that their response would make the EU Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) that was declared “operational” at the Summit look like a paper tiger.

The year 2002 saw a dramatic change in the transatlantic climate. The first indicators that the US was about to expand what by this stage had been branded the “war against terror” came in the State of the Union Address of President Bush the Younger in January that year.³⁵ In his speech, the US President claimed that Iran, Iraq and North Korea made up an “Axis of Evil”. It soon became clear that, among the three, Iraq would be singled out for special attention. The President, the Vice President and the Defense Secretary, all expressed confidence that the Iraqi leadership had developed and stockpiled biological weapons and chemical weapons, and was pursuing a clandestine nuclear programme that could be used against America and its allies.³⁶ The speeches were followed by a steady stream of accusations from Washington concerning Iraq’s supposed WMD programmes and alleged links to the *al Qaeda* organisation. A pivotal point came in August, when Vice President Cheney called openly for a regime change in Iraq.³⁷ Although talk of a regime change in Baghdad had been popular for some time, especially in conservative circles, it is usual to assume that the actual decision to go to war against Iraq was made around the time of Cheney’s speech.³⁸ The American

determination to act against Iraq appeared to flow directly from the success in Afghanistan and the assumed link between these two countries.

This move was met with apprehension in Europe. There was a sense that momentous events were taking place without Euro-American consultation, but there was no agreement on how Cheney's speech was to be interpreted. There was uneasiness regarding the centrality of the Vice President in the making of US Foreign Policy.³⁹ Yet, the White House had not consulted even its closest allies in Europe on prospects of any armed conflict. Also, very little had been done to gather European support, if the US was, indeed, preparing for a war against Iraq. Instead, Washington simply informed the Europeans (with the notable exception of Great Britain) of its policy publicly along with the rest of the world. What followed was a bruising intra-European debate as countries shuffled to line up for or against the US position. Contrary to widely held beliefs, the Europeans did try to deliver on the CFSP over the Iraq question. The second half of 2002 saw intense deliberations, especially among France, Germany and Britain, on how to formulate a common response to the belligerent American approach towards the regime in Baghdad.

In the summer of 2002, Germany was preparing for an election that the governing left-of-centre coalition was widely expected to lose. Perhaps with a sense of foreboding, the German Chancellor qualified his previous promise of "unlimited solidarity", warning that although Germany was "ready to take risks – also in the military sense", it would not be "prepared for adventures".⁴⁰ The American drift towards war was seen by a large majority of Germans as just such an "adventure". In early August, the Chancellor's election campaign took up an anti-war theme. First warily and then later – after having been greeted with overwhelming support from the electorate – with enthusiasm. In the heady final days before the election, Schröder went so far as to suggest that Germany would withhold its support even if the UNSCR endorsed military action against Iraq, and the Justice Minister even compared Washington's policies to those of Hitler. In Washington, Schröder's campaign tactics were received with shock and anger. The feeling that Schröder was playing electoral politics with the transatlantic partnership angered many in the US. The President abstained from congratulating Schröder on his election victory, from meeting him, or – apparently – even from taking his phone calls. This development contrasted with the newfound closeness between Berlin and Paris. The crisis appeared to reinvigorate the Franco-German axis with clarity, structure, shared vocabulary and agenda as was evident in the fervent celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty in January 2003. In an apparent show of how individual leaders can prevail over pressures from many directions and formulate foreign policy almost single-handedly, Schröder and Chirac drafted the anti-war platform that made a transatlantic clash inevitable. In early 2003, David Allen and Michael Smith summarised developments when they asserted that it was "difficult

to imagine a more challenging year for the EU in its relations [...] with the United States”.⁴¹

New Labour, old Europe

By the beginning of 2003, the American preparations for the Iraq invasion grew increasingly apparent. Although the Kosovo crisis and the dual enlargement of NATO and the EU had hastened the development of the CFSP/ESDP nexus, tensions had remained just below the surface. Triggered by the Iraq dispute, the frailty of the Europeanist–Atlanticist compromise burst onto centre-stage. While Germany and France were removed from favour in Washington, Britain remained close. The British Prime Minister remained persuaded that the only way to be able to shape US policies was through support and cooperation. Tony Blair seemed to have scored a series of such victories when Washington unexpectedly became more cooperative on a range of economic issues spanning foreign sales corporations (FSC) to punitive tariffs on steel imports. The US made a key concession when Secretary of State Colin Powell returned to the UNSC in September seeking an *imprimatur* to enforce previous UN resolutions. According to John Peterson, Prime Minister Blair had pleaded that such a resolution was necessary to sustain Europe’s public support for any conflict.⁴² London now began actively to muster support for the American position among the European governments by acting as a go-between and consensus-builder – a role that in the past had usually been played by the US itself.

At this stage transatlantic relations deteriorated sharply. US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld branded France and Germany as “old Europe”. He said, “Germany has been a problem, and France has been a problem [...]. But you look at vast numbers of other countries in Europe. They’re not with France and Germany on this; they’re with the United States.”⁴³ Far from mending the transatlantic rift, the statement drew attention to a second, intra-European divide. Shortly afterwards, the heads of governments from Denmark, Great Britain, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the Czech Republic and Hungary issued a public letter pledging support for the US Iraq policy, praising America’s past “bravery, generosity, and farsightedness”, and warning that “The trans-Atlantic relationship must not become a casualty of the current Iraqi regime’s persistent attempts to threaten world security.”⁴⁴ According to a British source, France and Germany were not asked to sign the letter, while Greece, at the time holding the European Union’s rotating presidency, was deliberately kept out of the loop, making a mockery of any pretence at EU consensus-building on the matter. Soon afterwards, an even more pro-American letter appeared on behalf of ten Central and East European applicants for membership of the EU and NATO. It was rumoured that the “Vilnius 10” letter had been penned by an American – the shadowy

former US military intelligence officer, Bruce Jackson – and actively pressed on the governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.⁴⁵

Instead of being a call for unity, the letter was seen as an attack on France and Germany. Germany responded by accusing the signatories of deliberately undermining the CFSP, while French President Jacques Chirac was equally dismissive of the pro-war countries. He stated that the candidate countries had “missed a good opportunity to keep quiet” when they signed the “Letter of Eight”. As for the East European “Vilnius 10”, Chirac said, “These countries have shown themselves to be badly brought up and somewhat insouciant about the dangers implied by allying themselves so rapidly with the American position.”⁴⁶ According to French defence expert Jean-Luc Marret, the French government was particularly angered by the fact that the states who were seeking the benefits of EU membership would actively add to the intra-European rift at the apparent bequest of the White House. “That such weak states would seek a confrontation with Germany and France just to please Washington more than anything illustrated that something had gone wrong over enlargement.”

From early 2003, the Iraq question effectively ceased to be an EU issue. The Greek Presidency, which had begun on 1 January 2003, made the best of the thankless task of brokering a Common Position on the question. Weekend after weekend saw ever-larger street demonstrations in European cities. On 17 February, the Greek EU Presidency convened an extraordinary meeting of the European Council in an attempt to stop the rift from deepening further and to find common ground among the 15 member states.⁴⁷ To many, the European Council took a surprisingly hawkish stance: “the Iraqi regime alone will be responsible for the consequences if it continues to flout the will of the international community and does not take this last chance”. The statement nevertheless stopped short of calling for armed intervention, and recognised that “the primary responsibility for dealing with Iraqi disarmament lies with the Security Council”.

However, any such role for the UN became unlikely after what came to be known as the “ambush” of Colin Powell. What happened at the United Nations on 20 January has been the topic of some debate.⁴⁸ What remains certain is that the US Secretary of State was at the UN for a different purpose when the French foreign minister made a passionate public assault on the American position over Iraq. De Villepin’s outburst made global news. Both in France and in the US, members of the defence establishment put this down as the moment when the differences between France and the US over Iraq became irreconcilable. Commenting on the role of the EU at this stage, a senior Council Official stated:

I believe that a common EU position over Iraq would have made a lot of difference. At the end of January the Bush Administration seemed

increasingly isolated at home and abroad. Without the determined backing of Tony Blair the White House would have faced a near-compact global opinion.

Although most policy experts agree that this in itself would not have prevented the Iraq war, it is likely that a common EU position would have increased American respect for the EU as a foreign policy actor.

Showdown at NATO

By the end of January 2003, the US gave up trying for a second UN resolution. Still eager to gain some degree of legitimacy, American attention now shifted to NATO, which became the arena for one of the most bruising showdowns in the history of the Euro-American partnership. The issue at hand was the endorsement of early military planning for the defence of Turkey in case of a war. Turkey had requested consultations under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that members will consult whenever the political independence or territorial integrity of a member is threatened. It was clear from the beginning that this was primarily symbolic, as such planning was already underway at NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) – as indeed has been confirmed in interviews. Matters were complicated by the fact that the issue was pushed up the agenda by the US, and not Turkey, where 94 per cent of the population were opposed to the approaching war.⁴⁹

From the perspective of France and Germany, the request for defensive aid was in itself a thinly veiled attempt at gaining NATO approval for the war. The US barely bothered to disguise the fact that an attack on Turkey was highly improbable as opposed to an attack on Iraq, and seemed intent on putting Germany in a spot over its support of the NATO Charter.⁵⁰ This time, Chancellor Schröder refused to allow himself to be locked down and simply did not accept the automatism implied by the wording put forth.⁵¹ While signalling to the 73 per cent of the German population who opposed the war that he would not go along with Washington, he secretly made it clear to Ankara that if the country were to be attacked, Germany would regard it as an attack on its own territory. The German Chancellor was joined by Belgium and France in blocking the required unanimous vote in NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC).

The US was not willing to accept this as the final word and upped the stakes by issuing a series of official and unofficial statements stating that if Turkey did not receive a statement of solidarity, the US would review its commitment to the Alliance.⁵² As trivial as the matter might seem, what was now at stake was the survival of NATO. This impasse continued for nearly a month amidst an icy front between Washington and the dissident capitals in Europe before a statement emphasising the defensive nature of commitment to Turkey was agreed upon unofficially between the US and

Germany. At this stage, the EU again emerged as a possible venue for developing a concerted European response. During the Kosovo conflict, the EU had added to the legitimacy of the cause. John Peterson claims that the US officials interviewed had “repeatedly” insisted that the US “had done the math” and calculated that if qualified majority voting (QMV) had been applied, the EU as a whole would have endorsed the American position.⁵³ If this curious logic is to be taken seriously, it would be a telling testimony to the EU’s ascent as strategic actor, but also to the American ignorance of how decisions are made in the CFSP framework. The matter was finally resolved when it was introduced and passed with the vote of Germany by NATO’s Defence Planning Committee, of which France is not a member owing to its continued abstention from NATO’s integrated military structure, discussed in the previous chapter.

In late April of 2003, the intra-European divisions appeared to be solidifying when Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg held a mini-summit with the aim of giving new impetus to the ESDP. The primary issue was the agreement that the ESDP should be fitted with an independent Operational Cell to be established within a year. The meeting raised fears in London and Washington that the four were breaking out of the consensus from Saint Malo and were preparing to challenge the primacy of NATO. The French Defence Minister, Michele Alliot-Marie, stated in *La Provence*: “The Iraq crisis has highlighted the need for Europe to express its own world outlook.”⁵⁴ The US State Department responded in a contemptuous manner by referring to the four states as “chocolate makers”.⁵⁵ Finding itself in a bridging position between the confrontational “old” Europe and the equally bellicose Bush Administration, London crafted a compromise in which the planning capability was placed within SHAPE so as to ensure that the EU developed planning capabilities without challenging the Berlin Plus agreement.⁵⁶ Although nobody had suggested that the EU should play a role in the Iraq war, the crisis paralysed the ESDP throughout the spring of 2003. The rift also stole the thunder from the EU Constitutional Treaty that was being canvassed at the time. While the Iraq crisis left the US at odds with key European Allies, it also made obvious a lack of common policy grounding among the EU states – something they had so far successfully clouded in ambiguity. At the Informal General Affairs and External Relations Council at Gymnich, Greece in May, the Greek Foreign Minister, George Papan-dreou, concluded that there was an “urgent need of a European strategic concept”.⁵⁷

Failed states, pre-emption and multilateralism

Although the Bush administration issued its second NSS in March 2006, this document, unlike the previous version neither reflects any clear shift in prevailing circumstances nor represents a clear adjustment to events.

The 2006 NSS was not met with an EU response and for this reason this analysis will focus on the 2002 NSS and the 2003 ESS. The similarities and differences in the EU and the US strategic approaches are perhaps most visible when comparing their security strategies.⁵⁸ This relevance is if anything compounded by the manner in which the EU arrived at its first-ever security strategy. The diplomatic forays preceding the war had made it clear that the construction of the ESDP had not been matched with a forging of common views on global governance and security. As Nicole Gnesotto, the then Director of the EU Institute for Strategic Studies, put it:⁵⁹

Before Iraq, raising the question of a European strategic concept amounted to either heresy or utopianism: among the Fifteen a combination of indifference, deference towards the United States and national preference jeopardised the very idea of the EU having its own security concept. Since Iraq, all members of the enlarged Union of 25 are enthusiastically involved in drawing up a common vision of the world and also a shared strategy on the Union's actions in it.

Steven Everts and Daniel Keohane quote a senior EU diplomat as saying, "It is not fashionable to say but the war in Iraq concentrated our minds. It showed that the EU had zero influence if the member states do not pull together."⁶⁰ On 8 December 2003, the leaders of the EU approved a shared security strategy, which they claimed would enable Europe to "share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world".⁶¹ The first-ever European Security Strategy (ESS) is an important document which has deservedly generated a considerable amount of commentary. The attempt to define a common EU policy base and to forge foreign policy cohesiveness, while reaffirming the transatlantic partnership, was not going to be an easy task, but one that, most agree, the EU strategic élite solved admirably.

The High Representative of EU Foreign and Security Policy (HR-CFSP), Javier Solana, had been commissioned by the Council to write a strategic concept. A strategic concept is a guide to be used while pursuing an agenda. It expresses the purpose, nature and fundamental security tasks of the organisation. It also identifies the central features of the security environment while specifying the elements of the organisation's approach to security.⁶² The ESS document clearly meets these criteria. In a traditional sense, a strategy paper is expected to define actual goals and set up priorities for achieving policy objectives. It should also prescribe the means that can be used, and under what conditions, in order to fulfil that specific purpose.⁶³ Commenting on the rebranding of the document, the leader of the EU Policy Unit, Christoph Heusgen, said:⁶⁴

It was clear for us [in the EU Policy Unit] from the beginning that we wanted to write a document which compared with the 2002 US

National Security Strategy (NSS).⁶⁵ Therefore, from our part we quickly after the informal meeting under the Greek Presidency (where the mandate was given), decided to call it “European Security Strategy”. Without any discussion, member states accepted this formulation.

The point that the EU was indeed mimicking the American NSS was further underlined by Solana when he attached a State of the Union speech to the draft version of the ESS in an apparent attempt to mirror the American equivalent.⁶⁶ Since the strategy, as Heusgen points out, was written in direct reference to the 2002 NSS, the two documents are inextricably linked, and have to be examined together. But this is somewhat like comparing apples and pears. The two documents are different not only in terms of length, but also their intended audience. While the 2002 NSS was, according to John Lewis Gaddis, “the most important reformulation of U.S. grand strategy in over a half century”, the 2003 ESS was the first attempt at providing a common foreign policy grounding for the 15 EU member states.⁶⁷ Also, as Robert E. Hunter points out, neither the NSS nor the ESS encompasses all the core elements of the EU or US strategy.⁶⁸ They do, nevertheless, touch upon key questions in international security at the turn of the century evident from the three core terms in the ESS and the NSS – failed states, preventive engagement and effective multilateralism – which in turn provide a useful backbone for the assessment of EU strategy. The comparison of the document with its American equivalent helps to clarify the deeper issues that brought about the Iraqi crisis.

Failed states

We have seen how the collapse of the comprehensive existential threat posed by the Soviet Union had laid open a new layer of threats. The ESDP is more than anything a response to this change in the global security environment. Therefore, it was to be expected that the ESS devotes much attention to defining “threats and challenges” to European security. The relatively uncontroversial listings attempt to provide a common policy ground for the EU states. Further, it is with regard to the “threats and challenges” that one can see the clearest attempts at reasserting the transatlantic relationship. While the ESS devotes five out of 14 pages to threat identification, its US counterpart – the NSS – limits its analysis to a few sentences. Despite this notable dissimilarity, the strategies are strikingly similar in their conclusions. Both documents focus on the dangers posed by terrorism, failed/rogue states and WMD proliferation.

The NSS identifies “rogue states” as a primary threat on the assumption that such states may provide sanctuary and support to terrorist organisations. The ESS mirrors this notion. In the “key threats” section, terrorism, WMD proliferation and failed states are singled out, while it is stressed

that regional conflicts and criminal networks enable WMD terrorism.⁶⁹ Essentially, the two strategies subscribe to much the same teleology. The three threats are expected to converge in a situation where WMD come into the hands of terrorists via the agency of failed/rogue states.⁷⁰ While the NSS states that “We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends”, the ESS states that “Taking these different elements together – terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, the weakening of the state system and the privatisation of force – we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed.”⁷¹

It is relatively clear that “terrorism” – defined as “premeditated, politically motivated violence against innocents” – primarily refers here to international networks in the same mould as the *al Qaeda*. When it comes to weapons of mass destruction, this concept comprises the full spectrum of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. The history of non-proliferation shows that both the EU and the US are primarily concerned with nuclear weapons technologies. The third element of the equation is less clear. The “rogue states” referred to ten times in the NSS are not the same as the “failed states” referred to seven times in the ESS. Both terms are vague. The NSS lists five “rogue state” characteristics: a state that brutalises its citizens, strives to obtain WMD, supports terrorism, does not respect human rights and, importantly, has strained relations with the US. This list includes North Korea, Cuba, Iran and Syria. These regimes have little else in common besides their durability, which is the opposite of what binds “failed states” together. The term “failed state” is a diagnosis referring to the inner workings of a state, and not its foreign policy outlook. This is specified in the ESS as “Bad governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability.”⁷² The EU’s list of states that are of concern is obviously longer than that of the US. The difference is that while the NSS sees “rogue states” as perpetrators of mayhem, the ESS sees “failed states” as facilitators of it. The NSS makes only one reference to failing states, but there are signs of a policy shift towards the EU position. The experiences in Iraq are increasingly turning the US agenda from “crisis management and containment to early diagnosis and prevention”.⁷³

The framing of an EU security policy began by focusing on the crisis-management lessons learnt from the Yugoslav civil war of the 1990s, and has evolved with the international security agenda. This point deserves mentioning as the EU has, in some policy areas, found it difficult to respond to new challenges. In a number of cases, the EU’s fear of upsetting hard-fought consensus has led to it getting stuck in ineffectual policies.⁷⁴ Different European countries face different threats, and therefore tend to assess them differently. Radical Islam is more of a threat to France

than to Slovakia. The nuclear dumping sites at the Kola Peninsula are more of a “clear and present danger” to Helsinki than to Athens. By subscribing to the same key threats as the US, the ESS gives up some of its original *raison d’être* of being an initiative focused on “different” security challenges than the US (and NATO). As a result, the EU appeared to keep pace with the international agenda, especially with regard to terrorism, which figures at the top of the ESS list of threats. The EU’s subscribing to the teleology of “WMD handed to terrorists by failed states” as the primary threat is, above all, a testimony to America’s power to set the agenda.

The “main threats” section of the ESS is preceded and followed by a largely disjointed set of “challenges”. To cite some examples: “Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe”; “We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus”; “The European Union’s interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners”; and “Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe.”⁷⁵ There are no attempts at prioritising among these “challenges”. The impression conveyed is that the counsel given is for the EU to simply engage in the entire list of foreign policy issues. Keeping in mind the limited success of the past, the lack of focus, and the monumental tasks chosen, this seems to be a recipe for policy overload. Which of the challenges should take first, second and third priority? The ESS offers few answers.⁷⁶ The authors in the EU Policy Unit judged such a prioritisation as being potentially divisive and left it out deliberately in order to ensure unanimous support for the document. The difference between the clarity of language when subscribing to a modified US agenda in the “key threats” section, and the lack of clarity and structure in the listings of the EU-defined “challenges”, suggests the continued dependence of the EU on the US in setting the security agenda.

Preventive engagement

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 made the US government fundamentally rethink its security strategy. The State Department explained:

President Bush has crafted a new national security strategy that essentially abandons concepts of deterrence – which dominated defence policies during the Cold War years – for a forward reaching, pre-emptive strategy against hostile states and terrorist groups, while also expanding development assistance and free trade, promoting democracy, fighting disease, and transforming the US military.⁷⁷

The question of pre-emption is perhaps the most important difference between the EU and US security strategies. The 2002 NSS asserts that “to

forestall or prevent [attacks] by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively".⁷⁸ In an apparent reply, the ESS claims: "In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those near at hand"; the EU "should be ready to act before a crisis occurs"; and "preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future".⁷⁹ The draft version of the paper contained the phrase "pre-emptive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future". The wording was changed in the second draft, according to a source involved in the drafting of the document, primarily due to the mixed experiences of the US in Iraq. Had the EU subscribed to the dubious doctrine of pre-emption, this would indeed have been a strong testimony to the influence of the US on EU policies, but in the event the EU settled for the less contentious term "prevention". Preventive engagement usually refers to the defusing of a conflict before it erupts. The ESS lists diplomacy, aid and sanctions as elements of the preventive engagement approach. When challenged over the term, Javier Solana said that preventive engagement implies a "mainstreaming of conflict prevention without implying any obligation to undertake pre-emptive military strikes either by the EU or by individual member states".⁸⁰ Here lies an important point, namely, that the EU proposes to respond to issues such as rogue states through containment and prevention of escalation.

The Iraq war raised fundamental questions about *jus ad bellum*. The "just war" tradition specifies the preconditions for a state to rightfully go to war. War must, among other things, be declared by a legitimate authority, for a just cause, and with the right intention. Moreover, a cause is seen as just only if all non-violent means of solving the problem have been exhausted. The question of whether the decision to go to war fulfilled these criteria was at the core of the transatlantic dispute over Iraq. The anticipatory use of force in the face of an imminent attack remains disputed under international law. The Bush strategy asserts that deterrence no longer works against rogue states and terrorist groups. Consequently, the US is compelled to strike before its enemies do.⁸¹ In his speech at West Point in June 2002, President Bush the Younger stated that the US should not wait for threats to materialise fully, before acting. The statement is noteworthy. By going against the established *jus ad bellum*, it appears that the US was intent on challenging one of the cornerstones in a world order that one would assume is in the interest of the leading power to uphold.⁸²

The ESS takes a different line by emphasising that "conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early".⁸³ This position can be taken as an implicit criticism of the belligerent American attitude towards the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, and as support for the more restrained preventive engagement approach advocated by Germany and France on this issue.⁸⁴ The EU wishes to handle rogue states by offering them a way back into international society through dialogue and cooperation. The EU non-proliferation efforts directed at

Iran and North Korea indicate that those failing to meet the EU standards will be tackled primarily by the withholding of rewards.⁸⁵ This approach, as seen in the previous chapter, has proved effective with EU candidate-countries, although it is less clear what leverage it provides to states not seeking EU membership.

The credibility of the ESS is amplified by its focus on terrorism as the primary threat facing Europe. In part, as a response to the offensive nature of the NSS, the ESS strikes a decidedly defensive note. The ESS lists all the means and all the threats, but is vague when it comes to the ends to be attained and is virtually silent about how the capabilities can be used to exert influence. The reluctance to even mention what the much-vaunted EU Rapid Reaction Force may be used for reconfirms that the EU will continue to focus its efforts on pre- and post-crisis management. By studiously avoiding the topic of when armed force can be applied, the ESS confirms a point made by High Representative Solana on numerous occasions: the ESS is not the final word on matters concerning European security. In the future, the Union will also be faced with hard choices regarding the use of force. By failing to outline a credible alternative to collective decision-making, the ESS places the responsibility for these choices firmly in the hands of the governments of the member states, who in the final instance will decide how the strategy is to be implemented.

Effective multilateralism

The ESS concurs with its US counterpart on the main threats to international peace and stability, but it differs on the means and authority by which international security is to be upheld. The ESS states: "Our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system."⁸⁶ The UNSC, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and NATO are singled out, followed by a string of regional institutions, as first-line proponents of multilateralism. This is contrasted by the NSS's statement: "The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism [...]."⁸⁷ Although the document is sprinkled with references to "friends and allies", it seems that these are expected to accept US leadership and that the US will take its own counsel wherever national security is concerned. One gets the impression that "distinctly American internationalism" is a variation on the same theme as that captured in phrases such as unilateralism, *Alleingang* and exceptionalism.

While the NSS leaves little doubt that it is the US government that has final authority on when to act militarily, the ESS does not bestow similar authority on the 25 member states.⁸⁸ The ESS does not look to NATO as the arbiter of war and peace, as was the case in the 1999 Kosovo war, which was fought without a clear UN mandate. Instead, it calls for a strengthening of the UN as the keeper of international peace and states

that the EU must “be ready to act when [UN] rules are broken”.⁸⁹ In doing so, the EU keeps in line with its own “founding myth” of being an essentially multilateral organisation.⁹⁰ This stand resonates with the EU population who are generally favourably inclined to the UN. That said, the UN Security Council mandates assertive action relatively seldom, and when it does, the result has often been a lot less successful than what the ESS seems to imply. According to the ESS, threats and challenges of this nature are to be countered with “political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities”,⁹¹ Interestingly, the “effective multilateralism” of the ESS seems to carry much the same meaning as “assertive multilateralism”, which was a key term during President Clinton’s first two years in office (1993–95).⁹² Looking back, assertive multilateralism, combined with a militarily active UN, foundered on the failed international interventions in Bosnia and Somalia in 1993–94. This led the second Clinton Administration to distance itself from the UN, at least in military terms. American scholar Robert Kagan formulates the thought driving this shift as being a tension not, as many assume, between unilateralism and multilateralism as foreign policy outlooks, but rather between effective multilateralism and paralytic multilateralism.⁹³ In one interview a former policy adviser to President Clinton stressed that the failure of the EU states to support the “lift and strike” policy dismayed also those multilaterally inclined in Washington. In the US, assertive multilateralism was reinvented in the phrase “multilateral when possible, unilateral when necessary”. The lesson drawn was underscored by the absence of any reference to “assertive multilateralism” in the 1995 NSS.⁹⁴

Like most new presidents, President George Bush the Younger marketed himself as being different from his predecessor – not least in terms of foreign policy. His foreign policy adviser, Condoleezza Rice, claimed: “The Clinton Administration has often been so anxious to find multilateral solutions to problems that it has signed agreements that are not in America’s interest.”⁹⁵ It seemed that the US was solving the “out of area or out of business” debate of whether NATO would have to begin to operate outside Europe by imposing a new bargain – “coalitions of the willing” would carry the NATO colours abroad at America’s bequest, while those not willing to do so were welcome to stay at home. Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz was at the annual Munich Security Conference – the showcase for the transatlantic partnership – in early February.⁹⁶ He called for a rebalancing of the transatlantic bargain, reiterating a position previously formulated by Defence Secretary Rumsfeld that the mission would define the coalition and not vice versa. This implied that NATO’s role as an alliance bloc, governed by consensus, was being replaced by American primacy and hand-picked coalitions. What this would entail in practical terms was seen in the *modus operandi* of the 2002 Afghan campaign.

A difference in means, not ends

Faced with what possibly amounts to the most pre-announced crisis in modern history, the EU states had failed – despite trying – to reach an agreement on how to tackle the Iraq question and the US attempts to influence the policies of its European allies. In spite of overwhelming public opposition to war against Iraq, EU unity crumbled under the conflicting short-term interests of the member states and American pressure. Logic dictates that for the CFSP to be effective, the member states should channel relevant components of their foreign and security policies through the EU. For this to occur, they must set common goals and agree on how to achieve these goals. This considered, perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the 2003 ESS was that it did not arrive earlier.⁹⁷ It is worth repeating just how little discussion had taken place among the member states over means and ends of the EU foreign and security policy. Looking back, however, the call to formulate a strategy was not the result of the debate over the need for a firmer policy platform. Rather, it was triggered by the Iraq crisis.

Given the circumstances, it would have been an exceedingly difficult task to draft a traditional strategy document for the EU. The complexities of the international system along with the multifaceted character of the threats confronting Europe hampered the composition of a strategy in the traditional sense. Moreover, the document was written in the most venomous transatlantic climate in living memory. The short time-frame in which the text was written also made it difficult to gather intelligence to elaborate upon the different options – or to build consensus. For these reasons, the 2003 European Security Strategy is an achievement. The authors succeeded in reaffirming the transatlantic security partnership with regard to the shared agenda, vocabulary and sense of urgency. Arguably, the removal of the term “pre-emption” and the weakening of the “failed state supplies WMD to terrorist organisation” teleology in the final draft, to some extent undermined the vocabulary and urgency of this effort. But the most important feature – a shared agenda – was kept intact. Less intended but equally important, is the fact that the ESS illustrates that the EU will continue to rely on US agenda-setting. The strategy sets itself apart from its American equivalent by reaffirming that the EU is a force for upholding the current international order – opposed to pre-emption and in favour of UN-centred multilateralism. The document makes it very clear that the EU favours other non-violent means to counter threats, and that the Union will draw legitimacy for action from elsewhere than the European Council, or indeed the transatlantic partnership. If one is so inclined, this could be interpreted as a Clintonesque reprimand of the Bush Administration. So what does the EU security strategy tell us about the differences and similarities in EU and US strategic perspectives? Sifting through the evident attitudes expressed in the 2002 NSS and the

2003 ESS reveals that the Americans and Europeans agree, for the most part, on the nature of the security threats, even though they diverge on how to respond.

American influence and EU strategic culture

Whether or not we should view the American influence on EU security policies over the Iraq crisis as “significant” comes down to whether the American goal was seen to deadlock the EU or to encourage policies that actively supported the US position. From this vantage point, the Iraq crisis leaves an inconclusive impression. American decision-makers frequently seemed to be uncertain about which of the two aims they were pursuing. The unilateral approach ensured that US policies were less restrained by allied considerations than they might otherwise have been, but were also less supported among the Europeans. Recalling the criteria by which American influence on EU security policy can be measured, at key junctures (such as the issues of failed states, preventive engagement and effective multilateralism) a change in EU policy can arguably be attributed to American influence. There were consecutive disagreements between the US and leading EU member states over how the Iraq crisis would be best handled. It is perhaps most accurate to say that the final outcome of the EU policy process was seemingly close to the signalled US position – but upon closer inspection farther removed than it would seem.

During the run-up to the Iraq War, the US’s primary goal was to prevent European dissent from translating into outright opposition. This was achieved through: (1) *influence by proxy* (actively expending the political capital earned in Central and Eastern Europe through NATO enlargement); (2) *discrimination* (promising reconstruction contracts, technology, economic aid and so on to those participating and threatening to withhold favours from those who did not); (3) *public diplomacy* (as exemplified by the freezing out of Germany; anti-French rhetoric and “old versus new Europe” remarks); (4) *decoupling* (using NATO frameworks as the base on which to construct a non-NATO coalition of the willing); and (5) *agenda power* (as illustrated by the forcing of the Iraq issue onto the transatlantic agenda, but also in the focus of the ESS). The overall American tactic was *unilateral leadership* – leading by example, thereby leaving the Europeans with few other options than to line up for or against the US, establishing the familiar pattern of a proactive Washington and a reactive European Union.

While the US interacted with the EU on a range of issues pertaining to the war against terror, American decision-makers did not seek policy dialogue at a strategic level with the European Union.⁹⁸ America’s success and failure in determining EU policies over the Iraq war has much to do with its policies being fuelled by discrete decisions pertaining to other issues, giving the Euro-American relations over this question a distinctly ad hoc flair. The US found its ability to influence its allies in Europe constrained

by its own contradictory objectives. The failure to maintain allied cohesion, or prevent unbridled dissent, was in itself a testimony to the limits of American influence on European security. It could also be viewed as significant that uniform European support was not considered essential by Washington. The American behaviour towards Europe is perhaps best understood in the light of the doctrinal unilateralism of the first administration of Bush the Younger, which essentially assumed that Europe was in no position to help or hinder US policies, and therefore could safely be ignored. In an apparently contradictory trend, interviews indicate that the Bush Administration was also more concerned over the prospects of the EU becoming an independent force than the previous administrations had been.⁹⁹

The EU failed in its primary objective of finding a multilateral solution to the Iraq question, to prevent the country from turning into a failed state and to dissuade the US from going to war pre-emptively without a UN mandate. The EU also failed in presenting a common European policy over Iraq or, indeed, in responding to events. On the other hand, the EU succeeded in not falling into either the pro-war or anti-war camps, no small feat considering the circumstances. As with the previous case studies, it's time again to point out some traits in the evolving EU strategic culture by assessing the degree to which ideas and expectations were reflected in patterns of behaviour and vice versa. Again, the EU was faced with Tanner Johnson's four dilemmas that confront foreign policy decision-makers: (1) pursuing the "best" policy and the most "feasible" policy; (2) whether to respond quickly or allow for extensive deliberation; (3) selecting information or evaluating as much information as possible; and (4) whether to act through strict consensus or through majority decisions.¹⁰⁰

- 1 The Iraq war proved the difficulties involved in maintaining a European consensus during times of crisis. The EU approach to the Iraq question failed to strike a functional balance between the ideal and the possible. For too long, the EU leaders hoped that the Iraq question was a peripheral issue of little importance to Europe. The institutions failed to develop a common strategy, which member states and applicant countries could be held to. As a result, the decision-making procedures in place proved woefully inadequate when the issue was forced onto the European security agenda. During the Iraq crisis, EU leaders appeared to be out of touch with the general public in Europe when trying to drum up support for the new Constitution, while ignoring the one issue where European public opinion was firmly in agreement.¹⁰¹ Subsequently, the EU seemed to be caught off guard by, arguably, the most pre-announced war in modern history. *Financial Times* journalist Judy Dempsey summarised the situation:

EU governments have failed to acknowledge that the Bush Administration's strategy will have a profoundly negative impact

on European integration and security. Instead, they have reverted to pursuing what they see as their national interests at a time when they should be pulling together.¹⁰²

But for all its shortcomings, the Union should be lauded for choosing to pursue the “most practical” policy, while preventing the dissent among the member states from proliferating into other EU policy fields. On the contrary, the fall-out was used to press ahead with the deepening of the foreign policy dimension and was crowned with the first-ever security strategy. The failure to reach a common position on how to deal with the Iraq question was not for lack of trying. There was a genuine lack of common ground among the member states that had everything to do with the issue effectively becoming a vote for or against the primacy of the United States. This, however, does not challenge the rather obvious point that – considering subsequent developments – it was probably to the benefit of the EU to stay clear of the Iraq war.

- 2 From a tactical perspective, rapid response was again a problem. The call in the ESS “to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention” is an implicit acknowledgement of the lack of a workable decision-making mechanism.¹⁰³ In the absence of a predefined strategy and the inability to agree on an effective policy response, the EU response to the crisis trailed events. The lack of predefined guidelines and benchmarks hampered the ability to respond proactively to the Iraq crisis. The EU had little choice but to keep its head down and hope not to get entangled in the unfolding events. The widely held understanding that the Union would probably have not been able to move beyond bland statements undercut its strategic relevance. There was a profound lack of agreement on when, where and for what reasons the EU should formulate common foreign policies. The sniping at the deficiencies in EU military capabilities misses the more important point of the absence of agreed ends towards which means could be applied. The 2003 ESS went some way towards acknowledging this gap, but did little to close it: when moving beyond an agenda defined by the Americans, the EU strategy becomes unfocused. All strategies seek to establish a link between military means, and political and evaluative ends – and can be criticised for their validity and logical consistency.¹⁰⁴ In a traditional sense, a strategy paper is expected to define actual goals and set up priorities and policy objectives to achieve these goals. It should also describe what means can be used, and under what conditions, in order to fulfil that specific purpose.¹⁰⁵ There can be little doubt that the ESS falls short of these criteria.
- 3 In approaching the Iraq crisis, the EU favoured gathering information in order to gain as complete a picture as possible of the Iraqi WMD programme. This was evident in its persistent support of the efforts of

the UN weapons inspectors and in allowing the EU common positions to be influenced by their findings. But the EU suffered from a lack of independent verification mechanisms. As events unfolded, the EU member states and institutions were restricted by their lack of access to independent intelligence regarding the state of the Iraqi WMD programme. The EU position imploded when a number of EU states abandoned the monitored approach favoured by the UN and followed American pressure for military action. At this stage, the individual states as well as the EU as a whole were making decisions based on their inclination to trust or distrust the intelligence provided by the US to the individual member states, and the intelligence of uncertain origin being circulated in the international media. The American faith in precision technology and military strength for solving international disputes contrasted with the European willingness to deter, accept and contain the threat represented by Iraq. The US determination was, above all, illustrated by its reluctance to wait for all of its allies to be convinced of the need for war. For the EU, the problem was that the manner in which its passive resistance to the belligerent approach of the US was concerted, failed to endear the Union to either the proponents or the opponents of the war.

- 4 The Americans were right when they stated that had QMV been employed, the EU would have come out in favour of the war. Since all involved parties knew that any EU position would have to be formulated through consensus, the actual deliberations over Iraq were carried out through a series of parallel unstructured dialogues. Strong public opinion against the war in most EU states increased the incentives for dissent. In failing to agree on a common approach, the EU allowed the common ground to be eroded. The EU decision-making process was geared towards procrastination and the lowest common denominator compromise, and complicated any positive, proactive approach towards the Iraq question. In the end, the EU chose much the same approach as China and Russia – that of simply dissociating itself from the venture. The EU appeared powerless amidst the groundswell of opposition to the war that was evident all over Europe. This was in part a result of the EU institutions lacking an authoritative strategic document on which a response from the EU as a whole could be based. Had the Commission attempted to tap into the strong anti-war sentiments in the European public, one can only speculate that the EU and American Iraq policies might have diverged more than they actually did. American influence was strengthened by the rough and uncompromising way in which it was levelled, forcing Germany to compromise its anti-war position within NATO. While providing an important lesson to the EU, the Iraq crisis had a significant impact in that it weakened NATO, at least in the short term, as a forum for transatlantic consultation.

American influence was made more effective by the traits latent in the EU: the lack of an agreed policy platform; lack of access to independent intelligence; the unwillingness to subordinate national positions to EU foreign policies; and a belief in *voluntary security* – that the EU should be able to define its own security agenda. Above all, the crisis was a testimony to the absence of a strategic culture that allowed for “early, rapid and robust” decision-making. The ESS expects such a culture to materialise as a result of experience. To this purpose, the strategy rightly states that “Common threat assessments are the best basis for common actions.”¹⁰⁶ If anything, the Iraq crisis illustrated that the EU cannot hope to be an effective strategic actor without a clear idea of common policy goals and the means by which they are to be attained. As a result, the EU was unable to address the Iraq question effectively. The main obstacle to developing a more effective EU strategic culture is that the current mode of collective decision-making does not facilitate effective multilateralism. Over Iraq, it was, above all, the inability to reach agreement rather than the capabilities and institutional frameworks that constrained the EU. Through the crisis, in their quest to minimise the costs of conducting foreign policy, the EU states were inclined to ignore problems that they were almost certain to encounter further down the road, thereby making a proactive approach impossible. The Iraq crisis exposed the CFSP in the sense that it made obvious a “consensus–expectations gap” – a gap between what unity the EU had been talked up to and what unity it was actually able to deliver.¹⁰⁷ When time-constraints worked against carefully crafted ambiguities, consensus-building and horse-trading, European unity crumbled under the conflicting short-term interests of the member states.

The transatlantic bargain and the Iraq crisis

In the dual bargain outlined in Chapter 2, there was an unspoken agreement that the European states would support, or in any case not openly challenge, US foreign policies, and that the US in return would support, or at least not undermine, European integration. Some commentators saw the Iraq crisis as a decisive blow to the Euro-American security bargain. Michael Cox warns against failing to appreciate the “seriousness of the challenge that still confronts the transatlantic relationship”. He goes on to claim that “a Rubicon of sorts has been crossed” and that the Euro-American connection has lost much, perhaps most of its relevance.¹⁰⁸ William Wallace and Tim Oliver concluded: “In the aftermath of the Iraq war and occupation, it looks unlikely that Washington elites will attach sufficient importance to partnership with the Europeans to be willing to modify American Foreign policy”.¹⁰⁹ Other commentators saw that the intra-European bargain was in tatters: “The US-led invasion raised profound questions

about whether the EU can develop its own security and defence policy and whether the disagreements that opened up during the crisis will solidify into permanent divisions.”¹¹⁰ The framework of this text steers us towards a less drastic, but perhaps more analytically helpful, perspective of viewing the crisis as symptomatic of a renegotiation of the transatlantic bargain.

In the Euro-American bargain, instead of a rupture, the crisis over Iraq drew attention to a more important shift that had taken place some time ago – the end of the Cold War. Finally, the bargain was being renegotiated to reflect the lessened need for cohesion. The Iraq crisis compounded concerns in Europe over Washington’s apparent willingness to use force, even if it meant going against the will of its European allies. Decreased attentiveness to European concerns was accompanied by steady reductions in US troop levels in Europe – to little more than 50,000 in 2003. By this, the Administration signalled a downscaling of engagement perhaps best understood as a shift from being a “European power” to being “a power in Europe”. This not only had implications for NATO’s transformation, but also for the EU. The crisis strengthened the determination among the member states to allow the Union to play a more effective role in international affairs. The Iraq crisis represented both continuity and change in the transatlantic bargain. As discussed in Chapter 2, since the 1970s, the US had assumed the global role it had previously shared with the European powers, and grew disinclined to invite their involvement in its handling of issues beyond the region, especially in the Middle East. The European states and the EU respected this, but a number of states withheld their support for America’s Middle East policies. By forcing the issue onto the agenda of the UN and NATO, the US tried to renegotiate the Euro-American bargain, but was denied (admittedly with the sweetener of the Europeans agreeing to play a military role in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban). Subsequently, both sides found their default positions challenged. European states found that their general support for America, while questioning its means and ends, was no longer enough to ensure cordial relations with the US. And Washington discovered very real limits to its primacy and that support, even from its most trusted allies in Europe, was not unconditional.

The Iraq crisis also destabilised the intra-European bargain. Anand Menon notes: “At the heart of these disputes were opposing conceptions of the appropriate relationship for Europe to maintain with the United States.”¹¹¹ At the height of the crisis, *The Economist* observed:

Many of the most fraught debates in the Convention have centred on foreign policy and defence, reflecting the splits caused by the Iraq war and the aspirations of those who hope to see the Union develop into a counterweight to the United States.¹¹²

The crisis also exposed the fragility of the Saint Malo compromise between France and Britain. At the call to stand up and be counted, roughly two-thirds of the European countries sided (more and less publicly) with the US – surely a blow to the pretensions of common foreign policies in the EU. The *en masse* support of the applicant countries in Eastern Europe rekindled French, and even German, suspicions that enlargement was bringing an American Trojan horse into the Union. The trilateral intra-European bargain fell apart long before the crisis reached its boiling point, as no easy compromise could be found and “sitting it out” was not an option. Elisabeth Pond goes so far as to claim that the crisis dashed any hopes “of eventually establishing a healthy balance of French, German and British leadership in a heterogeneous European Union”.¹¹³ Perhaps it is more accurate to say that the Iraq crisis showed that purist Atlanticist and Europeanist visions for the EU were equally untenable. While the Iraq war undeniably drove a wedge between the EU member states, its short- to medium-term effects on the intra-European bargain were largely temporary, and perhaps even invigorating. The crisis provided the EU with a much needed security strategy. It also helped break the log jam of hopelessly ineffective decision-making by providing a rough and tumble school of actual policy leadership. This amalgamated the *Directoire* into an informal steering group, operating in much the same way as the Quint had done during the Kosovo War. Later the same year Germany, Britain and France took the lead in the non-proliferation efforts directed at Iran, raising hopes that such a three-state “security council” in the future could become the solution to the Union’s defective decision-making procedure.¹¹⁴

By the end of 2003, there were signs that both Washington and the European capitals were eager to put the crisis behind them. In the months after the crisis, the US shifted towards the position of the ESS in a number of areas. Soon after the fall of Baghdad in November 2003, President Bush the Younger noted on a visit to London: “Effective multilateralism, and either unilateralism or international paralysis will guide our approach.”¹¹⁵ While the policy cooperation between the US and the EU for the most part remained relatively unchanged over Iraq, it was also clear that the EU would not be prepared to help where the US most desperately needed cooperation – the reconstruction effort. The intra-European wounds were simply too recent for any talk of reintroducing the issue onto the agenda. In 2004 and later the experiences of the Iraqi occupation have increasingly turned the US agenda from crisis management and intervention to early diagnosis and prevention – in the manner advocated in the 2003 ESS. So, what then is the trend with respect to the transatlantic bargain – is it falling apart or being forged anew? The predictable enough answer is that the Iraq crisis revealed elements of both. The crisis was a milestone, but it was

not a breaking point. While it remains clear that although the Iraq affair was arguably the most acute crisis in the transatlantic relationship since the Suez crisis, it was also an indicator of deeper trends that have grown increasingly pronounced since the end of the Cold War.

6 Towards a bipolar West

The present study has traced American influence on European Union security policies and the evolving EU strategic culture from 1998 to 2004. This influence was often incoherent, unfocused and indistinct, yet highly effective. That is not to say that American decision-makers have found it easy to come to terms with the multi-purpose, multidimensional, semi-supranational, semi-intergovernmental nature of the European Union. The relationship that binds the US and the EU is essentially a mismatch, in political discourse and practice, in manners of communication – and in terms of means and ends. This is not least a result of the “partial actor-ness” of the Union. During the period American attitudes to the EU as a foreign policy actor varied from guarded support to indifference to outright opposition – sometimes under the same presidency. One might say that a prevailing sense of two-mindedness pervaded American *Europapolitik*. The Washington consensus broadly favoured a greater role for the EU in regional and global security, yet at the same time ignored, patronised and, at times, undermined the specific attempts at common policies. This was especially the case when it seemed that European cooperation might call American leadership into question. The sense of entitlement to primacy ran counter to a gradual withdrawal not only of American armed forces, but also of political attention from Europe. In the case studies, we have seen how the US influenced EU decision-making through three primary mechanisms: bilateral multilateralism, incremental linkage and unilateral leadership. These American pressures were essential in shaping both the EU’s specific policies and its overall approach to security.

In the introductory chapter we briefly visited some of the primary actors in the making of the European Union and the American security policies. Studying the workings of the two decision-making processes from up close, if anything, re-emphasises the impression of a hierarchical and tightly controlled process in the United States and the unpredictable cluster patterns of the EU equivalent. It is above all the unclear seniority within and among the Troika (the holder of the rotating EU Presidency, the Commissioner for External Relations and the High Representative for

the CFSP) and the EU-3 (Britain, Germany and France) that gives EU foreign policy-making its distinct ad hoc flair. To make things more complicated the member states have found it difficult to move from a general agreement that the EU should play a greater role in world affairs, to actually agreeing on specific policies. While most member states would like to carry the weight of 27 states when pursuing national positions, they abhor the thought of allowing their own national interest be defined by 26 other states. The limited autonomy granted to the EU by the member states debilitates the Union strategically by encouraging reactive policy-making. This in turn amplifies the impact – and need – of American influence.

The American EU-policies under the Clinton and Bush the Younger administrations could perhaps be best summarised as one of “benign neglect”. The limited ability of the Europeans to speak with a single voice in foreign policy matters has come to be accepted as a fact by the American political establishment and opinion makers. Despite efforts such as President Clinton’s “New Transatlantic Agenda”, the Euro-American relationship remains highly compartmentalised and asymmetric. One should have no illusions about this: While American decision-makers do take the European Union very seriously in matters of trade and economy, the US has some way to go when it comes to recognising the European Union as a partner on a strategic level. American policies towards the EU were subsequently frequently driven and shaped by discrete decisions pertaining to other foreign policy principles, strategic ambitions, military doctrines and diplomatic initiatives. Adhocracy and inconsistency increasingly came at a price as the US tried to adapt the principles that had served it well during the Cold War to a post-Cold War reality where the bonds of necessity were weaker, but fraternal ties remained strong.

Complaints regarding the sometimes alienating and contemptuous manner in which the US treats its European allies are, all too often, valid. The American unwillingness to consider the use of ground forces in Kosovo, its use of NATO enlargement to favour US economic interests and the ruthless treatment of what were essentially legitimate concerns over whether to start a pre-emptive war against Iraq are but a few examples. The US–EU relations have nevertheless gained in closeness. Decision-makers that I have spoken to have almost to a man expressed hopes that the EU would “get its act together” to fill the leadership role in Europe that the US is growing increasingly reluctant to play. It would also be wrong to assume that the outcomes of the disputes examined in this study were a testimony to the sort of American dominance that is indicated by those who choose to conceive the connection in terms of hegemony or even “empire”. One must not forget that the outcomes of the Kosovo war, dual enlargement and the Iraq crisis were sub-optimal, also from an American perspective. All the focus on America misbehaving overshadows the more important issue, namely the realisation that the current transatlantic bargain was not giving the US what it needed. The

asymmetric bargain left the United States with a disproportionate share of the security burden while the European allies felt free to call American primacy into question with regularity. The fact that the American gradual withdrawal from Europe has not been committed to any major policy document, if anything underlies the strategic importance of the shift. In this sense it is fair to argue that the shift from a unipolar to a bipolar West was sparked by the events of 1998–2004.

The transatlantic bargain revised

By the end of 2004, the transatlantic bargain was decidedly different from what it had been in 1998. Most notably American leadership in European affairs had changed in emphasis and intensity. The man behind the “transatlantic bargain” concept, Harlan Cleveland, stated that “The glue that held the allies more or less together is a large, complex and dynamic bargain – partly an understanding among the Europeans, but mostly a deal between them and the United States of America.” That is arguably no longer the case. The transatlantic bargain after the post-Cold War is partly an understanding between the Europeans and the United States, but primarily among the Europeans. The gravitas of the European security order is now firmly fixed in Europe. While NATO has lost much of its role as a genuine forum for political consultation, the European Union has grown in stature. The intra-European Europeanist versus Atlanticist debate, over whether the Euro-American or the intra-European part of the transatlantic bargain should be given priority over the period 1998 to 2004, ended in a stalemate that favours the EU. The Europeans continued to invite American engagement while making determined efforts to do more themselves. The withdrawal of US military forces and attention from Europe, as well as the redefinition of NATO and the rise of the EU as a foreign policy actor, all point in the same direction. The US is stepping down from being a European power becoming instead a power in Europe. These developments all point in the direction of a bipolar transatlantic connection. This means that we are finally seeing the contours of the two-pillar structure originally envisioned in NATO.

The phase of renegotiation is clearly far from over. Not least because a sustainable power- and burden-sharing equilibrium in the post-Cold War Euro-American connection has yet to be found. A primary obstacle to an effective bipolar transatlantic West is that the intra-European bargain has not found the sort of decision mechanisms that guarantee a stable, coherent and effective European foreign and security policy. Any government that witnessed how the EU addressed the Kosovo or Iraq questions would think twice about leaving the EU to manage an urgent crisis single-handedly. The period 1998–2004 strengthened the perspective that the European Union needs to become more autonomous in defining its own strategic objectives. Under the new transatlantic bargain the European

states will continue to accept – even require – American leadership in defining the ends to which the policies are to be directed. The EU is set to exercise ever greater autonomy in pursuing these goals – often with other means than those favoured by the United States.

American primacy in Europe persists, although waning – not least because the EU was so far found it difficult to bring together the Europeanist and Atlanticist agendas. The member states ability to act in a coordinated manner in support of American-led operations has – as Rolf Holden has shown in his quantitative study on military interventions – actually become less coordinated since Saint Malo. At the same time the ability to act in concert in European-led operations has increased.¹ In London the notion of “the special relationship” lives on, even after the experiences in Iraq. Paris might have realised in theory that sharing leadership with the US is the better way ahead, but the knee-jerk tendency to oppose the Atlantic dimension in European security persists. The German success in bringing the two agendas together is based on willingness to align national interest with collective policies to a degree not found in Paris and London. The two remaining European great powers have so far failed to take the plunge and submit their foreign policies to integration. Rather than being a means to make gains in the international system, national sovereignty continues to be an end in itself. Sovereignty required continued distance between foreign ministries at the precise time when the EU states would have stood to gain from collectively presenting a unified position.

Although Euro-American relations have played a key role in giving direction to EU security policies, the inherent qualities and dynamics of intra-European relations have also added to the effort’s distinct flair. The operational nature of the institutional structures is illustrated by the EU’s engaging in a number of small pre- and post-conflict missions ranging from Indonesia to the Congo, Bosnia and, conceivably, Kosovo in 2008.² The experiences at the turn of the century brought Europe’s great powers closer than they had been at any moment since the Suez Crisis. The importance of individuals and personality should not to be underestimated. In much the same way as the change of heart for the British Prime Minister helps explain the Franco-British Saint Malo Declaration, the increasingly strained personal relations between Tony Blair, Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac clearly had an impact on the crucial EU-3 connection towards the end of the period in question. In 2008 the new hands in charge in London, Paris and Berlin mean new possibilities for renegotiating the intra-European security bargain.

The findings of this study thus seemingly present us with a paradox. The EU members departed on a quest to become a “global actor”. While at the same time taking steps towards constructing European structures, most EU states remained loyal to policies and structures that seemed to work explicitly in the opposite direction (*inter alia* the willingness to com-

promise the EU position discussed in Chapter 3, the case of US primacy in Chapter 4 and the European deployment in Afghanistan in Chapter 5). This study has shown that this disjuncture is best understood in terms of American pressures that reduced the room for Europe to define and pursue independent strategic goals. A combination of the capability–expectations gap and politically imposed inertia meant that successive leaders were in part unable and in part unwilling to formulate and implement policies independent of those of the US. American constraints on the autonomy of the EU leaders thus played a significant part in the mismatch of EU ambition and actual influence in the international system.

The European Union's difficulties in adapting to the events of the late 1990s and early 2000s were far from exceptional. Most actors struggled to find their feet, first in the unipolar order that arose from the rubble of the Berlin Wall and again when it became clear that the post-Cold War order was transitional. Just as it seemed that the post-Cold War order had settled with a United States from "Mars" and a European Union from "Venus" – the landscape changed yet again.³ Unipolarity as global political order was an inherently transitional phase, and one that by 2008 is irrevocably over. The post-Cold War order is in the process of being replaced by a new multipolarity. The new, bilateral transatlantic bargain is still hazy but some traits are discernible. NATO is likely to continue to play a role in the new Euro-American bargain. The continued need to ensure military interoperability will be sufficient to ensure the institution's survival, although its political role will likely be diminished in the face of a new US–EU bilateralism.

A distinctly European strategic culture

In terms of strategic culture, the EU has gradually become more resilient to stress as well as more effective in pursuing policies of its own devising – especially pertaining to issues within the broader confines of an American-defined agenda. The case studies show that the EU is able to learn from practice, and that the CFSP/ESDP evolves with each new strategic experience. Yet when it comes to providing positive foreign policies, the EU continues to deliver considerably less than the aggregate might of its member states. The power and reach of the Union in 2008 still falls far short of its potential. The strategic culture of the EU disposes it towards choosing the most "feasible" policy over the "best" policy; towards allowing for extensive deliberation rather than acting quickly; to take in as much information as possible rather than to act on key indicators; and, finally, to act through strict consensus. These insights not only help explain why the EU was susceptible to US pressure, they also say something about what can be expected from Europe in the future. Richard Tanner Johnson's model points to the EU as a cumbersome yet weighty strategic actor.

It is in this gap between the partial or temporary, between transient or permanent actorness, that many of the answers to the EU's distinct

strategic culture lie. In the introductory chapter we discussed various definitions of “actorness”. The reason why the EU is not a more effective foreign policy actor has everything to do with shortcomings in terms of having “a clear identity and a self-contained decision-making system” as well as the “practical capabilities to affect policy”.⁴ But none of these criteria are absolutes. In a strict sense only great powers would make the grade of what one might call “permanent actorness”. And there can be little doubt that the EU clearly has made progress towards achieving a greater degree of actorness in terms of a sense of self and the practical capabilities to carry out policies. Since the ESDP was initiated in 1998, the EU has made pointed efforts at structuring the economic, diplomatic and military assets of the member states in such a way that they could be mobilised in an EU context. Under the Headline Goal 2010, the member states are focusing on closing the enabling shortfalls while employing the capabilities available in the European inventories as effectively as possible. These capabilities are governed by a comprehensive, if somewhat Byzantine, and unevenly integrated institutional structure.

So how does EU strategic culture measure up to the yardstick in terms of the degree to which ideas and expectations are reflected in patterns of behaviour and, vice versa – the standard by which the effectiveness of a strategic culture can be measured? Efforts have been made at bridging Chris Hill’s capability–expectations gap, that is, the gap between what the Union had been talked up to do, and what it is actually able to deliver. There has been some progress in improving military capabilities and institutional frameworks as well as in the ability to agree. Economic constraints have played an important role in convincing the EU member states of the need for effective cooperation, while imposing very real restrictions on what the EU is actually able to deliver. In this sense the EU strategic culture is weak. The Union remains prone to promise more than it delivers and delivers other things than it promised. The “spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity” of the 1992 Treaty on European Union often proved elusive during the period in question. Consensus was often hard to arrive at, even in cases where the various national positions were not far apart.

Although several of the new CFSP/ESDP agencies are underfunded and understaffed, the EU possesses institutional frameworks through which policies can be implemented. Progress has also been made in terms of “identity”, to align foreign policy interests, traditions and goals in a way that generates substantive common policies. The 2003 ESS was a step in the right direction. The most persistent shortfall is in terms of a self-contained decision-making system. Despite initiatives under slogans such as *Directoire*, constructive abstention, qualified majority voting and permanent structured cooperation, the consensus decision-making mechanism has proved persistently unworkable. The CFSP/ESDP still lacks direction. The lesson is that the EU achieves actorness when means and ends have been agreed. This study has shown that the capability of the Union to

behave as an international actor to a large extent depends on the clarity of its goals and the subjective and objective conditions of their implementation. Among these conditions American influence is a first-rank factor. Unless the EU members agree a strategy on how to manage the Euro-American bargain, Washington will likely continue to play an important role in guiding the EU foreign and security policies.

However, the EU is set to grow bolder in pursuing issues within these confines – especially with regards to issues low in the international agenda (where the degree of politicisation is lower). As mentioned, the EU will likely most clearly show its autonomy vis-à-vis the US in the choice of foreign and security policy tools. The limited ability to project hard power both in terms of hardware and policy-making procedures predisposes the EU to a strategic culture that places less value on power and military strength and more value on such soft-power tools as negotiation, diplomacy and commercial ties, on international law over the use of force, on seduction over coercion, on multilateralism over unilateralism. Unspectacular – to be sure – but if interests are served and objectives are met, then surely worthwhile? It is reasonable to argue that both the degree of actor-ness and the strategic culture is actually well attuned to the threats – or lack thereof – facing the Union. A strategic culture is a process, never a finished product. Readers are wise to keep in mind Winston Churchill's words at the first attempt at constructing a common European defence in 1948: "We're not making a machine, we're growing a living plant, and we must wait and see until we understand what this plant turns out to be."⁵

From primacy to partnership

The ongoing shift from primacy to partnership has deep sources that have little to do with anti-Americanism or anti-Europeanism or indeed any fundamental difference of threat perceptions. It has everything to do with the end of the Cold War and the erosion of the unity of purpose that the Soviets had provided. The ties that bind are weaker. This, combined with the transformation of sovereignty as well as the shared experiences over Kosovo, Iraq and dual enlargement spelled the end of the post-Cold War era. This does not mean that we are witnessing the end of the transatlantic West with its blend of overlapping but distinct value systems and common and competing interests. The transatlantic partners continue to share the same basic interests and belief systems – easily overlooked to be sure – until confronted with actors that do not share them. The EU will continue to rely on American direction but the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy are now necessary and indispensable elements in European security.

The EU is set to play an increasingly important role in European and global affairs. What this work has shown is that the EU's failure in optimising its international influence is directly linked to its underdefined

affiliation to the United States. In plain terms, this means that the EU needs an *Amerikapolitik*. Arguably more so than a common strategy towards any other actor in the international system. The events examined do not show that the Union has been unable to formulate policies or that the EU strategies have been untenable; only that when Washington had other priorities, the American position tended to prevail. The EU's *modus operandi* of latent rather than willed ambiguity served to lessen its ability to shape outcomes, thus hampering the quest to become a "global actor" as listed in the 2003 European Security Strategy.

Indeed, here lies a degree of convergence in the Atlanticist and Europeanist perspectives – it is obvious that the road to a greater role for Europe in international affairs will require the support of Washington, and it is also likely that the voices calling for the EU to engage with the US collectively as a bloc will grow in intensity, not least because bilateralism has proven a recipe for marginalisation. The price paid by the loyal leaders of Europe with their domestic electorates over the Iraq conflict will make European leaders think twice before again handing the US a *carte blanche*. There can be little question that the CFSP is needed – and that it works best when supported by the US. Although the United States might seem an unlikely champion for European integration, America is the only actor with a proven track record for locking the Europeans into compromises – it has 50 years of practice at this in NATO. American support for European security policies will be as essential as the EU moves towards a new intra-European bargain.

The research has given me the opportunity to browse the shelves of literature written by scholars with similar projects from the past five decades. One cannot help but be struck by the continuity in findings: the acknowledgements of American primacy, frustrations over the weakness of Europe, the questions whether the asymmetric status quo is sustainable, and hopes of a second spring for Europe – either in harness with the US or as an independent force in world politics. In 1974 a Washington insider under the *nom de plume* "Z" lamented:

Whatever may be the final outcome of this autumn's Middle East crisis, accompanied, as it has been by a major political upheaval in the United States, it seems certain that it has brought about a deterioration in relations between America and her European allies not easily remedied.⁶

The words could have been written in 1956, in 1983, in 1991 or in 2004 for that matter. Yet although the most extreme rupture scenarios have proven wrong (as they often do) we must not fall into the trap of assuming unaffected continuity. For the first time in five decades it seems that the transatlantic bargain is being renegotiated in a direction of greater symmetry.

Today, there is no majority in Europe to counterbalance American influence in world affairs. By maintaining the institutions and bilateral ties of transatlantic security, the Europeans hope to sustain the stability that brought predictability on both sides of the Atlantic during the Cold War. It is the gradual American withdrawal that drives the West towards a new bipolarity. If a principal finding from this study is to be held up it would be that the US remains a primary factor in European security policies, and that it is finding a way to share that role with an increasingly confident European Union. At the end of an endeavour such as this it is customary to express optimism that the findings of a study can be used to improve future policies. The author harbours few such illusions. We started this inquest with a remark from Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and it would perhaps be fitting to sign off with a final observation from the same poet:

If men could learn from history, what lessons it might teach us. But passion and party blind our eyes, and the light which experience gives is a lantern on the stern, which shines only on the waves behind us.⁷

Notes

1 Understanding transatlantic relations

- 1 Nagel, J. (1975). *The Descriptive Analysis of Power*. New Haven, Yale University Press: 27–30. See also: Brody, R., Mutz, D. and Sniderman, P. Eds. (1996). *Political Persuasion and Attitude Change*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
- 2 What was referred to as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) from early 1999 was initially known as the *Common* European Security and Defence Policy – CESD. Among the new provisions of the 2004 EU Constitutional Treaty (see: Chapter V, Chapter II, Section 2) is the new short form CSDP, which is used in informal EU documents but not officially.
- 3 Peterson, J. *et al.* (2005). *Review of the Framework for Relations between the European Union and the United States: an Independent Study*, European Commission, DG External Relations: 4.
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 The EU–US Summits came into being as a result of the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration, which provided a new impulse to EU relations with the US. The 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) took cooperation a step further, from simple consultation to joint action. The Summits, held once a year until then, doubled in frequency. See: Pollack, M. A. (2005). “The New Transatlantic Agenda” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 43(5): 900.
- 6 See: Brewer, T. L. (1992). *American Foreign Policy: A Contemporary Introduction*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall: 23–49 and 114–160.
- 7 For an assessment of the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, see: Allen, D. and Smith, M. (1990). “Western Europe’s Presence in the Contemporary International Arena” *Review of International Affairs* 16(1): 19–37; Bretherton, C. and Vogler, J. (1999). *The European Union as a Global Actor*. London, Routledge: 16–79; Eliassen, K. Ed. (1998). *Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union*. London, Sage; Ginsberg, R. H. (1999). “Conceptualising the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical Capability–Expectations Gap” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 37: 429–454; Hill, C. (1993). “The Capability–Expectations Gap, or Conceptualising Europe’s International Role” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31(3): 305–328; Peterson, J. and Sjursen, H. Eds. (1998). *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP*. London, Routledge; Piening, C. (1997). *Global Europe: The EU in World Affairs*. Boulder, Lynne Rienner; and Rummel, R. Ed. (1990). *The Evolution of an International Actor: Western Europe’s New Assertiveness*. Boulder, Westview Press: 31–55.
- 8 Baldwin, D. A. (1997). “The Concept of Security” *Review of International Studies* 23(1): 5–26; Wæver, O. (1995). “Securitization and Desecuritization” in Liep-schutz, R. D. *On Security*. New York, Columbia University Press: 46–86; Tickner,

- J. A. Ed. (1995). *Re-visioning Security*. Cambridge, Polity Press; and Schultz, R. (1993). *Security Studies for the 1990s*. New York, Brassies.
- 9 Kennedy, P. Ed. (1991). *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*. New Haven, Yale University Press: 5.
 - 10 The European Economic Community (EEC) created by the 1957 Treaty of Rome was transformed into the European Community by the 1986 Single European Act. Later, the EC became "Pillar 1" of the three-pillar European Union established by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on the European Union; the other two pillars were the CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs. The ambiguity that would become emblematic of the CFSP was apparent from the outset with the CFSP section to the 1992b TEU not being included in *l'acquis* but at the same time a reference to it was worked into the Preamble [Art II] of the treaty. This is further underlined by the EU, as such, not possessing a legal personality, which means that the third country ambassadors dealing with the EU are formally accredited to the EC.
 - 11 Treaty of Amsterdam Chapter V (Article 5a TEC) states that "if a member of the Council declares that, for important and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the granting of an authorization by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken".
 - 12 Nuttall, S. J. (2000). *European Foreign Policy*. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 187–188.
 - 13 See: Wallace, H., Wallace, W. and Pollack, M. (2005) *Policy-Making in the European Union*, Oxford, Oxford University Press: Chs 1–3.
 - 14 Smith, K. E. (2004). *The Making of EU Foreign Policy*. London, Palgrave: 12.
 - 15 Smith, M. (1996). "The European Union and a changing Europe: Establishing the Boundaries of Order" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 43(1): 8–9; Moravcsik, A. (2003). "Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain" *Foreign Affairs* 82(3): 74–89.
 - 16 It should be noted that the term "troika" under the EPC referred to an arrangement whereby the foreign ministers of the past, present and future presidencies cooperated to ensure procedural and substantive consistency.
 - 17 Nuttall (2000): 272.
 - 18 Take for example the opening line in 2010 Headline Goal which reads: "The European Union is a global actor, ready to share in the responsibility for global security." Decided by the Council on 17 May 2004 and endorsed by the European Council of 17/18 June 2004.
 - 19 Javier Solana speaking at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 24 January 2005.
 - 20 Allen, D. and Smith, M. (1990). "Western Europe's Presence in the Contemporary International Arena" *Review of International Studies* 16(1): 19–37.
 - 21 Wessels, Wolfgang. (2002). "The EU as a Global Actor: Concepts and Realities" in Leech, J. Ed. *Whole and Free: Nato, EU Enlargement and Transatlantic Relations*. London, The Federal Trust: 143.
 - 22 Some helpful works include: Ginsberg, Roy H. (1999). "Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical Capability–Expectations Gap" in European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Biennial Conference, 2–5 June; Allen, D. and Smith, M. (1991). "Western Europe's Presence in the Contemporary International Arena" in Holland, Martin Ed. *The Future of European Political Cooperation*. London, Macmillan: 95–120; Duke, Simon (1994). *The New European Security Disorder*. London, St Martin's Press; Van Ham, P. (1997). "The EU and the WEU: From Co-operation to Common Defence?" in Edwards, G. and Pijpers, A. Eds. *The Politics of European Treaty Reform: The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and Beyond*. London, Pinter; Smith, M. (1994). "The European Union, Foreign Policy and the Changing World Arena" *Journal of European Public Policy* 1(2): 283–302.

- 23 See: Bretherton, C. and Vogler, J. (2006). *The European Union as a Global Actor*. London: Routledge: Ch 12.
- 24 Hill, Christopher and Wallace, William (1996). "Introduction: Actors and Actions" in Hill, Christopher Ed. *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*. London, Routledge: 13.
- 25 Allen, D. and Smith, M. (1991). "Western Europe's Presence in the International System" in Holland, M. Ed. *The Future of European Political Cooperation*. London, Macmillan: 95–120.
- 26 Smith, M. (1994): 287.
- 27 Sjöstedt, G. (1977). *The External Role of the European Community*. Westmead, Saxon House, cited in Hill (1993): 309. More recently Wolfgang Wessels adapts a very similar definition in Wessels (2002): 146–147.
- 28 Peterson, J. and Sjursen, H. Eds. (1998). *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP*. London, Routledge.
- 29 Title V, Article J and J-4 Treaty on the 1992 European Union (TEU). Reprinted in Hill, C. and Smith, K. E. Eds. (2000). *European Foreign Policy: Key Documents*. London, Routledge: 153–155. See: Ekengren, M. and Engelbrekt, K. (2006). "The Impact of Enlargement on EU Actorness: Enhanced Capacity Weakened Cohesiveness" in Hallenberg, M. and Karlsson, J. Eds. *Changing Transatlantic Security Relations*. London, Routledge: 19–20.
- 30 Bull, Hedley (1982). "Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 21(1): 151.
- 31 Nagel (1975): 29.
- 32 Many thanks to Jack Nagel for clarifying this point. As he pointed out in a personal communication on this issue: "Culture comprises a set of attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours. Thus it can be subject to power or influence."
- 33 Russell, B. (1946). *Power. A New Social Analysis*. London, Allen & Unwin: 35.
- 34 Nagel (1975): 29.
- 35 Baldwin, D. A. (1971). "Inter-nation Influence Revisited" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 15(4): 471–486.
- 36 Albright, M. (2003). *Madam Secretary*. New York, Miramax: 406.
- 37 Strange, S. Ed. (1988). *States and Markets*. London, Frances Pinter: 26.
- 38 Nye, J. (2004). *Soft Power*. New York, Public Affairs: 5.
- 39 Jervis, R. (1972). *The Logic of Images in International Relations*. New York, Columbia University Press: 6–9; Nagel (1975): 31.
- 40 Baldwin (1971) was primarily criticising David Singer's influential model for inter-state influence. Singer, J. D. (1963). "Inter-state influence: a formal model" *American Political Science Review* 57(June): 420–430.
- 41 Nagel (1975): 120.
- 42 Ibid.: 36–40. Herbert Simon claims that the asymmetry of the causal relation is unrelated to the asymmetry of any mode of implication that contra-poses. Rather, a causal relation is not a relation between values of variables, but a function of one variable (the cause) upon another (the effect): "If we can define the causal relation, we can define influence, power or authority." Simon, H. (1953). "Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power" *Journal of Politics* 15: 500–516 and Simon, H. and Rescher, N. (1966). "Cause and Counterfactual" *Philosophy of Science* 33: 323–340. Nagel's analysis also draws on lessons from statistical analysis. On the topic of power and causation, see also: March, J. G. (1955). "An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Influence" *American Political Science Review* 49: 431–451; March, J. G. (1966). "Measurement Concepts in the Theory of Influence" *Journal of Politics* 19: 202–226; and Dahl, R. A. (1979). *Modern Political Analysis*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall: 7–19.
- 43 This is a question of cause and effect. First, one needs to assess whether the

- dependent variable remains constant or whether there is a change. Such change will then have to be attributed to a cause. Identifying an independent variable is not the same as showing that it is the cause. The question will be empirically tested in Chapters 3–6 and also has counterfactual implications (Perhaps the ESDP would collapse without US pressure? Or would it be a success without US pressures?) which we will return to in the concluding chapter.
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 - 45 Aron, R. (1967). “What is a Theory of International Relations?” *Journal of International Affairs* 21 (2): 185–206.
 - 46 See: Snyder, J. (1977). “The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Options”, a project Air Force report prepared for the United States, Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation R-2154-AF: 5.
 - 47 Gray, C. S. (1981) “National Styles in Strategy: The American Example” *International Security* 6 (2): 21.
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 - 53 Kincade, W. (1990). “American National Style and Strategic Culture” in Jacobsen, C. G. Ed. (1990). *Strategic Power USA/USSR* London, Macmillan: 16.
 - 54 Gray, C. S. (1999). “Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back” *Review of International Studies* 25 (1): 49–69.
 - 55 Vital, D. (1967) *The Inequality of States. A Study of Small Power in International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 4.
 - 56 Johnston, A. I. (1995I): 37. See also: Johnston, A. I. (1995II). *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, Princeton University Press, NJ: 4–21.
 - 57 Johnston (1995I): 36–39.
 - 58 Klein, B. (1988). “Hegemony and Strategic Culture” *Review of International Studies* 14 (2): 133–148.
 - 59 Johnston (1995II): 37–38.
 - 60 Legro, J. W. (1995). *Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II*. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press.
 - 61 Johnston (1995I): 38.
 - 62 See: Cornish, P. and Edwards, G. (2001). “Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: the Beginning of a European Strategic Culture” *International Affairs* 77 (3): 587–603; Rynning, S. (2003). “The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?” *Security Dialogue* 34 (4): 479–496; van Staden, A., Homan, K., Kreemers, B., Pijpers, A. and de Wijk, R. (2000). *Towards a European Strategic Concept*. The Hague, Clingendael Institute. A selection of key contributors of the fourth generation strategic culture scholars are found in: Toje, A. Ed. (2005a). “The EU Strategic Culture” *Oxford Journal on Good Governance* 2 (1): 3–11.
 - 63 See: Gray, C. S. (1986). *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*. Lanham, Hamilton Press.

- 64 Robert Kagan's (2002) "Power and Weakness" (*Policy Review* 113: 3–28), which was written in explicit reference to differences in US and EU strategic cultures, arguably falls into this trap.
- 65 Snyder, J. (1990). "The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor" in Jacobsen, C. G. Ed. *Strategic Power USA/USSR*. London, Macmillan: 4.
- 66 Booth, K. (1990). "The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed" in Jacobsen, C. G. Ed. *Strategic Power USA/USSR*. London, Macmillan: 123–124.
- 67 See: Hoffmann, A. and Longhurst, K. (1999). "German Strategic Culture in Action" *Contemporary Security Policy* 20(2): 31–32; Longhurst, K. (2000). "The Concept of Strategic Culture" in Kuemmel, G. Ed. *Military Sociology: The Richness of a Discipline*. Baden Baden: Nomos.
- 68 Martinsen, P. M. (2003). "Forging a Strategic Culture – Putting Policy into the ESDP" *Oxford Journal on Good Governance* 1(1): 61–66.
- 69 Kennedy (1991): 5.
- 70 Ackoff, R. (1953). *The Design of Social Research*. Chicago, Chicago University Press: 8.
- 71 Solana, J. (2003). "A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy". The ESS was presented at the European Council meeting on 12 December 2003 in Brussels (15895/03, PESC787). See: Cornish and Edwards (2001): 597.
- 72 For other examples of this approach, see contributions on US and Soviet strategic cultures in: Jacobsen (1990). Cornish and Edwards (2001 and 2005) choose a similar angle but from a more restricted perspective.
- 73 Derived from Richard Tanner Johnson's classical 1974 study *Managing the White House: An Intimate Study of the Presidency*. New York, Harper & Row: 2.

2 The transatlantic bargain

- 1 From Coleridge's translation of *The Death of Wallenstein*, a play by Friedrich Schiller (Act V, Sc. 1).
- 2 Cleveland, H. (1970). *NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain*. New York, Harper & Row: 3–9.
- 3 Holbrooke, R. (1995). "America, a European Power" *Foreign Affairs* (March/April): 38–51.
- 4 See: Sloan, S. R. (2005). *NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged*. New York, Rowman & Littlefield: 3. This book is an updated version of his previous work: Sloan, S. R. (1985). *NATO's Future: Towards a New Transatlantic Bargain*. Washington, DC, National Defense University Press.
- 5 Cleveland (1970): 12.
- 6 Haberler, G. (1949). "The European Union" *World Politics* 1(3): 431–441.
- 7 Keohane, R. O. and Nye, J. S, Jr. (1984). *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. New Jersey, Princeton University Press: 34–35.
- 8 Variations on this bargain are described in Ikenberry, J. G. (2001a). "Getting Hegemony Right" *The National Interest* 63(1); Nye, J. (2002). *The Paradox of American Power*. Oxford, Oxford University Press; and Snyder, J. (2003). "Imperial Temptations" *The National Interest* 71: 29–41.
- 9 Lundestad, G. (1998). *"Empire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration 1945–1997*. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 3.
- 10 Quoted in Sampson, A. (1968). *The New Europeans*. London, Hodder & Stoughton: 194.
- 11 Lundestad, G. (1986) "Empire" by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–52" *Journal of Peace Research* 23: 263–277.
- 12 Sampson (1968): 192. See also: Hearden, P. J. (2006). "Early American Views

- regarding European Unification" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 19(1): 67–77.
- 13 This balance had progressively become more asymmetrical during the 1980s. In 1980, the US spent US\$138 billion as opposed to US\$113 billion spent by the European NATO allies. In 1990, this gap had grown to US\$306 billion versus US\$185 billion by the European NATO allies.
 - 14 Cleveland, H. (1969) "NATO after the Invasion" *Foreign Affairs* 47 (January): 259. A number of other scholars have made the same observation. See: Smith, D. (1989). *Pressure: How the US runs NATO*. London, Bloomsbury: 12; and Walker, J. (1991). "Keeping America in Europe" *Foreign Policy* 83(4): 129.
 - 15 The degree to which the European states influenced American security policies during the Cold War remains a topic of debate. See: Risse, T. (1995). *Cooperation among Democracies – The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy*. New Jersey, Princeton University Press.
 - 16 Fursdon, E. (1980). *The European Defence Community*. London, Macmillan: 9; Bozo, F. (2001). *Two Strategies for Europe: de Gaulle, the United States and the Atlantic Alliance*. Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield: 10–23.
 - 17 Ullman, R. H. (1991). *Securing Europe*. Twickenham, Adamantine Press: 49.
 - 18 Quoted in Fursdon (1980): 51–64; Dûchene, F. (1994) *Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence*. London, Norton: 218–224.
 - 19 Lie, T. (1954). *In the Cause of Peace*. New York, Macmillan: 36–37.
 - 20 Bouolhet, A. (2006) "Londres s'éloigne de Paris sur l'Europe de la Défense" *Le Figaro*, 13 September.
 - 21 Ibid.; Bozo (2001): ix.
 - 22 Sloan (2005): 6.
 - 23 See: Kirchheimer, O. (1951). "The Decline of Intra-state Federalism in Western Europe" *World Politics* 3(3). Most famously advocated in Winston Churchill's "A United States of Europe" speech in Zürich, 19 September 1946.
 - 24 Quoted in Duchêne (1994): 386.
 - 25 Winand, P. (1993). *Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe*. New York, St Martin's Press: 5.
 - 26 George H. W. Bush will be referred to throughout as "George Bush the Elder" in order to distinguish him from his son, George W. Bush (the Younger), who also served as American President. General Eisenhower addressing an audience of diplomats and politicians in 1951, London. See: Thompson, A. (1971). *The Day before Yesterday*. London, Granada Publishing: 98; "President George Bush the Elder remarks to the Citizens of Mainz. Rheingoldhalle, 31 May, 1989" *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H. Bush 1989* – Vol. I. Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1990: 645.
 - 27 Memorandum prepared by the Policy Planning Staff. FRUS 1947, 21 July 1947, III: 335c. See also: Layne, C. (2003). "America as European Hegemon" *The National Interest* 72 (Summer): 23–42.
 - 28 Hoffmann, S. "No trumps, No luck, No will" in Chace, J. and Ravenal, E. C. (1976). *Atlantis Lost – US-European Relations after the Cold War*. New York, Council on Foreign Relations: 1–2.
 - 29 Report of the NATO Council, "The Future Tasks of the Alliance", Brussels, 13–14 December 1967. Available online.
 - 30 Tucker, R. W. (1980–81). "The Purpose of American Power" *Foreign Affairs* (Winter): 241–274; Weeler, J. (1985). "Coming to Terms with Vietnam" *Foreign Affairs* 63 (Spring): 747–754.
 - 31 Chace and Ravenal (1976). See also: Bertram, C. (1984). "Europe and America in 1983" *Foreign Affairs* 62 (Fall): 622–623.
 - 32 Quoted in Gill, S. (1990). *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: xiv.

- 33 Kissinger, H. (1974). *American Foreign Policy*. New York, Simon & Schuster: 70–73; Joffe, J. (1983). “Europe and America: The Politics of Resentment (cont’d)” *Foreign Affairs* 61 (Spring): 569.
- 34 Quoted in Joffe (1983): 575–576.
- 35 Bertram (1984): 631.
- 36 Burrows, B. and Edwards, G. (1982). *The Defence of Western Europe*. London, Butterworth: 132–133.
- 37 Amendments to the Single European Act (Title III, Article 30.6).
- 38 This is the perspective advocated by Friedman, N. (2000). *The Fifty Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War*. Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press.
- 39 Speech given at Princeton University on 19 November 2003. Available online at: Princeton.edu.
- 40 Quoted in Keohane, R. O., Nye, J. and Hoffmann, S. Eds. (1993). *After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989–1991*. Boston, Harvard University Press: 119.
- 41 For an outline of European security cooperation from 1945 to the present, see: Aybet, G. (2001). *The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation*. London, Palgrave.
- 42 Speech given to the NATO meeting in Rome, 7 November 1991. “Bush Hits the Wrong Note in Rome”, *Chicago Tribune*, 10 November.
- 43 The still classified document is referred to as the *Bartholomew demarche* in Vanhoonacker, S. (2001). *The Bush Administration (1989–1993) and the Development of a European Security Identity*. Aldershot, Ashgate: 117, 132 and 212; and Cornish, P. (1996). “European Security: The End of Architecture and the New NATO” *International Affairs* 72(4): 755.
- 44 According to the 1995 US National Security Strategy these were expected to be in the realm of crisis management.
- 45 Quoted in Holbrooke, R. (1998). *To End a War: From Sarajevo to Dayton and Beyond*. New York, Random House: Introduction.
- 46 Gordon, R. H. (1996). “Europe’s Dallying amid Crises Scares its Critics” *International Herald Tribune*, 8 February.
- 47 The President’s first major policy decision after the election was to go along with Republican demands and increase the defence budget as described in the *Congressional Quarterly*, 17 December 1994: 3566–3569.
- 48 One indicator of this shift is found in the National Security Strategies (NSS) under Clinton. While the 1995 NSS makes 24 references to “multilateralism”, the 2002 NSS has 10 such references.
- 49 The New Transatlantic Agenda – EU/US Summit, Madrid, 3 December 1995. The declaration is available on the EU Commission website.
- 50 Defined as “a country that is dominant or predominant in all power categories”. Thanks to Frédéric Bozo for alerting me to the term “hyper puissance” having a more neutral meaning in French.
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- 52 Kissinger, H. (2003). “Repairing the Alliance” *Washington Post*, 14 April.
- 53 Judt, T. (2003). “The way we live it now” *New York Review of Books* (March–April): 4.
- 54 Gordon, P. (1997). “Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy” *International Security* 22(3): 74; Nye (2002): 29.
- 55 Huntington, S. (1989). “The US Decline or Renewal” *Foreign Affairs* 68(4): 93–112; Waltz, K. N. (1993). “The Emerging Structure of International Politics” *International Security* 18 (Fall): 44–79; Kagan, R. (2002). “Power and Weakness” *Policy Review* 113: 3–28.
- 56 Deporte, A. W. (1979). *Europe Between the Superpowers: The Enduring Balance*.

- New Haven, Yale University Press: 5–7. See also: Sandholtz, W. and Zysman, J. (1992). “Recasting the European Bargain” *World Politics* 42(2): 95–128.
- 57 Cooper, R. (2003). *The Breaking of Nations – Order and Chaos in the 21st Century*. New York, Atlantic Monthly Press: 7–10.
- 58 Haas, E. (1958, re-issued 2003). *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950–57*. Stanford, Stanford University Press: 490.
- 59 See: Goetz, K. H. and Hix, S. Eds. (2001). *Europeanised Politics. European Integration and National Political Systems*. London: Frank Cass.
- 60 Kissinger, H. (1957) *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace*. Boston, Houghton Mifflin: 1, 172.
- 61 See: “The Process of Integration among States” in Deutsch, K. W. *et al.* (1957). *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
- 62 Buzan, B. Ed. (1991). *Peoples, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*. Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf Books: 190; and Wæver, O. *et al.* (1993). *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*. London, Pinter: 9.
- 63 Sometimes translated as “United in Diversity”. The motto first came into use in 2000 and was, for the first time, officially mentioned in “The symbols of the Union” in the Treaty on establishing a Constitution for Europe: *Official Journal of the European Union*, Part I, Title I, Article I-8: 47.
- 64 Dûchene, F. (1973) “Die Rolle Europas im Weltsystem: von regionalen zur planetarischen interdependenz” in Kohnstamm, M. and Hager, W. *Zivilmacht Europe: Supermacht oder Partner*. Frankfurt, Suhrkamp: 19–26.
- 65 Smith, K. E. (2004). *The Making of EU Foreign Policy*. London, Palgrave: 10–11.
- 66 “Preamble”, *Treaty establishing the European Economic Community*, Rome, 25 March 1957, available on the EU Commission website.
- 67 Milward, A. (1992). *The European Rescue of the Nation State*. London, Routledge: 3.
- 68 Howorth, J. (2000c). “Britain, NATO and CESDP: Fixed Strategy, Changing Tactics” *European Foreign Affairs Review* 5(3): 379.
- 69 For a good presentation of the Atlanticist and Europeanist positions see the 1956 study *Britain in Western Europe: WEU and the Atlantic Alliance*, a Report by a Chatham House Study Group: 1–4.
- 70 Treaty on European Union (TEU) Title V, Article J and J-4.
- 71 TEU Title I, Common Provisions, Article A.
- 72 Ibid.
- 73 TEU Article III-294
- 74 TEU Article I-16.
- 75 Smith (2004): 3.
- 76 Petersberg Declaration (1992).
- 77 Peterson, J. (1996). “Security Cooperation with the United States: establishing a true Transatlantic Partnership” in Algieri, F., Janning, J. and Rumberg, D. Eds. (1996). *Managing Security in Europe*. Berlin, Bertelsmann: 121.
- 78 Hill, C. (1993). “The Capability–Expectations Gap, or Conceptualising Europe’s International Role” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31(3): 315, 326.
- 79 European Commission (1995b) “High-level Group of Experts on the CFSP”, *The Foreign and Security Policy of Europe for the Year 2000: Ways and Means to Establish Real Credibility* (Durieux Report), Brussels, Commission’s Spokesman’s Service, 28 November.
- 80 Gordon (1997): 76.
- 81 Pineau, C. (1976) *Suez 1956*. Paris, Robert Laffont: 191, my translation.
- 82 France also stepped up its efforts in developing an independent nuclear deterrent. In December 1956, a secret Committee for the Military Applications of

- Atomic Energy was convened. Four years later, in 1960, France was a nuclear power.
- 83 Record of the 508th meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, 22 January 1963, *Foreign Relations, 1961–1963*, Vol. VII, footnote 4: 459.
 - 84 Summary Record of the NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 39, Washington, Jan. 31, 1963, *Foreign Relations, 1961–1963*, Vol. VII: 161.
 - 85 De Gaulle, C. (1987), *Lettres, notes et carnets*. Paris, Plon (1964–66): 267, 10 March 1966 my translation.
 - 86 Informal European Summit Portschäch, 24–25 October 1998. Notes from Press Conference.
 - 87 Six months later, the Saint Malo agreement was made into EU policy for reasons closely tied to events we will examine in Chapter 3. See: Roper, J. (2000). “Two Cheers for Mr Blair? The Political Realities of European Defence Cooperation” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 38(4): 7–10.
 - 88 This is not to suggest that this was the first time that the two countries acted in concert strategically. The two countries together refused to give the US permission to use NATO facilities in support of Israel in the 1973 Arab–Israeli War as they had done in 1979/80 when American desire to counter the Soviet–Afghan invasion was vetoed on account of it being beyond NATO’s scope of responsibility.
 - 89 Joint Declaration on European Defence, British French Summit, Saint Malo, 3–4 December 1998.
 - 90 Tony Blair at a Press Conference after a meeting between Mr Blair and President Bush at Camp David, 23 February 2001.
 - 91 As opposed to the “capacity for autonomous action” agreed upon at Saint Malo. See: *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, 23 June 1999.
 - 92 “NATO, Europe, our Future Security”, Fiftieth Anniversary conference, 10 March 1999.
 - 93 Declaration of the European Council on strengthening the common European policy on security and defence, Brussels, 3 June 1999, Press release no. 122/99.
 - 94 Heisbourg, F. (2000). “Europe’s Strategic Ambitions: The Limits of Ambiguity” *Survival* 42(2): 6.
 - 95 WEU, Cologne and EU Helsinki Summits, 1999: Ch. 2.
 - 96 WEU Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, 19 June 1992, Para. II-4.
 - 97 Deighton, A. (2000b). “The Military Security Pool: Towards a New Security Regime for Europe?” *International Spectator* 35(4) (October–December): 25. Also see: Chapter 1.
 - 98 Comments given in a Q&A session at a talk by Javier Solana, October 2005, Pembroke College, Cambridge.

3 The Kosovo war

- 1 Quoted in Mounier, E. (1956). *The Character of Man*, London, Harper and Brothers: 156.
- 2 The spelling of Kosovo/Kosova alternates in different contexts. For example, the EU Council uses the former while the Albanian delegation refers to Kosova. For consistency, “Kosovo” is used throughout this chapter. The country that today we call Serbia, at the time of the conflict was known as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Since Montenegro opted out of the conflict at an early stage, FRY is used interchangeably with the common name of the country – Serbia.
- 3 For a more scholarly presentation of the history of the region, see: Malcolm, N. (1998). *Kosovo: A Short History*. London, Macmillan. Also see: Djilas, A. (1998). “Imagining Kosovo” *Foreign Affairs* 77(5): 124–131; and Judah, T.

- (1997). *The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. New Haven, Yale University Press.
- 4 See General Wesley Clark's account of the conflict, Clark, W. (2001). *Waging Modern War*. New York, Public Affairs; Petrisch, W. (2000). "Bosnien und Herzegowina 5 Jahre nach Dayton" *Europäische Rundschau* 28(3): 3–12; Clinton, W. J. (2004). *My Life*. New York, Knopf; Albright, M. (2003). *Madam Secretary*. New York, Miramax.
 - 5 Weller, M. Ed. (1999). *The Crisis in Kosovo 1989–1999*. Cambridge, Documents and Analysis Publishing, Centre of International Studies; Krieger, H. Ed. (2001). *The Kosovo Conflict and International Law. An Analytical Documentation 1974–1999*. Cambridge International Documents Series, Vol. II; Allin, M. E. D. and Marius, W. Eds. (2004). *Readings in European Security*. Brussels, CEPS Paperback Books, Vol. 2; Rutten, M. Ed. (2001). "European Defence: Core Documents: From Saint Malo to Nice", *Chaillot Paper* 47, Paris. The Western European Union Institute for Security Studies was also helpful.
 - 6 Allan Little's documentary, *Moral Combat: NATO at War* was first shown on Sunday, 12 March 2000 on BBC2. Dan Reed's documentary, *The Valley: Killing fields of Kosovo* from 1998 was an independent production.
 - 7 Notable dissemination reports include: Lambeth, B. J. (2001). "NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment", Washington, RAND and Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000). *The Kosovo Report*. Oxford, Oxford University Press. See also: British Ministry of Defence (2000). *Kosovo: Lessons from the Crisis*. London, Ministry of Defence, HMSO (Cm 4724), June, 70 pages; United States Houses of Congress (2000). *KOSOVO/Operation Allied Force. After Action Report to Congress*. Washington, DC, Department of Defense, 31 January, 162 pages; Français Ministère de la Defense (1999). *Les premiers enseignements de l'opération "force alliée" en Yougoslavie*. Paris, Ministère de la Defense, Rapports d'information, Commission des Affaires étrangères, November, 1999, 464: 98–99.
 - 8 Notably Simon Duke's excellent paper from 1999, "From Amsterdam to Kosovo: Lessons for the Future of the CFSP" *Eipascopes* 2:1–14. Existing literature tends to trace events rather than actors. Daalder, I. and O'Hanlon, M. (2000). *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo*. Washington, DC, Brookings. This is a definitive account of the events from a Washington insider's perspective. Daalder previously served as Director of European Affairs at the National Security Council (1995–96) with responsibility for coordinating US policy on Bosnia. See also: Kaplan, L. S. (1998). "International Diplomacy and the crisis in Kosovo" *International Affairs* 74(4): 745–753. Also noteworthy is Martin, P. and Brawley, M. R. Eds. (2000). *Alliance Politics, Kosovo and NATO's War: Allied Force or Forced Allies?* New York, Palgrave. Also see: Medvedev, S. (2002). "Kosovo between Ethnic Cleansing and Allied Bombing" in Van Ham, Peter and Medvedev, S. Eds. (2002). *Mapping European Security after Kosovo*. Manchester, Manchester University Press.
 - 9 The remaining section of the population was made up primarily of Turk, Roma and Gorani minorities.
 - 10 The 1974 Yugoslav constitution granted Kosovo the status of an Autonomous Province, which elevated the region to a status nearly equivalent to that of the Republics. Kosovo was one of two such autonomous areas, with its own national bank, courts and constitution, the other being Vojvodina. The increasing Serb resentment of the authority enjoyed by the minority enclaves in Serbia, including Vojvodina and Kosovo under Tito, urged the Serbs to demand the abrogation of their autonomy. This demand was fulfilled by President Milosevic's nationalist government in 1989.

- 11 This is discussed in greater detail in Weller (1999): 29.
- 12 The autonomy movement was led by Ibrahim Rugova, an academic and the leader of the biggest Kosovar political party, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK).
- 13 Reed (1998).
- 14 The EU General Affairs Council Meeting in Brussels (30–31 March 1998) condemned both parties in a Common Position on the restrictive measures against the FRY. On a visit to Pristina in 1998 (February), US Special Envoy Robert Gelbard stated that the KLA was “without any question, a terrorist group”; quoted in *New York Times*, 13 March 1998.
- 15 Luxembourg Foreign Minister and holder of the EC rotating Presidency, Jacques Poos, on a trip to Slovenia in May 1991, quoted in *Los Angeles Times*, 29 June 1991.
- 16 The Treaty was ratified on 1 May 1999, at the height of the conflict.
- 17 Presidency statement on 9 April 1996 cited in *Bulletin of the European Union* 4/96: 58.
- 18 Dutch Ambassador explaining EU policy in Pristina, 11 June 1997. See: Clément, S. (1997). “Conflict Prevention in the Balkans: Case Studies of Kosovo and the FRY of Macedonia”, *Chaillot Paper No. 30*, Paris, WEU, ISS: 43.
- 19 Most clearly stated in the “Doctrine of the International community” speech at the Economic Club, Chicago, 24 April 1999.
- 20 A senior NATO official interviewed noted this reluctance on the part of the EU to “own the conflict”.
- 21 See: Common Positions (26 February 1996, 19 March 1998, 7 May 1998 and 29 June 1998) and the Conclusions of the EU Council of Ministers (31 March 1998 and 27 April 1998) reproduced in Weller (1999): 222–229.
- 22 In reference to Article J.4.2. of the Treaty on European Union. The WEU also played a role in the early stage of the conflict in terms of convoy duty and sanction enforcement mission, Sharp Guard. The mission was a bit of a farce in which “double hatting” meant the forces were sometimes WEU and sometimes NATO. The WEU played a minor role in the conflict because none of the key players championed the organisation as part of the solution.
- 23 The EU had observer status with representatives from both the Commission and the Office of the High Representative. The Contact Group (without EU participation) played a central role in the resolution of the Bosnian crisis when the existence of the group was still secret. Schwegmann, C. (2001). “Modern Concert Diplomacy: The Contact Group and the G7/G8 in Crisis Management” in Kirton, J., Daniels, J. and Freytag, A. Eds. *Guiding Global Order*. London, Aldershot: 93–122.
- 24 The negotiations at Dayton and the European distaste for what amounted to a unilaterally imposed settlement are captured by Pauline Neville-Jones who participated in the conference. See: Neville-Jones, P. (1996). “Dayton, IFOR and Alliance relations in Bosnia” *Survival* 38(7): 45–65.
- 25 Duke (1999): 4.
- 26 Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000): 73.
- 27 Summarised in the EU Declaration on Kosovo, 27 October 1998, CFSP (98/128/CFSP).
- 28 UN Security Council Resolution 1022 (22 November 1995) suspended most of the sanctions against the FRY in recognition of its efforts to achieve peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Resolution 1074 (1 October 1996) terminated most of the sanctions altogether.
- 29 European Council (1996). “Common Position concerning Arms Exports to the FR of Yugoslavia”, General Affairs Council, 96/184/CFSP, Official journal NO. L 058, 07/03/1996 P. 1–2, Brussels, 26 February.

- 30 Rudolf, P. (2000). "Germany and the Kosovo Conflict" in Martin and Brawley (2000): 132.
- 31 European Council (1998). "Common Position on Restrictive Measures against the FR of Yugoslavia" 98/240/CFSP, Official journal NO. L 095, 27/03/1998 P. 1–3, Brussels, 19 March.
- 32 "Common Position", 26 February 1996, Doc 9.A.3. Reconfirmed on 19 March 1998 in reference to the earlier position 96/184/CFSP. The restrictions were tightened in the Common Position on the restrictive measures against the FRY, 1999.
- 33 "Common Position", 7 May 1998, Doc 9.A.7; 8 June 1998, Doc 9.A.8. The freezing of Serb assets abroad was announced in advance. This allowed the Serb leadership to extract large portions of the funds before the sanctions came into force.
- 34 "Common Position", General Affairs Council, 19 March 1998, Doc 9.A.5.
- 35 Presidency Conclusions, Cardiff European Council, 15 and 16 June 1998, SN 150/1/98.
- 36 "Common Position", General Affairs Council, 29 June 1998, Doc 9.A.10.
- 37 See: Everts, S. (2002). *Shaping a Credible EU Foreign Policy*. London, Centre for European Reform: 43.
- 38 Council regulation No. 926/98 (EC) on the decrease in economic relations with the FRY (27 April 1998). The sanctions were not enforced despite the limited economic interests of the EU countries in the FRY, making the economic and political price of non-compliance low.
- 39 These transactions are described in the *Financial Times*, 23 March 1997 and 27 January 1998.
- 40 The ban was finally enforced from 7 September 1998. The British were concerned that the existing bilateral agreement technically required one year's notice for withdrawal.
- 41 Senior State Department Official holds a background briefing on the US policy on Kosovo and Bosnia; see: US policy on Kosovo and Bosnia, Transcript, US State Department, 27 April 1998, online resources.
- 42 See: Chairman's Summary of the deliberations on Kosovo at the informal meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the European Union, Brussels, 14 April 1999, which summarised the demands of the international community.
- 43 As the Cardiff Summit put it: "The European Union remains firmly opposed to independence." "Common Position", General Affairs Council, 29 June 1998, Doc 9, A10.
- 44 Weller (1999): 220.
- 45 Duke (1999): 4.
- 46 On the history of the American threats to use force against the FRY, see: Kaplan (1998): 745–749.
- 47 Berdal, M. (2003). "The Security Council and the War in Bosnia" in Malone, D. M. Ed. *The UN Security Council from the Cold War to the 21st Century*. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner: 457.
- 48 Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000): 30–31.
- 49 Weller (1999): 221.
- 50 Ibid.
- 51 See: European Council, Declaration on Kosovo, Presidency Conclusions, Annex-II, 15 and 16 June 1998 and UN Security Council Resolution 1199, 23 October 1998.
- 52 Contact Group, Chairman's Conclusions, 2 October, 1998.
- 53 Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000): 45. When British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook appeared before the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee in

- April 1999, he was pressed on the issue of legal grounds for NATO's action in Kosovo. He replied: "The legal basis for our action is that the international community [...] do have the right to use force in the case of overwhelming humanitarian necessity."
- 54 Figures cited in *Le Monde*, 31 March 1999.
- 55 Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000): 26.
- 56 The view that French and German reservations undercut the negotiating leverage is a point associated with Richard Holbrooke, who is believed to have encouraged Clinton to increase pressure on Germany to fall into line. See: Rudolf (2000): 133–134.
- 57 On 10 October 1998, the NATO Secretary General had already presented the outcome of the meeting of the NATO Council the day before, in which Germany had also participated. On 12 October, Foreign Minister Kinkel then explained a possible military intervention by NATO. The German Bundestag finally discussed the issue on 16 October and justified air strikes against the FR Yugoslavia in which the Bundeswehr participated. There was little resistance to Germany's participation. Only the PDS – the former communist party – tried to call on the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court), but it was not successful.
- 58 Quoted in Martin and Brawley (2000): 55.
- 59 Maull, H. W. (2000). "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?" *Survival* 42(2): 58.
- 60 Statement by NATO Secretary General following ACTWARN Decision, Vilamoura, 24 September 1998, and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199, 23 September 1998.
- 61 Richard Holbrooke and William Walker, Transcript of Press Conference, 28 October 1998.
- 62 Gellman, B. (1999). "The Path to Crisis: How the United States and its Allies Went to War" *Washington Post*, 18 April: A.31.
- 63 Citing the report of the EU forensic expert team on the Racak incident, 17 March 1999. See: Clark (2001): 159–161.
- 64 Little (2000).
- 65 Weller, M. (1999). "The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo" *International Affairs* 75(2): 221.
- 66 General Affairs Council, Luxembourg, 21–22 February 1999 and General Affairs Council, Brussels, 25 January 1999.
- 67 Gellman (1999).
- 68 Clark (2001): 45.
- 69 As Marc Weller pointed out in a conversation, the Rambouillet negotiations were not a "conference" *sensu stricto*, but rather a meeting and a diplomatic nuance owing to French eagerness not to host a failed conference.
- 70 This was in contrast to the 1995 Dayton conference that ended the war in Bosnia, where Milosevic negotiated in person. Deighton in Martin and Brawley (2000): 59.
- 71 Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000): 84–85.
- 72 Q&A session: Madeleine Albright, Salzmänn Institute for War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, 28 October 2005.
- 73 Beaumont, P. and Wintour, P. (1999). "How the War was Won. Kosovo: the Untold Story" *The Observer*, 18 July: 13.
- 74 German Foreign Minister Fischer apparently had to raise this issue three times before the EU was handed this seat instead of the French or British Foreign Ministers. Mr Fischer also arranged an informal lunch for the EU members in order to agree upon common approaches. For more on this process see: Petrisch, W. (2004). *Kosovo/kosova: der lange Weg zum Frieden*. Klagenfurt, Wieser.

- 75 Many thanks to Marc Weller for alerting me to this point.
- 76 Schwegmann (2001): 94.
- 77 Contact Group (1999). Press briefing by the Contact Group Negotiators, Rambouillet, online resource.
- 78 Weller (1999): 235.
- 79 Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000): 30 and 56.
- 80 Madeleine Albright's personal secretary James Rubin, April 2000. See: Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000): 131 (where Rubin is referred to as "a close aide to Secretary Albright").
- 81 See: Drozdak, W. (1999). "War Showed U.S.-Allied Inequality" *Washington Post*, 28 June: 1.
- 82 Presidency Conclusions, Berlin European Council, 24–25 March 1999, Doc. 6886/99.
- 83 See: CFSP Presidency Statement 8378/99, 12 May 1999 and the statement from the General Affairs Council on Kosovo, 23 March 1999 and CFSP Presidency Statement 8278/99, 12 May 1999.
- 84 Statement by the EU Presidency following special session of the General Affairs Council in Luxembourg, 8 April 1999.
- 85 Clinton (2004): 851. President Clinton lists the "objectives" that were meant to halt ethnic cleansing, deter the Serb offensive in Kosovo and signal that if they "did not throw in the towel soon" the US would "seriously damage" their military capacity.
- 86 Approximately 23,000 bombs were delivered. There was no loss of service members to hostile action. During the air campaign, an estimated 5–10,000 Albanians died and 800,000 were forcefully expelled. There were 1–2,000 Serb casualties and damage to substantial amounts of equipment and infrastructure.
- 87 The operation was similar to the 1995 operation carried out by Croatia, dislocating an estimated 150,000 Serbs from the majority in the Krajina area and whom Serb authorities may have intended to resettle in Kosovo.
- 88 Clark (2001): 55.
- 89 Approximately 120 NATO tank-kills were claimed under operations, though only 14 actual tank carcasses were found after the war. See: Lambeth (2001): 9.
- 90 See: Ripley, T. (1999). "Kosovo: A Bomb Damage Assessment" *Jane's Intelligence Review* 11(9): 10–13.
- 91 Quoted in Macleod, A. (2000). "France: Kosovo and the Emergence of a New European Security" in Martin and Brawley (2000): 122.
- 92 General Wesley Clark interviewed in *Le Monde*, 21 June 2000. Another sensitive installation was the television tower in Belgrade. France was generally opposed to what was seen as unnecessary destruction, not least since they expected that the post-crisis management and the costs of reconstruction would be handed to the EU.
- 93 General Clark later stated in *Le Monde* that his relations with France during the conflict were "excellent". It should be noted that at an operational level, France suffered from its inexperience in NATO military operations and there were many disputes originating in differences in military doctrine.
- 94 Transcript, *Newshour*, Channel 13, 23 March 1999.
- 95 According to Lambeth, much of the ineffectiveness of the air campaign was a direct result of this decision of "trying to engage an enemy who had no need to shoot, move, or expose his position, thanks to the absence of a credible NATO ground threat". See: Lambeth (2001): 126.
- 96 British Ministry of Defence, HMSO (2000): 17.
- 97 The Chancellor was quoted as saying, "I will not participate in this specifically British debate on war theory." *Daily Telegraph*, 20 May 1999.

- 98 *Congressional Records* (1999), Vol. 145: 31111–31112.
- 99 “Deutsche initiative für den Kosovo”, German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 April 1999. The five conditions Belgrade had to accept were to end violence and repression, pull armed forces out of Kosovo, agree to an international military presence in Kosovo, accept a return of refugees and, finally, be willing to negotiate a final settlement based on the Rambouillet accords.
- 100 Jamie Shea, NATO Spokesperson, Press Briefing, NATO HQ, 31 March 1999.
- 101 Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000): 225.
- 102 Deighton in Martin and Brawley (2000): 61.
- 103 Examination of Robin Cook, *House of Lords Reports*, 13 July 1999, Question 275e.
- 104 Beaumont and Wintour (1999): 13.
- 105 Gegout, C. (2002). “The Quint: Acknowledging the Existence of a Big-Four – US Directorate at the Heart of the European Union’s Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40(2): 341. See also: Keukeleire, S. (2001). “Directorates in the CFSP/CESDP of the European Union: A Plea for ‘Restricted Crisis Management Groups’” *European Foreign Affairs Review* 6(1): 75–101.
- 106 Deighton in Martin and Brawley (2000): 69.
- 107 NATO sources claim that the idea came from US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. German sources attribute the idea to Joschka Fischer. The idea was for a go-between with strong UN and European credentials which was thought to be more acceptable to Belgrade. With its additional close ties to Russia, Finland, a non-NATO EU member, was an obvious choice.
- 108 Posen, B. (2000). “The War for Kosovo: Serbia’s Political-Military Strategy” *International Security* 24(4): 66–72.
- 109 European Council (1999). “Declaration of the European Union on Kosovo”, PESC/99/53, Brussels, 31 May, available on the European Council website.
- 110 In the years that followed, the mission was gradually taken over by the EU. After the Kosovo war, the EU initiated the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, a multilayered programme aimed at creating stable conditions in the region. This was the largest programme ever undertaken outside EU territory at the time.
- 111 See: Johnson, R. T. (1974). *Managing the White House: An Intimate Study of the Presidency*. New York, Harper & Row: 2.
- 112 Everts, S. (2001) “A Question of Norms: Transatlantic Divergences in Foreign Policy” *International Spectator* 36(2): 39–51, 115.
- 113 Such “models” can take the form of official doctrine such as the Monroe Doctrine, or be tacit as in the Domino Theory, or the perception that “Dictators only understand one language: force.” On the importance of such cognitive categories in strategy, see: Snyder, J. (1991). *Myths of Empire*. Ithaca, Cornell University Press: 3–9.
- 114 Patten, C. (2005). *Not Quite the Diplomat: Home Truths about World Affairs*. London, Allen Lane: 56.
- 115 Strobe Talbott, US Deputy Secretary of State (1999). “Address to the Royal Institute of International Affairs”, London, 7 October.
- 116 Rice, C. (2000) “Promoting the National Interest” *Foreign Affairs* 79(1): 53; and Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000): 183–187.
- 117 Cottrell, Robert (1999). “A Work in Progress: A Survey of Europe” *The Economist*, 23 October: 62.
- 118 Gnesotto, N. Ed. (2004). *European Security and Defence Policy – The First Five Years 1998–2004*. Paris, EU-ISS: 41–42.

- 119 Blair, T. (1999). "Address to the North Atlantic Assembly". Speech given to the NATO-PA conference, Edinburgh, 13 November 1998.

4 EU and NATO enlargements

- 1 "Central and Eastern Europe" here refers to the following eight countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia. At the time in question, the United States, Canada, Norway, Iceland and Turkey (plus Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic from 1999 to 2004) were non-EU/NATO members. It should be noted that the two Nordic countries were closely tied to the integration project through the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA). Ireland, Austria, Sweden and Finland were non-NATO/EU members.
- 2 Edwards, G. (2000). "Europe's Security and Defence Policy and Enlargement: The Ghost at the Feast?" *RSC* 69: 1. Florence, European University Institute.
- 3 Smith, K. E. (2004). *The Making of EU Foreign Policy*. London, Palgrave; Asmus, R. D. (2002). *Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era*. New York, Columbia University Press.
- 4 *Inter alia* Clinton, W. J. (2004). *My Life*. New York, Knopf; and Patten, C. (2005). *Not Quite the Diplomat: Home Truths about World Affairs*. London, Allen Lane. A number of works in this category are written by academics who enjoyed unparalleled access to the decision-making process while operating. See: Wallace, H. (1997). "Pan-European Integration: Real or Imagined Community?" *Government and Opposition* 32(2): 215–233; and Grabbe, H. and Hughes, K. (1998). *Enlarging the EU Eastwards*. London, RIIA.
- 5 Allin, D. M., Emerson, M. and Vahl, M. Eds. (2004). *Readings in European Security*. Brussels, CEPS Paperback Books, Vol. 2; and Rutten, M. Ed. (2001). "European Defence: Core Documents", *Chaillot Papers*, Western European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, Vols I–V: 47, 51, 57, 67 and 75.
- 6 On EU enlargement, see: Smith, K. E. (2004) and Howorth, J. (2000a). "European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge?", *Chaillot Paper*, No. 43, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris: 89–90. For an assessment of NATO enlargement, see: Gardner, A. (1997). *A New Era in US–EU relations? The Clinton Administration and the New Transatlantic Agenda*. London, Aldershot. This is an authoritative account of this question from an American perspective. Also see: Sloan, S. R. (2000). "The United States and European Defence" *Chaillot Paper* No. 39, Brussels, EU-ISS; Sloan, S. R. (1995). "US Perspectives on NATO's Future" *International Affairs* 71(2): 217–231; and Cornish, P. (1997). *Partnership in Crisis: The US, Europe and the Fall and Rise of NATO*. London, Cassell.
- 7 Rühle, M. and Williams, N. (1995). "NATO Enlargement and the European Union" *World Today* 51(5): 84–88; Smith, M. and Timmins, G. (2000a). "The EU, NATO and the Extension of the Institutional Framework in Europe" *World Affairs* 163 (Fall): 80–89; Wiarda, H. J. (2002). "The Politics of European Enlargement: NATO, the EU, and the New US–European Relationship" *World Affairs* 164(2): 178–197. Also see: Edwards (2000); Hill, C. (2002). "The Geopolitical Implications of Enlargement" in Zielonka, J. Ed. *Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union*. London, Stoughton; and Pollack, M. (2005). "The New Transatlantic Agenda" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 43(5): 899–919.
- 8 See Schimmelfennig, F. (2003). *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Smith, M. and Timmins, G. (2000b). *Building a Bigger Europe–EU and NATO Enlargement in a Cooperative Perspective*. Aldershot, Ashgate; and Dannreuter, R. (1997). *Eastward Enlargement: NATO*

- and the EU. Oslo, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. Also see: Wallace, W. (2000). "From the Atlantic to the Bug, from the Arctic to the Tigris" *International Affairs* 76(3): 475–493; and Howorth, J. and Keeler, J. Eds. (2003). *Defending Europe: The EU, NATO, and the Quest for European Autonomy*. London, Palgrave.
- 9 Cornish, P. and Edwards, G. (2005). "The Strategic Culture of the European Union: A Progress Report" *International Affairs* 81(4): 814–815.
 - 10 The emphasis on security and stability permeates all the key EU and US statements on Enlargement. See for example: "EC–US Statement on Peaceful and Democratic Transformation in the East", EPC Press Release, P.111/91, 9 November 1991. Frank Schimmelfennig (2003) makes a strong argument that the applicants played an important role in defining this security discourse, although his analysis runs the danger of overstating the importance of rhetoric over material and strategic interests. This work follows Karen Smith in her emphasis on security as the driving factor in enlargement; Smith, K. E. (2004): 1.
 - 11 Note the proactive tone in the Presidency Conclusions, SN 180/93, Copenhagen, 21–22 June 1993; Presidency Conclusions, SN 300/94, Essen, 9–10 December 1994; Presidency Conclusions, SN 211/95, Cannes, 26–27 June 1995.
 - 12 Hill (2002): 97–98.
 - 13 Schimmelfennig (2003): 55.
 - 14 Ibid.: 279–280. Stanley Sloan and Ronald Asmus appear to come out against this notion when they effectively dismiss claims that NATO enlargement was primarily driven by CEE lobbies in US domestic politics. See: Asmus (2002) and Sloan (2000).
 - 15 Among the most important initiatives were the 2004 Declaration on Counter Terrorism, the 2001 Energy Research Cooperation agreement, the 2001 Precursors Chemical Agreement, the 1997 Joint Initiative on the Trafficking of Women, the 1997 Caribbean Drugs Initiative, the 1998 Declaration of Common Non-Proliferation Orientation, the 2000 US–EU Biotechnology Consultative Forum, the 2005 Initiative to Enhance Transatlantic Economic Integration and Growth, and the 2004 Agreement on Enhanced Customs Cooperation.
 - 16 Brinkley, D. (1997). "Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine" *Foreign Policy* (Spring): 112.
 - 17 Article 98 of the 1951 Treaty of Paris simply states that "Any European state may accede to this treaty. It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after obtaining the opinion of the High Authority; the Council shall also determine the terms of accession." Tony Judt calls "the Europe for all Europeans" the "foundation myth" of the EU; Judt, T. (1996) *A Grand Illusion?: An Essay on Europe*, New York, Hill and Wang: 42.
 - 18 "European Union Programme for the prevention of violent conflicts." European Council (2001a). Presidency Conclusions, Göteborg, 15–16 June. The invitation for all European states to join the EU is reflected in the current Acquis Communautaire, Article 0 and 49 of the Treaty on the European Union.
 - 19 It should be noted, however, that the concept was an adaptation of a discarded US foreign policy doctrine. During his first term in office President Clinton had been criticised for his weak and ad hoc foreign policy leadership. The term "democratic enlargement" was intended to serve as the "big idea" of Clinton's foreign policy, but it failed to capture the imagination of the public. Brinkley (1997): 112.
 - 20 Somewhat befittingly, the EU doctrine was arguably best captured by an American. See President Clinton's address to the United Nations General

- Assembly on 27 September 1993. Official Records Supplement No. 47, United Nations A/50/47. Also see: Smith, K. E. (2004). "Was the Policy Strategic or Incremental?" in Smith, K. E. (2004): 174–175.
- 21 As expressed in the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria for joining the European Union. European Council (1993). Presidency Conclusions, SN 180/93, Copenhagen, 21–22 June: 10–15.
 - 22 The TEU went some way towards establishing an institutional framework for EU–NATO interaction, but cooperation over enlargement was persistently carried out on an ad hoc basis.
 - 23 Peterson, J. (1993). *Europe and America in the 1990s*. London, Aldershot: 150.
 - 24 Grabbe, H. (2004). "Big Bang that Began with a Whimper." *E!Sharp* (May): 13.
 - 25 Cornish (1997): 4. Glenn Snyder is less charitable: "Alliances have no meaning apart from the adversary threat to which they are a response." *Alliance Politics* (1997) Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 192.
 - 26 Asmus, R. D. and Nurick, R. C. (1996). *NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States*. Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation: 142. See also: Asmus, R., Kugler, R. and Larrabee, S. (1993). "Building a new NATO" *Foreign Affairs* 72(4): 28–40.
 - 27 Press Communiqué, NAC-2(95)116. Brussels, NATO, 1994. Also see: NATO's Strategic Concept, Press Release NAC-S (99) 65, 24 April 1999.
 - 28 Brzezinski, Z. (2001). "Enlargement and the way ahead", *Financial Times*, 11 June.
 - 29 Deputy Secretary Talbott's address to the German Society for Foreign Policy, Bonn, Germany, 4 February 1999.
 - 30 The EU was, for the first time, recognised as a security organisation in the Strategic Concept (NAC-S (99)65 – 24 April 1999) adopted at NATO's 1999 Washington Summit amidst the Kosovo war, in which the EU is mentioned four times.
 - 31 Article 10 of the 1949 Washington Treaty makes clear that NATO invites new members that are able and willing and "in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area". NATO had previously enlarged four times, extending membership to Greece and Turkey in 1952, followed by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982.
 - 32 For example, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl argued in June 1994 that "Europe needs America to play a central role in questions of European security" in his speech "Für uns Deutsche ist Europa ein Schicksalsfrage" given at Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 19 June, Bonn.
 - 33 Quoted in Bussière, R. (1995). "A Europe of Security and Defence" *NATO Review* 43(5).
 - 34 London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance. Brussels, NATO Information Service, 5–6 July 1990. George F. Kennan voiced the view that enlargement might weaken NATO and thereby could loosen transatlantic ties. He called NATO enlargement a "strategic blunder of potentially epic proportions". For more on this debate see: Talbott, S. (1995). "Why NATO should Grow" *New York Review of Books* 42, 10 February: 27–30.
 - 35 One of the first signs that NATO had no plans of dissolving came in May 1991 when NATO set up a NATO Rapid Reaction Corps under British command to address Article 5 (non-defence) missions.
 - 36 The former Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). NACC gained relevance as it became clear that central authority in Moscow was ebbing and that relations with the individual former Soviet republics were necessary.
 - 37 Radio Free Europe (RFE/RL) (1994). *Report on Eastern Europe* 2(9): 31.
 - 38 European Council sources: "The European community's relations with Comecon and its East European members", External Relations Information,

- January 1989; "Action Plan for Coordinated Aid to Poland and Hungary", COM (89) 470 final, 27 September 1989; and "Communication from the Commission to the Council – implications of recent changes in central and eastern Europe for the Community's relations with the countries concerned", SEC (90) 111, 23 January 1990.
- 39 Shorthand for Pologne et Hongrie à la Assistance Reconstruction Economique. European Commission sources: "PHARE: A performance review 1990–1993", March 1994 and "PHARE general guidelines 1994–1997", 1 June 1994; "The Europe Agreements and beyond: a strategy to prepare the countries of Central and Eastern Europe for accession", COM (94) 320 final, 13 July 1994.
 - 40 In 1994, President Clinton warned the CEE states against pressing for immediate NATO membership and took care to stress that NATO enlargement should not be construed as being directed at Russia. Clinton (2004): 235; Edwards (2000): 4.
 - 41 According to figures cited in *World Affairs*, polls on support for NATO membership tend to show 20 per cent less support than that for EU membership.
 - 42 The Norwegian application was defeated in a popular referendum in 1994.
 - 43 Rühle and Williams (1995): 86.
 - 44 European Commission, "Towards a closer association with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe", SEC (92) 2301 final, 2 December 1992, and "Towards a closer association with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe", SEC (93) 698 final, 18 May 1993. See also: European Commission, "Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement", EC Bulletin Supplement 3/92: 11.
 - 45 Presidency Conclusions SN 180/93: 10–15.
 - 46 The Madrid European Council in December revised the membership criteria to include conditions for member-country integration through the appropriate adjustment of its administrative structures, and for Community legislation to be reflected in national legislation and implemented effectively. See: NATO Press Communiqué M-1(97)81, Brussels, NATO, 1997.
 - 47 In June 1995, the Commission issued a White Paper: See: European Commission (1995a). "Preparation of the associated countries of central and eastern Europe for integration into the internal market of the Union", COM(95)163.
 - 48 Bulgarian political scientist Boyko Todorov lamented, "We asked for an affirmation of our European identity and got a check list of technocratic requirements in return."
 - 49 Available online. Chapter 5 of the study indicates that the NATO criteria were less stringent than those of the EU and thus more open to greater political consideration.
 - 50 Howard Wiarda goes so far as to claim that "the processes of the first enlargement to include militarily unprepared countries tended to minimize the strategic purpose in favour of vague and less strict political criteria". Wiarda (2002): 191.
 - 51 Grabbe and Hughes (1998). Apparently this sentiment was shared among the applicants. When Helmut Kohl had suggested such a connection in a speech in Warsaw in 1995, it sparked fears that the one might be used to postpone the other indefinitely. See: *International Herald Tribune*, 9 September 1995.
 - 52 The Commission's 1994 strategy paper: "The Europe Agreements and Beyond" COM (94), 320, Brussels: 2–3.
 - 53 See: "Partnership for peace invitation". Press communiqué M-1(94)2, Brussels, NATO, 11 January 1994.
 - 54 The decision to enlarge is elegantly recounted in Goldgeier's book.

- Goldgeier, J. M. (1999). *Not Whether but When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO*. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press: 155.
- 55 Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, North Atlantic Council, 11 January 1994, Para. IV.
- 56 NATO Press Release 034. North Atlantic Council (NAC), Berlin, 3–4 July 1996.
- 57 The June 1994 declaration has been portrayed as somewhat of a diplomatic “coup” on behalf of the Greek Presidency. According to EU lore the proposal was apparently stealthily introduced to the weary European leaders during a late-night session.
- 58 See Missiroli, A. Ed. (2002a). *Bigger EU, wider CFSP, stronger ESDP? The view from Central Europe*, an occasional paper of the European Union Institute for Security Studies, No. 34, April.
- 59 Longhurst, K. and Zaborowski, M. (2007) *The New Atlanticist: Poland’s Foreign and Security Priorities*. London, Blackwell Publishers: 34.
- 60 This was a controversial decision. The Commission voted on three options: opening negotiations with all applicants, with Visegrad, or with Visegrad plus Estonia and Slovenia. Washington had signalled strong support for Estonian membership since NATO expansion was seen as being too provocative to Russia. This was the option chosen – against the opinion of the Commission President.
- 61 Achcar, G. (2003). “Auxiliary Americans: Washington watches over EU and NATO expansion” *Le Monde diplomatique*, English ed., January.
- 62 Wiarda (2002): 194.
- 63 Smith and Timmins (2000b): 40, 42, 49, 172.
- 64 Schimmelfennig (2003): 237.
- 65 Ibid.: 43.
- 66 Smith, K. E. (2004): 177.
- 67 The topic figured prominently on the agenda at the US–Russian Summit in Helsinki (20–21 March 1997) where President Yeltsin’s attempts to stop NATO enlargement ended with him and Clinton agreeing to differ. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 21 March 1997. See: Bildt, C. (1993). “Watch Russia’s ‘Baltic near Abroad’” *International Herald Tribune*, 27 July.
- 68 Communiqué: M-1(97)81, NATO Summit, 8 July 1997, Madrid, Spain.
- 69 Madeleine Albright’s remarks to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US State Department, 21 October 1997.
- 70 The Baltic Charter, 16 January 1998, Washington, DC, US State Department. Available online.
- 71 Wallace (2000): 476. Turkey became a full member of NATO in 1952, but the country did not enter the Alliance as a European state. In Article 6 of the 1949 Atlantic Charter, Turkey is listed alongside French Algeria as one of the territories “in addition to” North America and Europe.
- 72 According to Heather Grabbe, the Swedish EU Presidency at the 2001 Göteborg Summit had to overcome German and French opposition to setting 2004 as a target date. Grabbe, H. (2001). “Profiting from EU Enlargement” *Centre for European Reform*. London: 10.
- 73 The White Paper setting out the pre-accession strategy was accepted at the Cannes European Council in June 1995. For Presidency Conclusions relating to enlargement 1993–2002, see: European Council (1995). Presidency Conclusions, SN 211/95, Cannes, 26 and 27 June.
- 74 See: 2002 Copenhagen Presidency Conclusions.
- 75 Smith, K. E. (2004): 186.
- 76 Report to the Congress on the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty

- Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications, US State Department.
- 77 The craftiness displayed by Washington in getting other states to bankroll the 1991 Iraq war in such a way that the US made a profit and took, as one might expect, most of the credit for the victory, was a lesson that played a part, not only in Germany and France, but also in Britain's viewing the American overtures with suspicion.
 - 78 Speech, Bulgarian Foreign Minister, Salomon Passy, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Sofia, 28 May 2002.
 - 79 Duke, S. (1997). "NATO and the CFSP: Help or Hindrance" *NATO Research Fellowship Programme, Budapest*: 41.
 - 80 According to one estimate made before NATO's Prague Summit, the new members would add 35 per cent territory but only 2.5 per cent more to the NATO budget. See: *SIPRI Yearbook 2003*: 61.
 - 81 "Armaments, Disarmament and International Security", *SIPRI Yearbook 1996*. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 133–134.
 - 82 Press Communiqué, NAC, Brussels, NATO HQ, NAC 2(97)155.
 - 83 Serfaty, S. (1997). *The Logic of Dual Enlargement*. NATO enlargement: the national debates over ratification, NATO Press Office, 7 October, available online.
 - 84 Source: G-24 Scoreboard, 9 September 1997.
 - 85 European Commission, Agenda 2000, COM (97) 2000, 15 July 1997 and European Council, Helsinki, 10–11 December 1999, Presidency Conclusions, Press release no. 400/1/00.
 - 86 See: Caparini, M. (2003). *SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 237.
 - 87 Ibid.: 239.
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- 101 The Defence Capability Initiative (DCI) was finally launched on the 50th Anniversary Summit of NATO in Washington in 1999.
- 102 As illustrated by the June 1996 French announcement that it was planning to reintegrate with NATO.
- 103 To be rotated among French, Spanish and Italian officers. The initiatives had little hope of success, considering the traditional role of SACEUR as a US military representative in Europe and AFSOUTH's importance to the US's 6th fleet.
- 104 Quoted in Menon, A. (2000). *France, NATO and the Limits of Independence, 1981–97: The Politics of Ambivalence*. London, Macmillan: 136.
- 105 Incoming Assistant Secretary of State, John Bolton, quoted in *The Guardian*, 23 December 2000.
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- 108 Albright, M. (1998). "The right balance will secure NATO's future" *Financial Times*, 8 December. Interviewees concur on the US concerns regarding "the real intentions" of the ESDP.
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- 111 The choice of Berlin as a venue was symbolic. After all, it was here in 1996 that the allies had negotiated the ESDI/DCI/CJTF compromise which, at that time, had mostly resolved the question of post-Cold War power and burden sharing. Menon (2000): 53–55.
- 112 This is what Glen Snyder calls the "secondary alliance dilemma" that occurs after the primary decision to align has been made. Snyder, G. H. (1984). "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics" *World Politics* 36(4): 461–495.
- 113 Ibid.: 466–467.
- 114 Ibid.
- 115 NATO admits new members by consensus as indicated in Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty and is elaborated in the 1995 "Study on NATO Enlargement". See: Chapter 2, paragraph 30.
- 116 *Europe: Magazine of the European Union*, June 1997: 16.
- 117 What is usually referred to as "Berlin Plus" is a "Framework Agreement" between the EU and NATO dated 17 March 2003, which consists essentially of an exchange of letters between the EU High Representative for the CFSP and the Secretary General of NATO. When the WEU was singled out as the security policy wing of the EU in Article J4 of the Treaty on European Union, the strongly worded Article 5 was omitted.
- 118 Article 11(2) of the 1992 Treaty on European Union (TEU) requests that the CFSP be carried out in a spirit of "loyalty and mutual solidarity".
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- 124 See: Johnson, R. T. (1974). *Managing the White House: An intimate Study of the Presidency*. New York, Harper & Row: 2.
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- 128 For instance, a strategy for EU relations with its neighbours is, in some ways, impossible without defining where the EU borders will eventually end. In 2008, the list of hopefuls would take the EU’s membership beyond 40. An agreement on where Europe ends would clearly make it easier to agree and respond to the hopeful applicants.
- 129 Smith and Timmins (2000b): 11.
- 130 Nuttall, S. J. (1996). “The Commission: The Struggle for Legitimacy” in Hill, C. *The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy*. London, Routledge: 142. See also Smith, K. E. (2004): 6–12.
- 131 Smith (2004): 404
- 132 Waltz, K. N. (2000). “NATO Expansion; a Realist’s View” *Contemporary Security Policy* 21(2): 23–38.

5 The Iraq crisis

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- 3 Little, D. (2002). *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945*. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press
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 - 31 Confirmed in interviews. When questioned as to why this had not been done, one NATO Official – after first having noted that Afghanistan was "out of area" for NATO – cited military weakness and memories from the Kosovo war: "They [the Europeans] said that they wanted to help, but all they wished to send was field hospitals. [...] that sort of help we can do without."
 - 32 NATO's role in the conflict was limited to providing five AWACS for the monitoring of US airspace that freed US resources for offensive missions. The Alliance also provided resources for the monitoring of the Horn of Africa. Select allies, notably Great Britain, were invited to participate in "Operation Enduring Freedom" primarily due to their Special Forces capabilities.
 - 33 A Commission official suggested that Prodi's statement was as much a reflection of anger that the fourth European power from the Kosovo "Quint" – his native Italy – had not been invited as a principled opposition to informal foreign policy groupings.
 - 34 Quoted in *The Economist*, 7 May 2004: 14.
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 - 37 Cheney, D. (2002). *Remarks by the Vice President to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention*, Nashville, August. The speech is available in full on the White House website.
 - 38 This will be discussed in greater detail in the following section. Also see: Pond (2005): 40; Shapiro and Gordon (2004): 57.
 - 39 Bob Woodward's widely read book at the time portrayed Mr Cheney as a somewhat less important strategist than his experience and stature would suggest. See: Woodward (2002): 38–39.
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 - 43 United States Department of Defense (DoD), News Transcript, 23 January 2003.
 - 44 Somewhat inappropriately titled "United we stand", the open letter appeared in European and US newspapers on 30 January 2003.
 - 45 See: *Financial Times*, London edition, 28 May: 19.
 - 46 Comments at the end of a summit of EU leaders on Iraq, 17 February 2003. Chirac's bile was apparently triggered by the letter referring to "the compelling evidence" presented by US Foreign Secretary Powell to the UN Secur-

- ity Council of an Iraqi WMD programme – a presentation that was not to take place until the day after the letter had been published.
- 47 Extraordinary European Council, Brussels, Doc 6466/03, 17 February 2003.
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 - 55 US State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher quoted in BBC. See: Boucher, R. (2003). "European press review" *BBC Monitoring*, Wednesday, 30 April, online resource
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 - 57 Press statement, President-in-Office of the Council, Informal General Affairs and External Relations Council, Gymnich, 2–3 May.
 - 58 Elements of the following section draws from Toje, A. (2005b). "The 2003 European Union Security Strategy – a Critical Appraisal" *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10(1): 117–134.
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 - 64 Exchange: Christoph Heusgen, Director of the Policy Unit, EU Council Secretariat General, Brussels, 14 May 2004. As it became clear that the ESS would be a success, there has been a considerable amount of myth-making. Some insiders claim that the idea was the result of a Brussels working lunch between Javier Solana and French, German and British Foreign Ministers. Others claim that the idea should be attributed to Director-General of External and Politico-Military Affairs, Robert Cooper, who is believed to have penned the strategy.
 - 65 "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America", The White House, Washington, DC, September 2002.
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- 69 ESS (2003): 5–6.
- 70 The Thessalonica draft (20 June 2003) of the ESS states: "Taking these different elements together – terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction and the failure of state systems – we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed." In the final version of the ESS, the failed-state aspect is toned down as a likely result of the failure of the US to discover WMD in Iraq.
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- 73 Bilgin, P. and Morton, A. (2004). "From Rogue to Failed States? The Fallacy of Short-termism" *Politics* 24(3): 169–180.
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- 76 Interviews indicate that such priorities do exist but are not made public. Interestingly, these priorities are supposedly derived more from in-house debate and the experience of Mr Solana, than direct input from the member states.
- 77 US Department of State, 20 September 2002.
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- accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in [...] Europe." See: NSS (2002): 6.
- 89 ESS (2003): 11.
- 90 The multilateralism of the ESS serves much the same functions as "freedom" in the NSS, which is mentioned no fewer than 47 times.
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6 Towards a bipolar West

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- 1 Editorial note: The year listed is the year of the edition used. Web links are not spelled out due to the short url-lifespan on the World Wide Web (an average of less than 30 days); instead the website is identified where appropriate.

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